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Brian Ellis [91]Brian D. Ellis [1]
  1. Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Scientific Essentialism defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. These laws are not imposed upon the world by God, the forces of nature or anything else, but rather are immanent in the world. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects which are constantly interacting with each other, and whose (...)
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  2. The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    For many years essentialism was considered beyond the pale in philosophy, a relic of discredited Aristotelianism. This is no longer so. Kripke and Putnam have made belief in essential natures respectable once more. Harré and Madden have argued against Hume's theory of causation and developed an alternative theory based on the assumption that there are genuine causal powers in nature. Dretske, Tooley, Armstrong, Swoyer, and Carroll have all developed strong alternatives to Hume's theory of the laws of nature. And Shoemaker (...)
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  3. Dispositional Essentialism.Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.
  4. The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2002 - Routledge.
    In "The Philosophy of Nature," Brian Ellis provides a clear and forthright general summation of, and introduction to, the new essentialist position. Although the theory that the laws of nature are immanent in things, rather than imposed on them from without, is an ancient one, much recent work has been done to revive interest in essentialism and "The Philosophy of Nature" is a distinctive contribution to this lively current debate. Brian Ellis exposes the philosophical and scientific credentials of the prevailing (...)
     
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  5.  75
    The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism.Brian Ellis - 2009 - Routledge.
    This book presents a major statement on the dominant philosophy of science by one of the world's leading metaphysicians. Brian Ellis's new book develops the metaphysics of scientific realism to the point where it begins to take on the characteristics of a first philosophy. As most people understand it, scientific realism is not yet such a theory. It is not sufficiently general, and has no plausible applications in fields other than the well-established sciences. Nevertheless, Ellis demonstrates that the original arguments (...)
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  6. The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature.John Bigelow, Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):371-388.
  7. Causal Powers and Laws of Nature.Brian Ellis - 1999 - In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 19--34.
  8. Forces.John Bigelow, Brian Ellis & Robert Pargetter - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):614-630.
    Traditionally, forces are causes of a special sort. Forces have been conceived to be the direct or immediate causes of things. Other sorts of causes act indirectly by producing forces which are transmitted in various ways to produce various effects. However, forces are supposed to act directly without the mediation of anything else. But forces, so conceived, appear to be occult. They are mysterious, because we have no clear conception of what they are, as opposed to what they are postulated (...)
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  9. The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism.Brian Ellis - 2009 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Ellis shows that realistic theories of quantum mechanics, time, causality and human freedom - all problematic areas for the acceptance of scientific realism - can be developed satisfactorily. In particular, he shows how moral theory can be recast to fit within this comprehensive metaphysical framework by developing a radical moral theory that conceives morals to be social ideals and has implications for key ethical concepts such as moral responsibility, moral powers, moral rights, and moral obligations. The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism (...)
     
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  10. Causal Powers and Categorical Properties.Brian Ellis - 2009 - In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that there are categorical properties as well as causal powers, and that the world would not exist as we know it without them. For categorical properties are needed to define the powers—to locate them, and to specify their laws of action. These categorical properties, I shall argue, are not dispositional. For their identities do not depend on what they dispose their bearers to do. They are, as Alexander Bird would say, ’quiddities’. But (...)
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  11. Universals, the Essential Problem and Categorical Properties.Brian Ellis - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):462–472.
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  12. Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism.Brian Ellis - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):90–92.
  13. Causal Laws and Singular Causation.Brian Ellis - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):329-351.
    In this paper it will be argued that causal laws describe the actions of causal powers. The process which results from such an action is one which belongs to a natural kind, the essence of which is that it is a display of this causal power. Therefore, if anything has a given causal power necessarily, it must be naturally disposed to act in the manner prescribed by the causal law describing the action of this causal power. In the formal expressions (...)
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  14.  56
    3 What Science Aims to Do.Brian Ellis - 1985 - In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. University of Chicago Press. pp. 48.
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  15. Physical Realism.Brian Ellis - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):371–384.
    Physical realism is the thesis that the world is more or less as present‐day physical theory says it is, i.e. a mind‐independent reality, that consists fundamentally of physical objects that have causal powers, are located in space and time, belong to natural kinds, and interact causally with each other in various natural kinds of ways. It is thus a modern form of physicalism that takes due account of the natural kinds structure of the world. It is a thesis that many (...)
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  16. Basic Concepts of Measurement.Brian Ellis - 1968 - Cambridge University Press.
    The nature of measurement is a topic of central concern in the philosophy of science and, indeed, measurement is the essential link between science and mathematics. Professor Ellis's book, originally published in 1966, is the first general exposition of the philosophical and logical principles involved in measurement since N. R. Campbell's Principles of Measurement and Calculation, and P. W. Bridgman's Dimensional Analysis. Professor Ellis writes from an empiricist standpoint. His object is to distinguish and define the basic concepts in measurement, (...)
     
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  17.  38
    The Existence of Forces.Brian Ellis - 1976 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (2):171.
  18.  52
    A Unified Theory of Conditionals.Brian Ellis - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):107 - 124.
  19. An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics.Brian Ellis, Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):355 - 357.
  20.  51
    Conventionality in Distant Simulataneity.Brian Ellis & Peter Bowman - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (2):116-136.
    In his original paper of 1905, "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies", Einstein described a procedure for synchronizing distant clocks at rest in any inertial system K. Clocks thus synchronized may be said to be in standard signal synchrony in K. It has often been claimed that there are no logical or physical reasons for preferring standard signal synchronizations to any of a range of possible non-standard ones. In this paper, the range of consistent non-standard signal synchronizations, first for any (...)
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  21.  17
    Causal Laws and Singular Causation.Brian Ellis - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):329-351.
    In this paper it will be argued that causal laws describe the actions of causal powers. The process which results from such an action is one which belongs to a natural kind, the essence of which is that it is a display of this causal power. Therefore, if anything has a given causal power necessarily, it must be naturally disposed to act in the manner prescribed by the causal law describing the action of this causal power. In the formal expressions (...)
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  22. The Logic of Subjective Probability.Brian Ellis - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):125-152.
  23. Marc Lange on Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):75 – 79.
    For scientific essentialists, the only logical possibilities of existence are the real (or metaphysical) ones, and such possibilities, they say, are relative to worlds. They are not a priori, and they cannot just be invented. Rather, they are discoverable only by the a posteriori methods of science. There are, however, many philosophers who think that real possibilities are knowable a priori, or that they can just be invented. Marc Lange [Lange 2004] thinks that they can be invented, and tries to (...)
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  24.  23
    Natural Kinds.Brian Ellis - 2008 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 139.
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  25.  8
    Physical Realism.Brian Ellis - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):371-384.
    Physical realism is the thesis that the world is more or less as present‐day physical theory says it is, i.e. a mind‐independent reality, that consists fundamentally of physical objects that have causal powers, are located in space and time, belong to natural kinds, and interact causally with each other in various natural kinds of ways. It is thus a modern form of physicalism that takes due account of the natural kinds structure of the world. It is a thesis that many (...)
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  26.  98
    Response to David Armstrong.Brian Ellis - 1999 - In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 39--43.
  27. Basic Concepts of Measurement.Brian Ellis - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):323-326.
     
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  28. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks the Truth.Brian Ellis - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):495-497.
    This is an admirable book, and is essential reading for all students of scientific realism. It reviews and evaluates nearly all of the important arguments for scientific realism in the literature, and does so fairly, lucidly, and thoroughly. But it has one major defect: one that it shares with most other justifications for scientific realism. It presents the case for realism as a two-stage argument from the empirical success of science, to the truth, or approximate truth, of its dominant theories, (...)
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  29.  64
    Two Theories of Indicative Conditionals.Brian Ellis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):50 – 66.
  30. Solving the Problem of Induction Using a Values-Based Epistemology.Brian Ellis - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):141-160.
  31. “Review of Machery’s ‘Doing Without Concepts’”. [REVIEW]Edoardo Zamuner & Brian Ellis - forthcoming - Review of Metaphysics.
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  32.  79
    Universal and Differential Forces.Brian Ellis - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (55):177-194.
  33.  53
    Scientific Platonism.Brian Ellis - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (4):665-679.
  34.  46
    Essentialism and Natural Kinds.Brian Ellis - unknown
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  35. Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism.Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.) - 2013 - Routledge.
    While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, (...)
     
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  36. Truth and Objectivity.Brian Ellis - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):291-294.
     
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  37. Rational Belief Systems.Brian Ellis - 1979 - Synthese 44 (1):161-169.
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  38.  59
    An Essentialist Perspective on the Problem of Induction.Brian Ellis - 1998 - Principia 2 (1):103-124.
    If one believes, as Hume did, that all events are loose and separate, then the problem of induction is probably insoluble. Anything could happen. But if one thinks, as scientific essentialists do, that the laws of nature are immanent in the world, and depend on the essential natures of things, then there are strong constraints on what could possibly happen. Given these constraints, the problem of induction may be soluble. For these constraints greatly strengthen the case for conceptual and theoretical (...)
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  39.  50
    Avowals Are More Corrigible Than You Think.Brian Ellis - 1976 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):116-122.
  40. Internal Realism.Brian Ellis - 1988 - Synthese 76 (3):409 - 434.
    I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth (...)
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  41.  41
    Some Fundamental Problems of Direct Measurement.Brian Ellis - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):37 – 47.
  42. The New Essentialism and the Scientific Image of Man-Kind.Brian Ellis - 2000 - Epistemologia 23 (2):189-210.
     
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  43.  20
    A Vindication of Scientific Inductive Practices.Brian Ellis - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):296 - 304.
  44. Truth and Objectivity.Brian Ellis - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):293-295.
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  45.  27
    Constructing an Ontology.Brian Ellis - 2006 - In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher. pp. 15-26.
    Empirical, logical, historical and mathematical inquiries may be able to tell us what it is ultimately right for us to believe in these various fields, and, in this pragmatic sense, they may be able to tell us what is true. But such inquiries cannot tell us what must exist in reality for them to be true, since they cannot tell us what their truthmakers are. To do this, we have to step back from the particular disciplines of science, mathematics, history, (...)
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  46. The Ontology of Scientific Realism.Brian Ellis - 1987 - In J. J. C. Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart. Blackwell.
  47. Physical Monism.Brian Ellis - 1967 - Synthese 17 (June):141-161.
  48.  7
    Some Fundamental Problems of Direct Measurement.Brian Ellis - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:37.
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  49.  12
    An Essentialist Perspective on the Problem of Induction.Brian Ellis - 1998 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (1):103-124.
    If one believes, as Hume did, that all events are loose and separate, then the problem of induction is probably insoluble. Anything could happen. But if one thinks, as scientific essentialists do, that the laws of nature are immanent in the world, and depend on the essential natures of things, then there are strong constraints on what could possibly happen. Given these constraints, the problem of induction may be soluble. For these constraints greatly strengthen the case for conceptual and theoretical (...)
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  50.  10
    Human Agency, Realism and the New Essentialism.Brian Ellis - unknown
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