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Brad J. Thompson [7]Brad Thompson [5]Bradley Jon Thompson [1]
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Brad Thompson
Southern Methodist University
  1. Senses for Senses.Brad J. Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.
    If two subjects have phenomenally identical experiences, there is an important sense in which the way the world appears to them is precisely the same. But how are we to understand this notion of 'ways of appearing'? Most philosophers who have acknowledged the existence of phenomenal content have held that the way something appears is simply a matter of the properties something appears to have. On this view, the way something appears is simply the way something appears to be . (...)
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    Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.
    It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to be (...)
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  3. The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad J. Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
    To what extent is the external world the way that it appears to us in perceptual experience? This perennial question in philosophy is no doubt ambiguous in many ways. For example, it might be taken as equivalent to the question of whether or not the external world is the way that it appears to be? This is a question about the epistemology of perception: Are our perceptual experiences by and large veridical representations of the external world? Alternatively, the question might (...)
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  4. Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism.Brad J. Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
    Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content of (...)
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  5. Comments on Ismael's "Double-Mindedness: A Model for a Dual Content Cognitive Architecture?".Brad J. Thompson - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Two general worries are raised for the dual content approach to consciousness as presented by Ismael in.
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  6. Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content.Brad J. Thompson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.
    In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content. It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum - inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience.
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  7. Representationalism and the Argument From Hallucination.Brad J. Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.
    Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism.
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  8. The Nature of Phenomenal Content.Brad Thompson - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Arizona
  9. Representationalism and the Conceivability of Inverted Spectra.Brad J. Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):203-213.
    Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of (...)
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  10. Moral Value, Response-Dependence, and Rigid Designation.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):71-94.
  11.  32
    Bthompso@Smu.Edu.Brad Thompson - unknown
    When I open my eyes and look at a Rubik’s cube, there is something it is like for me visually in looking at it. Various color qualities are presented to me, and they are arranged in a specific pattern. By having an experience with this particular phenomenal character I am also thereby visually representing the world outside my experience as being a certain way. If I experience a blue square to the left of a red square, the world outside my (...)
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  12. Moral Value, Response-Dependence, and Rigid Designation.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):71-94.
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