This guide is intended to be a comprehensive survey of Dewey's work. It consists of ten essays by Dewey scholars surveying an area of Dewey's work. Each essay is followed by a checklist of articles and books. The topics include divisions such as Dewey's Psychology, Philosophy and Philosophic Method, Logic and Theory of Knowledge, Ethics, etc. Contributors include Schneider, Hahn, Kennedy, Rucker, Leys, among others. Despite the enormous amount of work that must have gone into producing (...) this volume, its value is questionable. One reason for this is that Dewey's thought does not lend itself into such convenient divisions--it is difficult to think of a standard "topic" that isn't intertwined with some other. The novice may be bewildered by the rapid surveys and checklists. And scholars of Dewey and American philosophy may detect other groupings which they consider more illuminating. Although one can appreciate the desire not to reproduce the type of bibliography prepared by M. H. Thomas, a complete annotated bibliography would have been a much more helpful guide than the present one. Nevertheless the present guide does help the novice and the scholar to see important connections among the more than thousand items that make up the Dewey corpus.--R. J. B. (shrink)
In this comprehensive exposition and defense of Dewey, Geiger uncovers a number of prevailing misinterpretations of Dewey's philosophy. He carefully distinguishes what Dewey believed from the myth which has developed around his name. Geiger also discusses the importance of the esthetic aspect of Dewey's theory of experience.--R. J. B.
Eliot wrote this book as his Ph.D. dissertation in 1916, and has allowed it to be published "as a curiosity of biographical interest." It is not difficult to move from his insistence in the thesis on the continuity of ideality and reality, of word and object, to his poetry and criticism. Precisely because of this insistence, Eliot's thesis is of more than merely biographical interest. As a work in philosophy it has a strikingly contemporary ring. E.g., "Without words, no objects". (...) Eliot was fundamentally sympathetic to Bradley's thought, but he was also open to the criticisms of Meinong and Russell, both of whom are discussed at length. The result is a kind of via media between idealism and realism, a very contemporary concern. Two 1916 essays on Leibniz are appended.—R. J. W. (shrink)
Thomas, who started working on Dewey bibliography in 1926, has completely revised his 1939 edition. Many features, including a list of writings on Dewey which contains unpublished dissertations and masters' theses, reviews of Dewey's works, and translations, help to make this a definitive bibliography. Considering the chaotic state of Dewey's writings, Thomas is to be congratulated for his extreme care, and the publisher is to be thanked for this fine edition.--R. J. B.
The forty items in this volume also include an analysis of Thomas Hobbe's philosophy; an affectionate commemorative tribute to Theodore Roosevelt, our Teddy; the syllabus for Dewey's lectures at the Imperial University in Tokyo, which were ...
Collections demand great care. In any attempt to select, sift, and/or package the literary efforts of a major literary figure, whatever is included will be debated and found wanting. For example, what short stories of Ernest Hemingway or sonnets of William Shakespeare or pithy comments of Winston Churchill would make up a selected collection? The choices and possibilities are numerous, and the possible repercussions mind bending. Arguments are sure to ensue, and even like-minded advocates will fiercely debate the inclusion or (...) exclusion of a specific work.Renowned French mathematician Jules Henri Poincare mused to colleague Lord Bertrand Russell that “Science is built up with facts, as a house is with stones. But a... (shrink)
First published in 1899, The School and Society describes John Dewey’s experiences with his own famous Laboratory School, started in 1896. Dewey’s experiments at the Laboratory School reflected his original social and educational philosophy based on American experience and concepts of democracy, not on European education models then in vogue. This forerunner of the major works shows Dewey’s pervasive concern with the need for a rich, dynamic, and viable society. In his introduction to this volume, Joe R. (...) Burnett states Dewey’s theme. Industrialization, urbanization, science, and technology have created a revolution the schools cannot ignore. Dewey carries this theme through eight chapters: The School and Social Progress; The School and the Life of the Child; Waste in Education; Three Years of the University Elementary School; The Psychology of Elementary Education; Froebel’s Educational Principles; The Psychology of Occupations; and the Development of Attention. (shrink)
The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis (...) of the indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)
Volume 4 of’ “The Early Works” series covers the period of Dewey’s last year and one-half at the University of Michigan and his first half-year at the University of Chicago. In addition to sixteen articles the present volume contains Dewey’s reviews of six books and three articles, verbatim reports of three oral statements made by Dewey, and a full-length book, The Study of Ethics. Like its predecessors in this series, this volume presents a “clear text,” free of (...) interpretive or reference material. Apparatus, including references, corrections, and emendations, is confined to appendix material. Fredson Bowers, the Consulting Textual Editor, has provided an essay on the textual principles and procedures, and Wayne A. R. Leys, Professor of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University, has written an Introduction discussing the relationship between Dewey’s writings of this period and his later work. That Dewey’s scholarship and writing was at an especially high level during 1893 and 1894 may be considered an index to the significance of this two-year period. (shrink)
This work combines two early pamphlets by F. H. Bradley , the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist movement. The first essay, published in 1874, deals with the nature of professional history, and foreshadows some of Bradley's later ideas in metaphysics. He argues that history cannot be subjected to scientific scrutiny because it is not directly available to the senses, meaning that all history writing is inevitably subjective. Though not widely discussed at the time of publication, the pamphlet (...) was influential on historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood. The second pamphlet is Bradley's critique of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick was the first to propose the paradox of hedonism, which is the idea in ethics that pleasure can only be acquired indirectly. Published in 1877, this work is divided into three parts, treating Sidgwick's definitions, arguments, and his view of ethical science. (shrink)
The author interprets those facets of major American thinkers which resemble, lead to, or complement the insights of Zen; and if a pedantic scholar might quarrel with some of his readings, his own intention and insights are refreshing and provocative. Beginning with Jefferson, and passing through Thoreau, James, Peirce, Santayana, Dewey, and others, he traces the Zen-like themes to their most complete expression in G. M. Mead. In - their regard for non-dualism, participation, responsibility, dynamism, openness, concern for the (...) "everyday," compassion, zest, and being-at-one with self, others, and nature, Ames finds that Zen and American thought meet, and suggests that their differences can be mutually fertilizing. This gentle book is a success in a field too often plagued by non-conformist and cultish postures. --R. C. D. (shrink)
This work combines two early pamphlets by F. H. Bradley, the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist movement. The first essay, published in 1874, deals with the nature of professional history, and foreshadows some of Bradley's later ideas in metaphysics. He argues that history cannot be subjected to scientific scrutiny because it is not directly available to the senses, meaning that all history writing is inevitably subjective. Though not widely discussed at the time of publication, the pamphlet was (...) influential on historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood. The second pamphlet is Bradley's critique of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick was the first to propose the paradox of hedonism, which is the idea in ethics that pleasure can only be acquired indirectly. Published in 1877, this work is divided into three parts, treating Sidgwick's definitions, arguments, and his view of ethical science. (shrink)
This book makes two principal claims: that Mead is misinterpreted by being aligned with Dewey, and that Mead's influence upon sociology has been exaggerated and misinterpreted. The latter claim is argued for on the basis of student reminiscences and citation counts, and seems plausible. The former rests upon a recategorization of Mead and Peirce as "realistic" pragmatists, and of James and Dewey as "nominalistic" ones, and also upon the claim that Dewey's thought was "biologistic" rather than "social." (...) Both of these premises are rather dubious. Lewis and Smith accept Peirce's account of the nature and significance of scholastic realism quite uncritically, and then use the Peircian notion of "the reality of thirdness" as a bridge of Mead's notion of symbol systems. The similarities between Mead and Dewey are downplayed wherever possible--e.g., by interpreting the Meadlike passages in Experience and Nature as unconscious plagiarism from Mead. The tone of the book is suggested by the following passage: "... the problem was a deep-rooted incommensurability between the James-Darwin biologistic philosophy and the social realism of Peirce and Mead. Perhaps it was due to his Hegelian heritage that Dewey had a tolerance for asserting essentially incompatible ideas". Those who see Dewey as offering a plausible synthesis of the biological and the social will find Lewis and Smith's treatment of Dewey cavalier. However, those who see Peirce's discussion of signs as the high point of pragmatism may find their treatment of American philosophy sympathetic.--R.R. (shrink)
This is an anthology with a thesis. For Mrs. Rorty is not only concerned to present us with selections from the "classical" American pragmatists, but to show us how pragmatic themes pervade many aspects of contemporary philosophy. Part One contains ample selections from Peirce, James and Dewey. Part Two consists of some of the criticisms of pragmatism by Russell, Moore and Lovejoy. Part Three is the most interesting and original section. By judiciously selecting papers from a variety of contemporary (...) philosophers, many of whom would probably not think of themselves as pragmatists she shows us how alive pragmatic philosophy is today. There is an excellent bibliography and fine short introductions. Altogether the anthology presents an imaginative perspective on pragmatic philosophy.—R. J. B. (shrink)
We frequently think of American pragmatism as consisting of the philosophies of Peirce, James, and Dewey. But this picture of pragmatism distorts the actual historical development of this loosely associated movement. As Rucker notes and convincingly shows, it was at the University of Chicago that a truly co-operative movement among pragmatically inclined thinkers evolved. It is the story of this movement that he tells in this book. It is a movement very much involved in the history of the University (...) of Chicago, especially during the period when it was lead William Rainey Harper. Rucker describes for us how the various individuals that make up the Chicago School--including Dewey, Mead, Tufts, Angell--came to Chicago, what were their distinctive contributions, and how they exerted an enormous intellectual influence both on their students and their colleagues, especially those in the social sciences. Rucker not only presents us with a fine intellectual history of the Chicago School from 1895 until 1930, but portrays the school as a paradigm of the spirit of cooperative inquiry which was so central to the deepest convictions of the pragmatists.--R. J. B. (shrink)
A restatement of Thomistic educational philosophy designed to counter "progressive education." The author's polemical intentions color his entire study: Not only is Dewey treated unsympathetically, but elements in St. Thomas' thought with which Dewey would have agreed are de-emphasized.—R. J. W.
Pragmatism is interpreted broadly to permit selections from Emerson, James, Peirce, Holmes, Dewey, Mead, Bridgman, Lewis, Kallen, and Hook. A short introduction and bibliography is supplied for each author.--R. J. B.
Throughout his life, Dewey emphasized the importance of developmental categories. The question naturally arises, what were Dewey's philosophic beginnings? Traditionally, this has been answered by saying that Dewey started as a Hegelian. But the truth is that Dewey did not start his philosophic career as a Hegelian. This fine edition of Dewey's earliest papers and his book on Leibniz provides the reader with an excellent opportunity to study Dewey's first attempts in philosophy. We find (...)Dewey beginning his philosophic career with discussions of materialism, Spinoza, Kant, and Leibniz. We see Dewey's early interest in education, the social sciences, and especially the "new psychology." There are reflections on religion and ethics, and the concern to make philosophy relevant to the practical affairs of men. Indeed one can see here the origins of many of Dewey's later leading ideas such as the importance of the category of the organic for philosophic analysis. Although this is Volume I in the projected first phase of the collected works of Dewey, it is actually the second volume to appear in the series. The same high level of textual analysis is employed here. There is a clear statement of the textual principles used, a helpful introduction to these papers by Lewis E. Hahn, an illuminating note on the texts by Jo Ann Boydston which helps provide the setting for each paper, and the full critical apparatus demanded by textual criticism. This is clearly a definitive critical text. All scholars and students of American philosophy must be grateful for the high standards already achieved by "Dewey Project" of Southern Illinois University.--R. J. B. (shrink)
The author is concerned with resurrecting the political doctrines which supported the Greek democracies. He finds them in the Greek anthropologists, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, and Democritus, and in Protagoras and Antiphon. Their empirical approach to history produced a body of thought suggestive of Hume and Dewey which was both democratic in character and liberal in temper. Furthermore, this position was until now obscured by the Platonic and Aristotelian concern with authority and law and with the essential nature of the (...) individual--the source of later "inalienable rights" doctrines.--R. P. (shrink)
Chronologically ordered readings varying in length from a high of sixty-two pages from J. S. Mill to a low of twenty-two pages from Brentano, with most of the other eleven philosophers included having between thirty-five and forty-five pages each. Comte, Spencer, and Mach are mild surprises whose presence is explained over that of, say, Marx, by the editor's desire to emphasize epistemological, metaphysical, and methodological themes. The bibliographies accompanying the selections are "non-selective"; sometimes they appear positively random. The general introduction (...) is too brief to be of any real use but one can sympathize with the fact that the editor had to say something by way of introduction. In addition to the philosophers mentioned above, selections from Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Peirce, Bradley, and Frege are included.—E. A. R. (shrink)
This seventh John Dewey Lecture brings together the existentialist concern for "the meaning of life" with the analytical interest in precision in linguistic meanings. The treatment is provocative, though schematic. A brief analysis of "the meaning of life" is given, and then applied to education with considerable insight.—R. J. W.
A collection of Lovejoy's essays written during the first quarter of the century dealing mainly with issues in James and Dewey--there is hardly any mention of Peirce. A charming sketch of James as a philosopher is included. Throughout Lovejoy writes with wit and urbanity. But the dominant impression is one of reading a period piece rather than participating in living philosophic inquiry.--R. J. B.
Blanshard analyzes and criticizes contemporary ethical theories including those of Moore and Ross, Perry, Dewey, the emotivists, and recent linguistic philosophers. Goodness can be understood only against the background of human life, and has the dual character of satisfaction and fulfillment. There are many kinds of intrinsic goods, but Reason threads its way throughout, arbitrating claims upon our attention and seeking out the type of life which is most satisfying and fulfilling. Written in Blanshard's distinctively urbane style, this book (...) balances synoptic vision with systematic analysis.--R. C. N. (shrink)
A companion volume to the one above in which the only deviation from the format of the previous volume is the inclusion of four school rather than individual-chronological headings. The school headings are "American Realism," "Logical Positivism," "Existentialism," and "Ordinary Language Analysis." The individual philosophers included are James, Bergson, Lenin, Husserl, Santayana, Dewey, Whitehead, Moore, and Russell. In all other respects Volume II is like Volume I.—E. A. R.
Develops an account of man's contemporary situation based on Ortega's view that "human life is radical reality." In an effort to avoid "the absolutism of the intellect," the author uses "the method of vital reason," presenting a philosophical anthropology which insists that a man's thought and action have meaning only when seen in the light of his historical situation. Although its basic approach is by now familiar, and despite its non-systematic character, the book is suggestive and rich in insight; it (...) makes an original contribution in consciously attempting to avoid the pitfalls of extreme subjectivism by developing a view strongly reminiscent of Dewey's theory of "transactions."--R. R. (shrink)
It is sometimes shocking to realize that despite the flood of monographs and books on minor figures in American intellectual history, no full-length biographies have been published of such major American philosophers as Peirce, Royce and Dewey. Of the three, we perhaps know least about Royce. Yet Royce who was born in California when it was still a frontier and became the leading idealist philosopher in America provides a fascinating chapter in American intellectual life during the latter part of (...) the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. These letters which cover the period from 1875 until 1916 not only help tell the story of Royce's life but also of what American intellectual life was like during this creative period. Unlike James and Peirce who used their letters to expound and develop their philosophic ideas and to criticize the views of others, we learn much less about Royce's philosophy from these letters. They do help to create a vivid portrait of his many faceted personality. Clendenning's introduction helps to present the essentials of Royce's life and thereby places these letters in their historical context.--R. J. B. (shrink)
The essays collected in this volume to honor Ernest Nagel reflect his wide interest in all topics relating philosophy to the natural and social sciences. The essays, written by distinguished philosophers and scientists form a mixed bag, but most of them are very good. The first part, "Science and Inquiry" begins with notes taken by Patrick Suppes of Nagel's lectures on Dewey's logic delivered in 1947. It follows with essays on knowledge by Stuart Hampshire, on intensions and the law (...) of inverse variation by R. M. Martin, and four essays on problems of induction and confirmation which contribute markedly to this well-worn field. The eleven essays of the second part, "Structure of Science" range from discussions of physics and ontology, mechanism and evolution to essays on functionalism in anthropology and ethics and legal theory. In between there are very good essays by C. Hempel on reduction, S. Morgenbesser on the realist-instrumentalist controversy, essays on the identity thesis, extensive measurement, causation and action, philosophy of language, and the differences between the natural and social sciences. Part three contains six essays on the role of values in various settings, e.g., ethical theory, the social sciences, legal theory and existentialism. The fourth and final part contains a variety of historical studies: Clagett on the quadrature of lunes in medieval science, I. Bernard Cohen on Newton, A. Koslow on the law of inertia, Charles Parsons on Kant's philosophy of arithmetic, Philip Wiener on a Soviet view of Peirce's pragmatism and S. Diamond on John D. Rockefeller and the historians.--R. H. K. (shrink)
Writing from a liberal Marxist point of view, Schaff admits that Marxists have failed, thus far, to face the challenges of contemporary scientific semantics. He explores a wide spectrum of problems concerning the philosophy of language and exhibits a sophisticated knowledge of the works of Husserl, Peirce, Russell, Wittgenstein, Dewey and others. His approach is dialectical in so far as he attempts to reach his own position through the criticism of others. Nevertheless, his criticism is too frequently extremely superficial. (...) Though much of what Schaff says concerning the social context of human communication is only programmatic, the striking feature of this study is not the differences but the similarities of his Marxist approach and the results of recent non-Marxist investigations of semantics.--R. J. B. (shrink)
Eliot once wrote a doctoral dissertation on F. H. Bradley. This book attempts to use the philosophy to gain insight into the early poetry and criticism, and uses the conjunction of these to interpret Eliot's artistic and intellectual development. The resulting theory is applied in an extended discussion of Burnt Norton. This three-pronged approach to Eliot is fruitful; it would have been better had it not slighted the theological dimension of his poetry.--R. J. W.
An anthology of essays by Aristotle, Mill, Carroll, Dewey, Russell, Veatch and Ryle, with a brief background statement on each author. Most of the essays are concerned with the relationship of logic to philosophy.--R. J. W.
The editorial board of the co-operative Research on Dewey Publications Project at Southern Illinois University should be cheered for this magnificent edition of Dewey's Psychology. Anyone who has attempted to do serious scholarly work on Dewey knows the present chaos existing among his published works. We have needed a careful edition of Dewey's collected works. But the project at Southern Illinois is attempting to do much more—to provide definitive critical editions of Dewey's works. Without being (...) pedantic, the editorial board has made an intelligent use of the best modern scholarly techniques. The result is an invaluable edition of the Psychology for the scholar, and a very readable text for the curious. It is now possible to locate at a glance the various works that Dewey cites in his study, and to discover the ways in which Dewey altered his text in the course of its twenty-six printings. As for the Psychology itself—Dewey's first book—one is struck again by its oldness and newness. It is at once bound by the tradition of psychology textbooks of the time and breaks out of these bounds with fresh ideas that were destined to form the basis for Dewey's mature philosophic outlook. The care, intelligence, and taste used in designing this definitive edition ought to serve as a model for modern editions of philosophical texts.—R. J. B. (shrink)