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  1.  97
    A Theory of Epistemic Risk.Boris Babic - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):522-550.
    I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy. This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors (...)
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  2.  58
    Approximate Coherentism and Luck.Boris Babic - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent credences. This norm is intended as a generalization of ordinary coherence. I argue that it may be unable to play this role by considering its application under learning experiences. While it is unclear how imperfect agents should revise their beliefs, I suggest a plausible route is through Bayesian updating. However, Bayesian updating can take an incoherent agent from relatively more coherent credences to relatively less coherent credences, depending on the (...)
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  3. Algorithms on Regulatory Lockdown in Medicine.Boris Babic, Sara Gerke, Theodoros Evgeniou & I. Glenn Cohen - 2019 - Science 6470 (366):1202-1204.
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  4. Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk.Zoe Johnson-King & Boris Babic - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
     
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  5.  70
    Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence.Boris Babic, Anil Gaba, Ilia Tsetlin & Robert Winkler - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Many philosophers have argued that statistical evidence regarding group char- acteristics (particularly stereotypical ones) can create normative conflicts between the requirements of epistemic rationality and our moral obligations to each other. In a recent paper, Johnson-King and Babic argue that such conflicts can usually be avoided: what ordinary morality requires, they argue, epistemic rationality permits. In this paper, we show that as data gets large, Johnson-King and Babic’s approach becomes less plausible. More constructively, we build on their project and develop (...)
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  6.  71
    The Need for a System View to Regulate Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning-Based Software as Medical Device.Sara Gerke, Boris Babic, Theodoros Evgeniou & I. Glenn Cohen - 2020 - Nature Digital Medicine 53 (3):1-4.
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