65 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Brian Garrett [38]Brian Jonathan Garrett [21]Brian J. Garrett [6]
See also
Brian Garrett
Australian National University
Brian Jonathan Garrett
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
  1. What is This Thing Called Metaphysics?Brian Garrett - 2006 - Routledge.
    Why is there something rather than nothing? Does God exist? Does time flow? What are we? Do we have free will? What is truth? Metaphysics is concerned with ourselves and reality, and the most fundamental questions regarding existence. This clear and accessible introduction covers the central topics in metaphysics in a concise but comprehensive way. Brian Garrett discusses the crucial concepts in a highly readable manner, easing the reader in with a look at some important philosophical problems. He addresses key (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  2.  6
    Personal Identity.Brian Garrett - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):128-130.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  3. Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness.Brian Garrett - 1998 - Routledge.
    _Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness_ is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  4. Non-Reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind.Brian J. Garrett & John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):209.
  5. Causal Essentialism Versus the Zombie Worlds.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):93-112.
    David Chalmers claims that the logical possibility of ‘zombie worlds’ — worlds physically indiscernible from the actual world, but that lack consciousness — reveal that consciousness is a distinct fact, or property, in addition to the physical facts or properties.The ‘existence’ or possibility of Zombie worlds violates the physicalist demand that consciousness logically supervene upon the physical. On the assumption that the logical supervenience of consciousness upon the physical is, indeed, a necessary entailment of physicalism, the existence of zombie worlds (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  77
    Black on Backwards Causation.Brian Garrett - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):230-233.
    In this discussion paper I argue that Max Black's well-known bilking argument does not succeed in showing the impossibility of backwards causation.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Vague Identity and Vague Objects.Brian Garrett - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):341-351.
  8.  30
    Experience and Time.Brian Garrett - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):427-430.
    In this discussion, I claim that the debate over ‘the bias towards the present’ turns on an axiological question. Is the value of a present experience greater than its value when past? I argue not and hold that our bias towards the present, understood as a pure time preference, is irrational.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  46
    Pluralism, Causation, and Overdetermination.Brian J. Garrett - 1998 - Synthese 116 (3):355-78.
  10.  51
    On the Epistemic Bilking Argument.Brian Garrett - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):139-140.
    The standard bilking argument is well-known and attempts to prove the impossibility of backwards causation. In this discussion note, I identify an epistemic bilking argument, which has not received sufficient attention in the literature, and indicate how best to respond to it. This response involves a parity argument based on a forwards causation case.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11.  63
    Tim, Tom, Time and Fate: Lewis on Time Travel.Brian Garrett - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):247-252.
    In his well-known time travel story, David Lewis claims that there is a sense in which Tim can go back in time and kill his Grandfather and a (more inclusive) sense in which he cannot. Lewis describes Tim’s predicament as semi-fatalist, but holds that this does not compromise Tim’s freedom or his ability to kill Grandfather. I argue that if semi-fatalism is true of Tim, it is true of everyone, and that this is a troubling conclusion.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Anscombe on `I'.Brian Garrett - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):507-511.
    I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  13
    Time, Space, Dummett and McTaggart.Brian Garrett - 2017 - Metaphysica 18 (1).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem".Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):576-588.
    Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  77
    Santayana’s Treatment of Teleology: Bulletin of the Santayana Society.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2010 - Overheard in Seville 28 (28):1-10.
    Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Bermudez on Self-Consciousness.Brian J. Garrett - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.
    I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17.  54
    Agents, Knowledge and Backwards Causation.Brian Garrett - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):285-285.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  16
    Bulletproof Grandfathers, David Lewis, and ‘Can’T’-Judgements.Brian Garrett - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):177-180.
    In this discussion piece, I argue that David Lewis fails to support his claim that time-travelling Tim cannot kill his Grandfather in 1921. This result, in turn, undermines Lewis’s contextualist solution to the Grandfather Paradox—i.e. conceding that Tim can and cannot kill Grandfather, but relative to different contexts in each case.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  5
    Michael Dummett, Reasons to Act, and Bringing About the Past.Brian Garrett - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):547-556.
    My intention in this paper is to outline and criticise some of the main ideas in Michael Dummett’s classic article “Bringing about the Past”. From Dummett’s remarks we can reconstruct two sceptical arguments designed to show that it can never be rational to attempt to bring about past events. Dummett is critical of both arguments. Though happy with Dummett’s reply to the first sceptical argument, I disagree with his reply to the second.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  96
    Personal Identity and Extrinsicness.Brian Garrett - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (2):177-194.
  21.  72
    Defending Non-Epiphenomenal Event Dualism.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.
  22.  67
    Davidson on Causal Relevance.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 1999 - Ratio 12 (1):14-33.
    Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of events, this is not (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23.  23
    Fatalism: A Dialogue.Brian Garrett - 2018 - Think 17 (49):73-79.
    In this dialogue I discuss the connection between eternalism and fatalism. I do not think, as some do, that eternalism implies fatalism, but I do think that eternalists can avoid fatalism only by denying a seemingly intuitive claim about what a traveller to the past cannot do.Export citation.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  38
    Animalism.Brian Garrett - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):348-353.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comThis article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model...The editors of this interesting collection,1 Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon, have placed the various essays, most of which were specially written for this volume, in three categories: Part I contains articles critical of animalism; Part II contains essays defending animalism and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Personal Identity and Reductionism.Brian Garrett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June):361-373.
  26.  54
    `Thank Goodness That's Over' Revisited.Brian Garrett - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):201-205.
  27.  10
    Vitalism and Teleology in the Natural Philosophy of Nehemiah Grew.Brian Garrett - 2003 - British Journal for the History of Science 36 (1):63-81.
    This essay examines some aspects of the early history of the vitalism/mechanism controversies by examining the work of Nehemiah Grew in relation to that of Henry More , Francis Glisson and the more mechanistically inclined members of the Royal Society. I compliment and critically comment on John Henry's exploration of active principles in pre-Newtonian mechanist thought. The postulation of ‘active matter’ can be seen as an important support for the new experimental philosophy, but it has theological drawbacks, allowing for a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28.  14
    Héritabilité causale et propriétés émergentes.Brian Garrett - 2000 - Philosophiques 27 (1):139-159.
    Sur la base de ce qu’il a appelé « le principe d’héritabilité causale », Jaegwon Kim a soutenu que les propriétés réalisables de façons multiples ne constituent pas des sortes causales scientifiques. Mon principal objectif est de répondre aux arguments de Kim contre le physicalisme non réductionniste. Je défends l’idée qu’il existe plus de pouvoirs causaux que les seuls pouvoirs causaux physiques. Cela n’a rien de surprenant puisqu’il existe plus de particuliers que le nombre total de particules physiques fondamentales. Et (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29.  47
    Dummett on Bringing About the Past.Brian Garrett - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (1):113-115.
    In ‘Bringing about the Past’ Michael Dummett attempted to defend the coherence of the idea of bringing about the past. I agree that bringing about the past is conceptually no more problematic than bringing about the future, but argue, against Dummett, that there is no need to restrict the scope of an agent’s knowledge in order to make sense of intentionally bringing about past events.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  60
    Douglas Ehring , Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation . Reviewed By.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):279-281.
  31. A Sceptical Tension.Brian Garrett - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):205–206.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Some Thoughts on Animalism.Brian Garrett - 2003 - In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 1--41.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33.  85
    Wittgenstein and the First Person.Brian Garrett - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):347 – 355.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  52
    Constitution, Over Determination and Causal Power.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2013 - Ratio 26 (2):162-178.
    Kim's exclusion argument threatens to show that irreducible constituted objects are epiphenomenal. Kim's arguments are examined and found to be unconvincing; that a constituted cause requires its constituent to be a cause is not an adequate reason to reject the causation of the constituted object (event or property-instance). However, I introduce and argue for, the Causal Power Uniqueness Condition (CPUC). I argue that CPUC and the causal closure of the physical, implies that constituted objects or property-instances are not novel causal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  22
    Identity and Extrinsicness.Brian Garrett - 1988 - Mind 97 (385):105-109.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. Johnston on Fission.Brian J. Garrett - 2004 - Sorites 15 (December):87-93.
    In this discussion paper, I evaluate some arguments of Mark Johnston's which appear in his articles «Fission and the Facts» and «Reasons and Reductionism» . My primary concern is with his description of fission cases, and his assessment of the implications of such cases for value theory. In particular, Johnston advances the following three claims:Rejecting the intrinsicness of identity is an arbitrary response to the paradox of fission;Fission cases involve indeterminate identity;Contra Parfit, fission cases have no implications for value theory (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Vagueness, Identity and the World.Brian J. Garrett - 1991 - Logique Et Analyse 135 (1):349.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  8
    Anscombe On ‘I’.Brian Garrett - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):507-511.
    I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  35
    David Chalmers , Constructing the World . Reviewed By.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (6):440-442.
  40.  62
    Persons and Values.Brian J. Garrett - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):337-44.
  41.  37
    Neil Levy , Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed By.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (3):212–214.
  42.  14
    A Dilemma for Eternalists.Brian Garrett - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1735-1739.
    In this discussion I argue that, given the possibility of travel to the past, eternalists face a dilemma. They must choose between fatalism and the denial of an intuitive claim about what a traveller to the past cannot do. The eternalist should deny this seemingly intuitive claim which is in fact a version of fatalism about the past.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  13
    Hamilton's New Look: A Reply.Brian Garrett - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):220-225.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Jens Harbecke, Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World Reviewed By.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (6):415-418.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  11
    Defending Non-Epiphenomenal Event Dualism.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  14
    Some Remarks on Backwards Causation.Brian Garrett - 2015 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):695-704.
    Resumo Neste texto, o autor concentra-se em dois artigos históricos: o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past”. O autor irá mostrar onde falha o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida. Por conseguinte, o autor irá concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar a fim de que algo possa ocorrer no passado, contudo, discordando da argumentação de Dummett face a um desafio céptico, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  16
    Neil Levy , Consciousness and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed By.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2014 - Philosophy in Review 34 (5):240-242.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  19
    Dana Kay Nelkin , Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility . Reviewed By.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (1):60-62.
  49.  10
    Personal Identity and Reductionism.Brian Garrett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):361-373.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Causal Relevance and the Mental : Towards a Non-Reductive Metaphysics.Brian Jonathan Garrett - unknown
    My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states, then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim that our explanatory practice should guide our (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 65