1. Belief and representation in nonhuman animals.Sarah Beth Lesson, Brandon Tinklenberg & Kristin Andrews - 2009 - In Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 370-383.
    It’s common to think that animals think. The cat thinks it is time to be fed, the monkey thinks the dominant is a threat. In order to make sense of what the other animals around us do, we ascribe mental states to them. The cat meows at the door because she wants to be let in. The monkey the monkey fails the test because he doesn’t remember the answer. -/- We explain animal actions in terms of their mental states, just (...)
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  2. Comparative psychometrics: establishing what differs is central to understanding what evolves.Christoph J. Völter, Brandon Tinklenberg, Amanda Seed & Josep Call - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (20170283).
    Cognitive abilities cannot be measured directly. What we can measure is individual variation in task performance. In this paper, we first make the case for why we should be interested in mapping individual differences in task performance on to particular cognitive abilities: we suggest that it is crucial for examining the causes and consequences of variation both within and between species. As a case study, we examine whether multiple measures of inhibitory control for non-human animals do indeed produce correlated task (...)
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