Results for 'Brain in a Vat'

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  1. Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain in a Vat?Ned Markosian - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):161-181.
    The topic of this paper is the familiar problem of skepticism about the external world. How can you know that you are not a brain in a vat being fooled byalien scientists? And if you can't know that, how can you know anything about the external world? The paper assumes Evidentialism as a theory about justification, and then argues that you are justified in believing that you are not a brain in a vat, in virtue of the fact (...)
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  2.  43
    Brain in a Vat or Body in a World? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience.Evan Thompson & Diego Cosmelli - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):163-180.
    We argue that the minimal biological requirements for consciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull. Our argument proceeds by reconsidering the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. Careful examination of this thought experiment indicates that the null hypothesis is that any adequately functional “vat” would be a surrogate body, that is, that the so-called vat would be no vat at all, but rather an embodied agent in the world. Thus, what the thought experiment actually shows is that (...)
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  3.  64
    Brains in a vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
    In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...)
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  4. Brains in a Vat.Hilary Putnam - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  5. Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:313-345.
    This paper evaluates Putnam’s argument in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History, for the claim that we can know that we are not brains in a vat (of a certain sort). A widespread response to Putnam’s argument has been that if it were successful not only the world but the meanings of our words (and consequently our thoughts) would be beyond the pale of knowledge, because a causal theory of reference is not compatible with our having knowledge of (...)
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  6.  54
    Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):397-413.
    The brain-in-a-vat argument for skepticism is best formulated, not using the closure principle, but using the “Preference Principle,” which states that in order to be justified in believing H on the basis of E, one must have grounds for preferring H over each alternative explanation of E. When the argument is formulated this way, Dretske’s and Klein’s responses to it fail. However, the strengthened argument can be refuted using a direct realist account of perception. For the direct realist, refuting (...)
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  7. The Brain in a Vat.Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.) - 2015 - United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
    The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse range of philosophical issues, from (...)
     
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  8. Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Brain in a Vat, Five-Minute Hypothesis, McTaggart’s Paradox, etc. Are Clarified in Quantum Language [Revised version].Shiro Ishikawa - 2018 - Open Journal of Philosophy 8 (5):466-480.
    Recently we proposed "quantum language" (or, the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics"), which was not only characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics but also the linguistic turn of Descartes=Kant epistemology. We believe that quantum language is the language to describe science, which is the final goal of dualistic idealism. Hence there is a reason to want to clarify, from the quantum linguistic point of view, the following problems: "brain in a vat argument", "the Cogito (...)
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  9.  30
    Brains in a Vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
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  10. A brain in a vat cannot break out: why the singularity must be extended, embedded and embodied.Francis Heylighen & Center Leo Apostel Ecco - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1-2):126-142.
    The present paper criticizes Chalmers's discussion of the Singularity, viewed as the emergence of a superhuman intelligence via the self-amplifying development of artificial intelligence. The situated and embodied view of cognition rejects the notion that intelligence could arise in a closed 'brain-in-a-vat' system, because intelligence is rooted in a high-bandwidth, sensory-motor interaction with the outside world. Instead, it is proposed that superhuman intelligence can emerge only in a distributed fashion, in the form of a self-organizing network of humans, computers, (...)
     
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  11.  43
    Direct realism and the brain-in-a-vat argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):397-413.
    The brain-in-a-vat argument for skepticism is best formulated, not using the closure principle, but using the “Preference Principle,” which states that in order to be justified in believing H on the basis of E, one must have grounds for preferring H over each alternative explanation of E. When the argument is formulated this way, Dretske’s and Klein’s responses to it fail. However, the strengthened argument can be refuted using a direct realist account of perception. For the direct realist, refuting (...)
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  12.  9
    Re: Brains in a vat.Stephen Hetherington - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (4):307–312.
    The hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is one which we believe to be false. Could it possibly be true, however? Metaphysical realists accept that our believing it to be false does not entail its falsity. They also accept that if –as brains in a vat –we were to say or think “We are brains in a vat”, then we would be correct. Ever the claimed foe of the metaphysical realist, though, Hilary Putnam argues that the brains‐in‐a‐vat hypothesis (...)
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    Re: Brains in a Vat.Stephen Hetherington - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (4):307-312.
    The hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is one which we believe to be false. Could it possibly be true, however? Metaphysical realists accept that our believing it to be false does not entail its falsity. They also accept that if –as brains in a vat –we were to say or think “We are brains in a vat”, then we would be correct. Ever the claimed foe of the metaphysical realist, though, Hilary Putnam argues that the brains‐in‐a‐vat hypothesis (...)
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  14. Brains in a VAT and memory: How (not) to respond to Putnam's argument.Tim Kraft - 2020 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (33):39-53.
    Putnam's argument that we are not brains in a VAT has recently seen a resurgence in interest. Although objections to it are legion, an emerging consensus seems to be that even if it successfully refutes one version of the brain in a VAT scenario, lifelong envatment, it is powerless against a different one, recent envatment. Although initially appealing, I argue in this paper that this response-merely replacing lifelong envatment by recent envatment-is a bad response to Putnam's argument. Yet there (...)
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  15.  19
    Brain-in-a-vat Experience.Giorgio Sbardolini - 2011 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2 (2):189-190.
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  16.  17
    Could We Be Brains in a Vat?Peter Smith - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):115-123.
    The course of my experience is quite consistent with the hypothesis that it is being produced by a mad scientist who is feeding into my sensory receptors entirely delusive stimuli. Indeed, I could at this very moment be nothing more than a brain floating in a vat of nutrients, my nerve ends linked up to some infernal apparatus by means of which my unknown deceiver induces in me utterly erroneous beliefs about the world.So begins a familiar line of thought (...)
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  17.  13
    Brains in a vat, language and metalanguage.Roberto Casati & Alonso Church - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):91-93.
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  18. Brains in a Vat.Hilary Putnam - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.
     
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  19. Serious theories and skeptical theories: Why you are probably not a brain in a vat.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1031-1052.
    Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayesian grounds, the scenario is not well supported by the evidence. By contrast, serious theories make reasonably specific predictions about the evidence and are then well supported when these predictions are satisfied.
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  20. The “brain in a vat” argument.Lance P. Hickey - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  21.  5
    The brain in a vat in cyberpunk: the persistence of the flesh.Dani Cavallaro - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):287-305.
    This essay argues that the image of the brain in a vat metaphorically encapsulates articulations of the relationship between the corporeal and the technological dimensions found in cyberpunk fiction and cinema. Cyberpunk is concurrently concerned with actual and imaginary metamorphoses of biological organisms into machines, and of mechanical apparatuses into living entities. Its recurring representation of human beings hooked up to digital matrices vividly recalls the envatted brain activated by electric stimuli, which Hilary Putnam has theorized in the (...)
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  22. Brains in a vat: whose brains? which vat?: skeptical thoughts on reference and knowledge.Eric Reeves - 2001 - Northampton, Massachusetts: Pyrrhonist Press. Edited by Barbara B. Blumenthal, Michael Russem, Michael Bixler, Winifred Bixler & Harold Skulsky.
     
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  23.  16
    Could We Be Brains in a Vat?Peter Smith - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):115--23.
    The course of my experience is quite consistent with the hypothesis that it is being produced by a mad scientist who is feeding into my sensory receptors entirely delusive stimuli. Indeed, I could at this very moment be nothing more than a brain floating in a vat of nutrients, my nerve ends linked up to some infernal apparatus by means of which my unknown deceiver induces in me utterly erroneous beliefs about the world.So begins a familiar line of thought (...)
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  24.  24
    How you know you are not a brain in a vat.Alexander Jackson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2799-2822.
    A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat ; but she doesn’t panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not inferentially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that ‘Moorean’ response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological literature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that’s plausibly responsible for a (...)
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  25.  22
    The brain in a vat in cyberpunk: the persistence of the flesh.Dani Cavallaro - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):287-305.
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  26. I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.
    Epistemic externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual-world agent and their brain-in-a-vat counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her biv counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words, only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this (...)
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  27.  64
    The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg.Cameron Boult - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):75-82.
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  28.  96
    Are We Brains in a Vat? Top Philosopher Says No.John Heil - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):427-436.
    In Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam addresses the notion that we might all be brains in a vat in a way that has been widely discussed.1 What follows is an attempt to get dear on Putnam's argument, more particularly, to determine how exactly that argument goes and what precisely it is supposed to establish. Putnam's presentation is not unambiguous on either count, nor is it always as dear as one might have wished.
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  29.  15
    Brains in a vat: Different perspectives.Yuval Steinitz - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):213-222.
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  30.  21
    Could a Brain in a Vat Self‐Refer?Rory Madden - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):74-93.
    : Radical sceptical possibilities challenge the anti-realist view that truth consists in ideal rational acceptability. Putnam, as part of his defence of an anti-realist view, subjected the case of the brain in a vat to a semantic externalist treatment, which aimed to maintain the desired connection between truth and ideal rational acceptability. It is argued here that self-consciousness poses special problems for this externalist strategy. It is shown how, on a standard model of first-person reference, Putnam's brain in (...)
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  31. Putnam’s Argument that the Claim that We are Brains-in-a-vat is Self-Refuting.Richard McDonough - 2018 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 10 (1):149-159.
    In Reason, Truth and History, Putnam provides an influential argument for the materialist view that the supposition that we are all “actually” brains in a vat [BIV’s] is “necessarily false”. Putnam admits that his argument, inspired by insights in Wittgenstein’s later views, is “unusual”, but he is certain that it is a correct. He argues that the claim that we are BIV’s is self-refuting because, if we actually are BIV’s, then we cannot refer to real physical things like vats. Although (...)
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  32.  13
    Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  33. Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited.Graeme Forbes - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  34.  21
    If I am a brain in a vat, then I am not a brain in a vat.Anthony Brueckner - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):123-128.
    Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty.
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  35.  18
    Neither mentioning 'brains in a vat' nor mentioning brains in a vat will prove that we are not brains in a vat.Marian David - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896.
    In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in (...)
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  36. Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited.Graeme Forbes - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):205-222.
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  37.  21
    Brains in a Vat, Language and Metalanguage.Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):91 - 93.
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  38.  10
    Brain in a Vat.John Pollock - 2009 - In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 17--19.
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  39. How I Know I'm Not a Brain in a Vat.José L. Zalabardo - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:65-88.
    I use some ideas of Keith DeRose's to develop an (invariantist!) account of why sceptical reasoning doesn't show that I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat. I argue that knowledge is subject to the risk-of-error constraint: a true belief won’t have the status of knowledge if there is a substantial risk of the belief being in error that hasn’t been brought under control. When a substantial risk of error is present (i.e. beliefs in propositions that (...)
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  40. Are We Brains in a Vat? Top Philosopher Says, "No"!John Heil - 2003 - In Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  41. On Being a Lonely Brain-in-a-Vat: Structuralism, Solipsism, and the Threat from External World Skepticism.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    David Chalmers has recently developed a novel strategy of refuting external world skepticism, one he dubs the structuralist solution. In this paper, I make three primary claims: First, structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, even if it is combined with a functionalist approach to the metaphysics of minds. Second, because structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, the structuralist solution vindicates far less worldly knowledge than we would hope for from a solution to skepticism. Third, these results (...)
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  42.  11
    A Moorean response to brain-in-a-vat scepticism.T. Black - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):148 – 163.
  43.  5
    Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not Brains in a Vat.Marian David - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896.
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  44.  56
    Putnam’s Brains in a Vat and Bouwsma’s Flowers.Edward S. Shirley - 1988 - Southwest Philosophy Review 4 (1):121-126.
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    Review of The Brain in a Vat, Edited by S. Goldberg. [REVIEW]Cameron Boult - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):75-82.
  46.  25
    Putnam on brains in a vat.Pavel Tichý - 1986 - Philosophia 16 (2):137-146.
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  47.  10
    A Critique of Putnam’s Arguments of the Brain in a Vat - The Three Dimensions.박제철 ) - 2022 - Modern Philosophy 20:393-423.
    본 논문에서 필자는 퍼트남의 “통 속의 뇌” 논증을 비판한다. 퍼트남은 “통 속의 뇌” 논증에 서로 다른 세 개의 차원을 설정하고 있다. 가능세계, 현실세계, 그리고 믿음체계, 이 셋이 그것이다. 퍼트남은 “통 속의 뇌” 논증에서 이러한 세 개의 차원을 설정한 다음, 우리가 가능세계에 인지적으로 접근할 수 없다는, 즉 우리가 가능세계를 눈으로 보거나, 귀로 듣거나 할 수 없다는 점에 근거해, 우리의 발화 “나는 통 속의 뇌이다”라는 발화가 스스로를 논파하는 발화라고 주장하며, 따라서 이 발화는 필연적으로 거짓이라고 주장한다. 그러나 필자가 보기에 이 발화의 진리값은 가능세계와 (...)
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  48.  2
    Internal Realism, Metaphysical Realism, and Brains in a Vat.Gábor Formi - 1996 - Dialectica 50 (4):259-274.
    The paper explores the relationship between skepticism on the one hand and the metaphysical realist and the internal realist conceptions of truth on the other. After a brief description of the metaphysical realist and the internal realist positions, it is argued that the former but not the latter is committed to an important sort of skepticism, namely, that we might be wrong about practically everything at the same time. First an abstract argument is presented to this effect, then the issue (...)
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  49.  7
    You Just Can't Crispin Brains in a Vat.David Miguel Gray - unknown - Episteme 7 (2).
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  50.  23
    A butterfly dream in a brain in a vat.Xiaoqiang Han - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):157-167.
    Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the existence of myself , (...)
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