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Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim
Polonsky Academy, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute
  1.  39
    When Aristotelian Virtuous Agents Acquire the Fine for Themselves, What Are They Acquiring?Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (4):674-692.
    In the Nicomachean Ethics, one of Aristotle’s most frequent characterizations of the virtuous agent is that she acts for the sake of the fine (to kalon). In IX.8, this pursuit of the fine receives a more specific description; virtuous agents maximally assign the fine to themselves. In this paper, I answer the question of how we are to understand the fine as individually and maximally acquirable. I analyze Nicomachean Ethics IX.7, where Aristotle highlights virtuous activity (energeia) as central to the (...)
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  2.  26
    Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics on the Sameness of Friendship and Justice.Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim - forthcoming - Apeiron.
    In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that friendship and justice are the same, apparently flouting the not uncommon contrast between friendship and justice. I start by assessing Aristotle’s principle of equality: friends of equal standing engage in exact reciprocity in goods and friends of unequal standing engage in proportional reciprocity. In a number of ways that have gone unnoticed, the equalization principle is a requirement for understanding the sameness of friendship and justice. Just relations and friendship share the same domain, (...)
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  3.  13
    The Two Categorizations of Goods in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (4):297-315.
    This article resolves some difficulties with Aristotle's discussion of the choice-worthy (haireton). Nicomachean Ethics I posits goods that are choice-worthy for themselves and for something else, but Nicomachean Ethics X appears to present being choice-worthy for itself as mutually exclusive with being choice-worthy for something else; moreover, Nicomachean Ethics X seems to claim that action is choice-worthy for itself and, therefore, not choice-worthy for something else but also seems to claim that action is choice-worthy for something else and, therefore, not (...)
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  4.  30
    Aristotle’s NE Ix 9 on Why the Happy Person Needs Friends.Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim - 2021 - Ancient Philosophy 41 (2):495-518.
    In Nicomachean Ethics ix 9, Aristotle answers the question of why the happy person needs friends. I argue that interpretatively, we must understand ix 9 in instrumental terms. I begin with ix 9’s opening sections, arguing that Aristotle understands the question of why the happy person needs friends, and his answer, in instrumental terms. Aristotle’s first major argument suggests that the instrumental role friends play has to do with one’s own activity, specifically self-contemplation. This argument, however, does not clearly show (...)
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  5.  73
    Is Aristotelian Friendship Disinterested?: Aristotle on Loving the Other for Himself and Wishing Goods for the Other's Sake.Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):32-44.
    It has been not atypical for commentators to argue that Aristotelian friendship features disinterested concern for others, that is, concern for others that is completely independent of one's own happiness. Often, the relevant commentators point to some normative features of Aristotelian friendship, wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the other for herself, where these are assumed to be disinterested. While the disinterested interpretations may be correct overall, I argue that wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the (...)
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