Sober (1992) has recently evaluated Brandon's (1982, 1990; see also 1985, 1988) use of Salmon's (1971) concept of screening-off in the philosophy of biology. He critiques three particular issues, each of which will be considered in this discussion.
Professor C. A. Mace, the psychologist, once wrote: ‘It is difficult … to present and defend any sort of behaviourism whatever without committing oneself to nonsense.’ I shall illustrate this thesis. I shall comment on the writings of some psychologists. This is relevant to my topic; for psychologists' expositions of behaviourism contain much more philosophy than science, and the inconsistencies which permeate their versions of behaviourism reappear in the works of eminent philosophers. My quotation from Mace comes from a paper (...) defending what he calls ‘analytical behaviourism’; which he distinguishes from ‘methodological behaviourism’ and ‘metaphysical behaviourism’. According to Mace, analytical behaviourism does not question the truth of our everyday statements about a person's mind or states of consciousness; what it claims is that such statements ‘turn out to be, on analysis, statements about the behaviour of material things’, that is, about a person's ‘bodily acts, bodily states, bodily dispositions, bodily “states of readiness” to act in various ways’. The father of behaviourism, J. B. Watson, rarely says anything suggesting this doctrine. As he presents it, behaviourism is both a methodological principle and a metaphysical theory. (shrink)
Many recent developments in artificial intelligence research are relevant for traditional issues in the philosophy of science. One of the developments in AI research we want to focus on in this article is diagnostic reasoning, which we consider to be of interest for the theory of explanation in general and for an understanding of explanatory arguments in economic science in particular. Usually, explanation is primarily discussed in terms of deductive inferences in classical logic. However, in recent AI research it is (...) observed that a diagnostic explanation is actually quite different from deductive reasoning. In diagnostic reasoning the emphasis is on restoring consistency rather than on deduction. Intuitively speaking, the problem diagnostic reasoning is concerned with is the following. Consider a description of a system in which the normal behavior of the system is characterized and an observation that conflicts with this normal behavior. The diagnostic problem is to determine which of the components of the system can, when assumed to be functioning abnormally, account for the conflicting observation. A diagnosis is a set of allegedly malfunctioning components that can be used to restore the consistency of the system description and the observation. In this article, this kind of reasoning is formalized and we show its importance for the theory of explanation. We will show how the diagnosis nondeductively explains the discrepancy between the observed and the correct system behavior. The article also shows the relevance of the subject for real scientific arguments by showing that examples of diagnostic reasoning can be found in Friedman's Theory of the Consumption Function. Moreover, it places the philosophical implications of diagnostic reasoning in the context of Mill's aprioristic methodology. (shrink)
At the time of writing L'Être et le Néant , Sartre intended both to give a new account of human experience and action, and, subsequently, to offer a ‘new morality’. It is clear that he wished to keep the two enterprises separate, the former not entailing the latter but also that they would together form an integrated Weltanschauung , as he puts it. But Sartre's philosophical account of human life cannot, I shall argue, be integrated with any morality whatsoever, since (...) his account really entails the impossibility of the moral life. It is not surprising that doubts about what remains of morality, once the Sartrean picture has been accepted, are prominent in the last pages of L'Être et le Néant ; I intend to show that they deserve more serious attention than some commentators have thought, and that the major problem over Sartre's moral philosophy is not the interpretation of authenticity but the investigation of his account of moral choice. (shrink)
Georg Curtius' Griechische Schulgrammatik, achtzehnte wesentlich veränderte Auflage bearbeitet von Dr Wilhelm von Hartel. Leipzig. 1888. Mk. 2.40.Methodik des Grammatischen Unterrichtes im Griechischen im Anschlnsse an W. v. Hartel's Neubearbeitung der Griechischen Sehulgrammatik von Georg Curtius, verfasst von Dr August Scheindler. Leipzig. 1888.Abriss der Grammatik des homerischen nnd herodotischen Dialekts, im Anschlusse an die 18 Auflage, von Dr. Curtius' Griechischen Schulgrammatik bearbeitet von Dr Wilhelm Von Hartel. 60 pf.Kurzgefasste griechische Schulgrammatik bearbeitet von Dr Bernhardt Gerth. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig. C. (...) F. Winter. 1 Mk. 60. (shrink)
A. Klimczuk, Book review: R. Sackmann, W. Bartl, B. Jonda, K. Kopycka, C. Rademacher, Coping with Demographic Change: A Comparative View on Education and Local Government in Germany and Poland, Cham, Heidelberg, Springer 2015, "Pol-int.org" 2017, https://www.pol-int.org/en/publications/coping-demographic-change-comparative-view-education-and#r59 41.
In Plato's Gorgias, Gorgias of Leontini, a famous teacher of rhetoric, has come to Athens to recruit students, promising to teach them how to become leaders in politics and business. A group has gathered at Callicles' house to hear Gorgias demonstrate the power of his art. This dialogue blends comic and serious discussion of the best human life, providing a penetrating examination of ethics, the foundations of knowledge, and the nature of the good.
Hume's sceptical arguments regarding induction have not yet been successfully answered. However, I shall not in this paper discuss the important attempts to answer Hume since that would be too lengthy a task. On the supposition that Hume's sceptical arguments have not been met, the empirical world is a place where, as the popular metaphor goes, all the glue has been removed. For the Humean sceptic, the only empirical knowledge that we can have is given to us in immediate perception. (...) We have no reason to believe that the patterns of future events will in any way resemble patterns of events in the present or past. We have no reason to believe even that present events not observed resemble present events that are observed, or that knowledge of past and present can be any guide in making new discoveries about what took place in the past. What we have is an ideal setting for the calculation of a priori probabilities. We have a field of distinct events having no logical or evidential ties to one another. The attempt to justify induction that I wish to present is an appeal to a priori probability. (shrink)