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Brendan Balcerak Jackson [11]Brendan Jackson [7]
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Brendan Balcerak Jackson
University of Miami
  1. Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):31-54.
    One way to challenge the substantiveness of a particular philosophical issue is to argue that those who debate the issue are engaged in a merely verbal dispute. For example, it has been maintained that the apparent disagreement over the mind/brain identity thesis is a merely verbal dispute, and thus that there is no substantive question of whether or not mental properties are identical to neurological properties. The goal of this paper is to help clarify the relationship between mere verbalness and (...)
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  2. Metaphysics, Verbal Disputes and the Limits of Charity.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):412-434.
    Intuitively, (1)-(3) seem to express genuine claims (true or false) about what the world is like, attempts to correctly describe parts of extra-linguistic reality. By contrast, it is tempting to regard (4)-(6) as merely reflecting decisions (or conventions, or dispositions, or rules) concerning the terms in which that extra-linguistic reality is described, decisions about which things to label with 'vixen', 'bachelor' or 'cup'.
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  3. Defusing Easy Arguments for Numbers.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):447-461.
    Pairs of sentences like the following pose a problem for ontology: (1) Jupiter has four moons. (2) The number of moons of Jupiter is four. (2) is intuitively a trivial paraphrase of (1). And yet while (1) seems ontologically innocent, (2) appears to imply the existence of numbers. Thomas Hofweber proposes that we can resolve the puzzle by recognizing that sentence (2) is syntactically derived from, and has the same meaning as, sentence (1). Despite appearances, the expressions ‘the number of (...)
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  4.  49
    Against the Perceptual Model of Utterance Comprehension.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):387-405.
    What accounts for the capacity of ordinary speakers to comprehend utterances of their language? The phenomenology of hearing speech in one’s own language makes it tempting to many epistemologists to look to perception for an answer to this question. That is, just as a visual experience as of a red square is often taken to give the perceiver immediate justification for believing that there is a red square in front of her, perhaps an auditory experience as of the speaker asserting (...)
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  5. Beyond Logical Form.Brendan Jackson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):347 - 380.
    Notice that each of (1)–(4) is an instance of a more general pattern. For example, we could replace ‘black’ in (1) with any of a wide range of other adjectives such as ‘furry’ or ‘hungry’ or ‘three-legged’, without rendering the entailment invalid or any less obvious. Similarly, there are a number of verbs that occur in entailments parallel to (3): ‘Moe boiled the water; so the water boiled’; ‘Bart blew up the school; so the school blew up’; ‘Homer sank the (...)
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  6.  47
    What Does Displacement Explain, and What Do Congruence Effects Show?: A Response to Hofweber.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (3):269-274.
    This is a brief response to Thomas Hofweber's "Extraction, Displacement and Focus: A Reply to Balcerak Jackson" (Linguistics and Philosophy 37.3 (2014)), which was a reply to my "Defusing Easy Arguments for Numbers" (Linguistics and Philosophy 36.6 (2013)).
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  7.  28
    Number Word Constructions, Degree Semantics and the Metaphysics of Degrees.Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Doris Penka - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (4):347-372.
    A central question for ontology is the question of whether numbers really exist. But it seems easy to answer this question in the affirmative. The truth of a sentence like ‘Seven students came to the party’ can be established simply by looking around at the party and counting students. A trivial paraphrase of is ‘The number of students who came to the party is seven’. But appears to entail the existence of a number, and so it seems that we must (...)
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  8.  14
    Model-Theoretic Semantics as Model-Based Science.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3061-3081.
    In the early days of natural language semantics, Donald Davidson issued a challenge to those, like Richard Montague, who would do semantics in a model-theoretic framework that gives a central role to a model-relative notion of truth. Davidson argued that no theory of this kind can claim to be an account of real truth conditions unless it first makes clear how the relativized notion relates to our ordinary non-relativized notion of truth. In the 1990s, Davidson’s challenge was developed by Etchemendy (...)
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  9.  78
    Truth Vs. Pretense in Discourse About Motion (or, Why the Sun Really Does Rise).Brendan Jackson - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):298–317.
    These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full (...)
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  10. Logical Form: Classical Conception and Recent Challenges.Brendan Jackson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):303-316.
    The term ‘logical form’ has been called on to serve a wide range of purposes in philosophy, and it would be too ambitious to try to survey all of them in a single essay. Instead, I will focus on just one conception of logical form that has occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, and in particular in the philosophical study of linguistic meaning. This is what I will call the classical conception of logical form. The classical conception, (...)
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  11. Understanding and Semantic Structure: Reply to Timothy Williamson.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343.
    In his essay ‘“Conceptual Truth”’, Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson’s argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider (...)
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  12.  18
    Understanding and Semantic Strucure: Reply to Timothy Williamson.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343.
  13.  49
    Structural Entailment and Semantic Natural Kinds.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (3):207-237.
    Is there a principled difference between entailments in natural language that are valid solely in virtue of their form or structure and those that are not? This paper advances an affirmative answer to this question, one that takes as its starting point Gareth Evans’s suggestion that semantic theory aims to carve reality at the joints by uncovering the semantic natural kinds of the language. I sketch an Evans-inspired account of semantic kinds and show how it supports a principled account of (...)
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  14. Semantic Natural Kinds.Brendan Jackson - unknown
    My interest in semantic categories arises out of consideration of what is often called structural entailment. Consider the following: 1. Lisa quickly left; so Lisa left. The first of the two sentences in (1) entails the second; necessarily, if the first is true then so is the second. Moreover, (1) is an instance of a more general pattern whose validity doesn’t seem to depend on the specific meanings of the words in (1). The adverb ‘quickly’, for example, can be replaced (...)
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  15.  67
    Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):205 - 206.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 205-206, March 2012.
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  16.  29
    Proceedings From SALT XI.Rachel Hastings, Brendan Jackson & Zsófia Zvolensky (eds.) - 2001 - CLC.
    Proceedings of the 11th Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference, held May 11-13, 2001, at New York University.
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  17.  14
    Proceedings From SALT X.Brendan Jackson & Tanya Matthews (eds.) - 2000 - CLC Publications.
  18.  23
    Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers have always recognized the value of reason, but the process of reasoning itself has only recently begun to emerge as a philosophical topic in its own right. Is reasoning a distinctive kind of mental process? If so, what is its nature? How does reasoning differ from merely freely associating thoughts? What is the relationship between reasoning about what to believe and reasoning about how to act? Is reasoning itself something you do, or something that happens to you? And what (...)
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