5 found
See also
Breno Andrade Zuppolini
Universidade Federal de São Paulo
  1. Aristotle's Foundationalism.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2016 - Dissertatio 44:187-211.
    For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  2.  42
    Forma lógica Das proposições científicas E ontologia da predicação: Um falso dilema nos segundos analíticos de aristóteles.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2014 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 19 (2):11-45.
    In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on the formulation of scientific propositions: their terms must be able to perform the role of subject as well as of predicate; their terms should be universal; every demonstration must involve “primary” subjects denoted by terms that “cannot be said of another underlying subject”. Several interpreters, inspired by theses from the Categories, believed that this third requirement refers to names and descriptions of particular substances as basic subjects of predicative statements, since they (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3. Book review: David Bronstein, Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. (pp.xiii-272). [REVIEW]Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):179-186.
  4.  87
    Beber ou não beber? Qual é a questão? Duas leituras de República IV, 439c2-d8.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2019 - Dissertatio 49:45-63.
    In this paper, I explore two possible readings of Republic IV, 439c2-d8, and of Plato’s claim that the just soul is governed by its rational element. My aim is to argue against a “desiderative” interpretation of the passage, according to which the motivational strength of rational desires depends on a set of desires given in advance and produced independently of reason. As an alternative, I advance a “cognitivist” reading according to which the rational desires of the just soul have as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
  5.  23
    Copresença de opostos em república V, 478e-480a.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (3):81-110.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation