Results for 'Blomberg Olle'

181 found
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  1. Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  2. From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (1):101-124.
    According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the (...)
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  3. Motor Intentions and Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story.Olle Blomberg & Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):137-146.
    According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent's habits and skills. Markos Valaris argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. (...)
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  4.  71
    Joint action without and beyond planning.Olle Blomberg - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account of ‘shared intentional activity’, take joint activity to be the outcome of two or more agents having a ‘shared intention’, where this is a certain pattern of mutually known prior intentions that are directed toward a common goal. With Bratman’s account as a foil, I address two lacunas that are relatively unexplored in the philosophical literature. The first lacuna concerns how to make sense of the apparently joint cooperative activities (...)
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  5. Plikt att kollektivisera?Olle Blomberg & Björn Petersson - 2018 - Tidskrift För Politisk Filosofi 22 (2):36-46.
    En del moraliska dilemman och samhällsproblem uppstår ur många sinsemellan orelaterade individuella handlingar eller underlåtelser, samtidigt som problemen bara kan åtgärdas genom kollektiv handling. Vi kritiserar tre sätt att resonera om ostrukturerade gruppers moraliska plikter och ansvar i sådana situationer. Därefter föreslår vi att intuitionen att en sådan grupp kan ha moraliska plikter och vara ansvarig bäst förklaras med utgångspunkt i att individer åtminstone i småskaliga fall kan identifiera sig med gruppen i en stark mening, och betrakta beslutssituationen ur gruppens (...)
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  6.  71
    What We Ought to Do: The Decisions and Duties of Non-agential Groups.Olle Blomberg - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):101-116.
    In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In "Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals", Stephanie Collins claims that such attributions involve a “category error”. I critically discuss Collins’ argument for this claim and argue that there is a substantive sense in which non-agential groups can have moral duties. A plurality of agents can have a single duty to bring about an outcome by virtue of a capacity of each to practically (...)
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  7.  57
    Team Reasoning, Mode, and Content.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 39-54.
    A “we-intention” is the kind of intention that an individual acts on when participating in joint intentional action. In discussions about what characterises such a we-intention, one fault line concerns whether the “we-ness” is a feature of a we-intention’s mode or content. According to Björn Petersson, it is an agent-perspectival feature of its mode. Petersson argues that content accounts are incompatible with theories of so-called “group identification” and “team reasoning”. Insofar as such group identification and team reasoning are commonplace in (...)
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  8. Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
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  9. We‐Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective Intentionality.Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):183-203.
    According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a "we-experience"—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject "as ours" rather than merely "as my experience" (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti (...)
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  10. How to be morally responsible for another's free intentional action.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (3):545-579.
    I argue that an agent can be morally responsible and fully (but not necessarily solely) blameworthy for another agent’s free intentional action, simply by intentionally creating the conditions for the action in a way that causes it. This means, I argue, that she can be morally responsible for the other’s action in the relevantly same way that she is responsible for her own non-basic actions. Furthermore, it means that socially mediated moral responsibility for intentional action does not require an agent (...)
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  11. Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action.Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
    According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exclusivity constraint, one cannot intend to perform another agent’s action, even if one might be able to intend that she performs it. For example, while one can intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act of leaving. However, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of joint activity requires participants to have intentions-in-action (in John Searle’s (1983) sense) that violate this constraint. I argue (...)
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  12. Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  13. Collective Responsibility and Acting Together.Olle Blomberg & Frank Hindriks - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge.
    What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions (...)
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  14.  44
    Olle Blomberg om Nonideal Social Ontology av Åsa Burman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2024 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 45 (1):59-63.
  15.  53
    Conceptions of Cognition for Cognitive Engineering.Olle Blomberg - 2011 - International Journal of Aviation Psychology 21 (1):85-104.
    Cognitive processes, cognitive psychology tells us, unfold in our heads. In contrast, several approaches in cognitive engineering argue for a shift of unit of analysis from what is going on in the heads of operators to the workings of whole socio-technical systems. This shift is sometimes presented as part of the development of a new understanding of what cognition is and where the boundaries of cognitive systems are. Cognition, it is claimed, is not just situated or embedded, but extended and (...)
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  16. Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body.Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284.
    According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action (...)
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  17. Review of Gerald Lang's Strokes of Luck: A Study in Moral and Political Philosophy[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (5):899-901.
  18.  26
    Review of Sherry Turkle’s Simulation and Its Discontents[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2009 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 13 (47).
  19.  40
    Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (4).
  20.  45
    Cooperative activity, shared intention, and exploitation.Olle Blomberg & Erik Malmqvist - 2024 - Ethics 134 (3):387-401.
    Jules Salomone-Sehr argues that an activity is cooperative if and only if, roughly, it consists of several participants’ actions that are (i) coordinated for a common purpose (ii) in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. He argues that guidance by shared intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation. Thereby, he claims to “topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory." In response, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s account captures another notion of cooperation than the sociopsychological notion shared agency theory (...)
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  21. Disentangling the thick concept argument.Olle Blomberg - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.
    Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, (...)
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  22. Do socio-technical systems cognise?Olle Blomberg - 2009 - Proceedings of the 2nd AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy.
    The view that an agent’s cognitive processes sometimes include proper parts found outside the skin and skull of the agent is gaining increasing acceptance in philosophy of mind. One main empirical touchstone for this so-called active externalism is Edwin Hutchins’ theory of distributed cognition (DCog). However, the connection between DCog and active externalism is far from clear. While active externalism is one component of DCog, the theory also incorporates other related claims, which active externalists may not want to take on (...)
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  23.  42
    Review of Ian Apperly's Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind"[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (13).
  24.  19
    Review of Matthew Hindman’s The Myth of Digital Democracy[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2009 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 13 (31).
  25.  51
    Tuomela on Social Norms and Group-Social Normativity.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 219-241.
    In everyday life, as members of larger or smaller groups, we hold each other accountable with respect to social norms. For this practice to be intelligible, we must arguably by and large be justified in demanding that other group members comply with these norms. Other things being equal, it seems that we have a group membership-based pro tanto reason to comply with the social norms of our group. In this chapter, I examine how such demands and reasons for compliance can (...)
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  26. An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  27. Team reasoning and collective moral obligation.Olle Blomberg & Björn Petersson - forthcoming - Social Theory and Practice.
    We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it does not imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight (...)
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  28.  30
    Review of Gregory Mellema's Complicity and Moral Accountability[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2017 - Journal of Social Ontology 3 (1):139-142.
  29.  71
    Experimental Philosophy, Ethnomethodology, and Intentional Action: A Textual Analysis of the Knobe Effect.Gustav Lymer & Olle Blomberg - 2019 - Human Studies 42 (4):673-694.
    In “Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language” (2003), Joshua Knobe reported an asymmetry in test subjects’ responses to a question about intentionality: subjects are more likely to judge that a side effect of an agent’s intended action is intentional if they think the side effect is morally bad than if they think it is morally good. This result has been taken to suggest that the concept of intentionality is an inherently moral concept. In this paper, we draw attention to (...)
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  30.  71
    Review of Anne Schwenkenbecher's Getting our Act Together: a Theory of Collective Moral Obligations[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):875-877.
  31.  53
    Review of Bryce Huebner's Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2014 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 18 (32).
  32.  72
    Review of Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, edited by Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  33.  88
    Review of Holly Lawford-Smith's Not In Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable For Their States’ Actions?[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):554-557.
  34.  43
    Review of Wolfgang Prinz’s Open Minds: The Social Making of Agency and Intentionality[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2013 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 17 (4).
  35.  67
    Review of Lilian O’Brien’s Philosophy of Action[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (3).
  36.  75
    Review of Kirk Ludwig's From Individual to Plural Agency, Collective Action: Volume 1[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):626-628.
  37. Review of Michael Bratman's Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):346-348.
  38.  39
    Review of Bennett W. Helm's Communities of Respect – Grounding Responsibility, Authority, and Dignity[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):441-443.
  39.  47
    Review of Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
  40. Practical knowledge and acting together.Blomberg Olle - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-111.
    According to one influential philosophical view of human agency, for an agent to perform an action intentionally is essentially for her to manifest a kind of self-knowledge: An agent is intentionally φ-ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that this is what she is doing. I here argue that this self-knowledge view faces serious problems when extended to account for intentional actions performed by several agents together as a result of a joint (...)
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  41. Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg.Kirk Ludwig - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (1):125-146.
    Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (...)
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  42.  33
    Response to Critics.Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):141-157.
    This is a response to the critial comments by Anne Schwenkenbecher, Olle Blomberg, Bill Wringe and Gunnar Björnsson.
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  43.  8
    Intencionalidade coletiva: a linhagem interacionista.Luiz Paulo Da Cas Cichoski - 2023 - Griot 23 (1):144-165.
    Neste artigo pretendo apresentar de forma introdutória o campo de investigação da Intencionalidade Coletiva. Entretanto, optei por concentrar a exposição em um tipo particular de explicação do fenômeno. Na primeira seção, apresento as dificuldades que motivam o desenvolvimento de teorias no campo da Intencionalidade Coletiva dentro da Filosofia da Ação. Na segunda seção, identifico a origem da linhagem teórica tratada com a explicação da noção de intenção compartilhada, uma interligação reflexiva dos estados mentais dos indivíduos envolvidos em uma ação coletiva, (...)
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  44.  79
    Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems for Schroeder.Olle Risberg - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (1):101-107.
    In this article I argue against Schroeder's account of the weight of normative reasons. It is shown that in certain cases an agent may have reasons she cannot know about without them ceasing to be reasons, and also reasons she cannot know about at all. Both possibilities are troubling for Schroeder's view.
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  45. Intelligent design and the NFL theorems.Olle Häggström - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (2):217-230.
    Another look is taken at the model assumptions involved in William Dembski’s (2002a, No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot be Purchased without Intelligence. Roman & Littlefield, Lanham, MA) use of the NFL theorems from optimization theory to disprove the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection, and his argument is shown to be irrelevant to evolutionary biology.
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  46.  77
    Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit.Olle Risberg, Jens Johansson & Erik Carlson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):164-174.
    ABSTRACT Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and well-being levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive accounts of harm (...)
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  47. Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2).
    In this paper I present an account of a distinctive form of ‘practical’ or ‘deliberative’ uncertainty that has been central in debates in both ethics and metaethics. Many writers have assumed that such uncertainty concerns a special normative question, such as what we ought to do ‘all things considered.’ I argue against this assumption and instead endorse an alternative view of such uncertainty, which combines elements of both metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. A notable consequence of this view is that even (...)
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  48. The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):542-559.
    According to many popular views in normative ethics, meta-ethics and axiology, facts about what we ought to do or what is good for us depend on facts about the attitudes that some agent would have in some relevant idealized circumstances. This paper presents an unrecognized structural problem for such views which threatens to be devastating.
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  49. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  50.  17
    Mid-Libertarianism and the Utilitarian Proviso.Olle Torpman - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (4):651-670.
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