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Michael E. Bratman [55]Michael Bratman [28]Michael Edward Bratman [1]M. E. Bratman [1]
  1. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...)
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  2. Structures of Agency: Essays.Michael Bratman - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics and metaphysics.
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  3. Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.Michael E. Bratman - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
     
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  4.  54
    Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):73-88.
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  5. Shared Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
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  6. Shared Cooperative Activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
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  7. Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self‐Governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):411-443.
  8. Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.
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  9. Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  10. Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35-61.
  11. Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
  12. Shared Agency.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways. Forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal, both intrinsically – think of friendship and love, singing duets, and the joys of conversation -- and instrumentally – think of how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals. My focus will be on activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups. My approach begins with an underlying model of individual planning agency, and (...)
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  13. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press.
  14. Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--36.
    Two approaches to instrumental rationality Suppose I intend end E, believe that a necessary means to E is M, and believe that M requires that I intend M. My attitudes concerning E and M engage a basic requirement of practical rationality, a requirement that, barring a change in my cited beliefs, I either intend M or give up intending E.2 Call this the Instrumental Rationality requirement – for short, the IR requirement.
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  15. Two Problems About Human Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
    I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...)
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  16. A Desire of One's Own.Michael E. Bratman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.
    You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the (...)
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  17. Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason.Michael E. Bratman - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18.
    I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such phenomena — (...)
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    Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint.Michael E. Bratman - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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  19. Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1998 - In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press. pp. 59--83.
     
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  20. Autonomy and Hierarchy.Michael E. Bratman - 2003 - Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):156-176.
    In autonomous action the agent herself directs and governs the action. But what is it for the agent herself to direct and to govern? One theme in a series of articles by Harry G. Frankfurt is that we can make progress in answering this question by appeal to higher-order conative attitudes. Frankfurt's original version of this idea is that in acting of one's own free will, one is not acting simply because one desires so to act. Rather, it is also (...)
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  21. I Intend That We J.Michael Bratman - 1999 - In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 142–161.
  22. Intention Rationality.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
    The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about (...)
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  23. What is the Accordion Effect?Michael E. Bratman - 2005 - Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):5-19.
    In "Action and Responsibility,'' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.'' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,'' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.'' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion effect is (...)
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    Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith.Michael E. Bratman - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):59-76.
    These are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  25. Normative Thinking and Planning, Individual and Shared: Reflections on Allan Gibbard's Tanner Lectures.Michael Bratman - manuscript
    There is thinking, conducted by a single person, about how to live. And there is thinking together– a kind of “language infused”(5) shared activity – about how to live together. In the first of these fascinating and deeply probing Tanner Lectures Allan Gibbard is concerned with both of these phenomena and with how they interact.
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    Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.Michael E. Bratman - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):1-5.
    A précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  27. The Interplay of Intention and Reason.Michael E. Bratman - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):657-672.
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  28. Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):119-121.
     
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  29. Intention and Means-End Reasoning.Michael Bratman - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (2):252-265.
  30.  12
    Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman & Michael E. Bratman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277.
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    Dynamics of Sociality.Michael E. Bratman - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):1–15.
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  32.  83
    Valuing and the Will.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):249 - 265.
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  33. Three Theories of Self-Governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):21-46.
  34. Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will.Michael Bratman - 1979 - Noûs 13 (2):153-171.
    In a case of weak-willed action the agent acts-freely, deliberately, and for a reason-in a way contrary to his best judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accordance with his best judgment. The possibility of such actions has posed one problem in moral philosophy, the exact nature of the problem it poses another. In this essay I offer an answer to the latter problem: an explanation of why a plausible account of free, deliberate and purposive action seems to (...)
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  35.  9
    Rational Planning Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:25-48.
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  36. Shared Valuing and Frameworks for Practical Reasoning.Michael Bratman - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--27.
     
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  37. Planning and the Stability of Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  38. Reflections on the Philosophy of Action.Michael Bratman - forthcoming - In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
     
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  39. Setiya on Intention, Rationality and Reasons.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):510-521.
    ‘The idea that there are standards of practical reason apart from or independent of good character,’ Kieran Setiya trenchantly argues, ‘is a philosophical mirage’. 1 Setiya's argument in this fine book is a striking blend of philosophy of action and normative philosophy. A central claim is that the intention is a special kind of belief. I want both to challenge that claim and to reflect on a subtle argument in its favour that is in the background.1.Practical thinking, as understood by (...)
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  40. Introduction to Philosophy.John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Sixth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. The sixth edition includes five new readings--by renowned contemporary philosophers Anthony Brueckner, John Martin Fischer, Alan Goldman, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Thomas Nagel--and additional descriptive material on the authors throughout the book.
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  41.  67
    Kagan on "the Appeal to Cost".Michael E. Bratman - 1994 - Ethics 104 (2):325-332.
  42. Review of Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity[REVIEW]Michael E. Bratman - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):699-709.
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    Taking Plans Seriously.Michael Bratman - 1983 - Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):271-287.
  44. Responsibility and Planning.Michael E. Bratman - 1997 - Journal of Ethics 1 (1):27-43.
    We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson''s account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent''s degree of (...)
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  45.  14
    Shapiro on Legal Positivism and Jointly Intentional Activity.Michael E. Bratman - 2002 - Legal Theory 8 (4):511-517.
  46. Cognitivism About Practical Reason (Review of Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman). [REVIEW]Michael E. Bratman - 1991 - Ethics 102 (1):117-.
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  47. Anchors for Deliberation.Michael Bratman - 2007 - In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy: the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy. Ashgate Publishing.
    This chapter sketches a model of deliberation that is anchored in plan-like commitments of the agent, commitments that constitute a form of valuing. These anchors need not be inescapable, they can sensibly vary from person to person, they can stand in complex relations to judgments about the good, and they play basic roles in the coss-temporal organization of practical thought and action. And deliberation so understood is, I conjecture, central to autonomy and self-government. The model sketched here is located in (...)
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  48.  59
    Yaffe on Criminal Attempts.Michael E. Bratman - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):101-113.
    Central to Gideon Yaffe's powerful theory of the legitimate criminalization of unsuccessful attempts is his according to which, I argue that this principle, taken together with Yaffe's theory of the nature of attempts, threatens to lead to a normatively problematic conclusion in support of the legitimate criminalization of attempts that are merely a matter of thinking and do not involve action in the public space. And I argue that Yaffe's efforts to block this conclusion are themselves problematic. This leads to (...)
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    Intention and Personal Policies.Michael E. Bratman - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:443-469.
  50.  81
    Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans.Michael E. Bratman - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327–335.
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