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Brian Hedden [15]Brian R. Hedden [1]
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Brian Hedden
University of Sydney
  1. Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
    I advocate Time-Slice Rationality, the thesis that the relationship between two time-slices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. The locus of rationality, so to speak, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. This claim is motivated by consideration of puzzle cases for personal identity over time and by a very moderate form of internalism about rationality. Time-Slice Rationality conflicts with two proposed principles of (...)
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  2. Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to (...)
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  3.  36
    Hindsight Bias is Not a Bias.Brian Hedden - forthcoming - Analysis:any023.
    Humans typically display hindsight bias. They are more confident that the evidence available beforehand made some outcome probable when they know the outcome occurred than when they don’t. There is broad consensus that hindsight bias is irrational, but this consensus is wrong. Hindsight bias is generally rationally permissible and sometimes rationally required. The fact that a given outcome occurred provides both evidence about what the total evidence available ex ante was, and also evidence about what that evidence supports. Even if (...)
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  4.  80
    Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  5.  70
    Options and Diachronic Tragedy.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.
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  6. Options and the Subjective Ought.Brian Hedden - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.
    Options and the subjective ought Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-18 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9880-0 Authors Brian Hedden, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  7. Does MITE Make Right? Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty.Brian Hedden - 2016 - In Russ Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 11. pp. 102-128.
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  8.  95
    Self‐Reinforcing and Self‐Frustrating Decisions.Caspar Hare & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):604-628.
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  9. Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Brian Hedden defends a radical view about the relationship between rationality, personal identity, and time. On the standard view, personal identity over time plays a central role in thinking about rationality, because there are rational norms for how a person's attitudes and actions at one time should fit with her attitudes and actions at other times. But these norms are problematic. They make what you rationally ought to believe or do depend on facts about your past that aren't part of (...)
     
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  10.  66
    Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):495-513.
    I argue that a attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief—the prag- matic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among others—implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary control over your actions, and what actions you perform in part determines what (...)
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  11. Incoherence Without Exploitability.Brian Hedden - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):482-495.
  12.  44
    A Defense of Objectivism About Evidential Support.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.
    Objectivism about evidential support is the thesis that facts about the degree to which a body of evidence supports a hypothesis are objective rather than depending on subjective factors like one’s own language or epistemic values. Objectivism about evidential support is key to defending a synchronic, time-slice-centric conception of epistemic rationality, on which what you ought to believe at a time depends only on what evidence you have at that time, and not on how you were at previous times. Here, (...)
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  13.  18
    Should Juries Deliberate?Brian R. Hedden - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (4):368-386.
    Trial by jury is a fundamental feature of democratic governance. But what form should jury decision-making take? I argue against the status quo system in which juries are encouraged and even required to engage in group deliberation as a means to reaching a decision. Jury deliberation is problematic for both theoretical and empirical reasons. On the theoretical front, deliberation destroys the independence of jurors’ judgments that is needed for certain attractive theoretical results. On the empirical front, we have evidence from (...)
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  14.  7
    Replies to Döring and Eker, Snedegar and Lenman.Brian Hedden - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):607-618.
    In Reasons without Persons, I defend a time-slice-centric conception of rationality, on which the locus of rationality is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent, and there are no distinctively diachronic or intra-personal requirements of rationality. Here I reply to criticisms from Doring and Eker, Snedegar, and Lenman, who object to the motivations for and implications of time-slice rationality.
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  15.  25
    Mental Processes and Synchronicity.Brian Hedden - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):873-888.
    I have advocated a time-slice-centric model of rationality, according to which there are no diachronic requirements of rationality. Podgorski challenges this picture on the grounds that temporally extended mental processes are epistemically important, rationally evaluable, and governed by diachronic requirements. I argue that the particular cases that Podgorski marshals to make his case are unconvincing, but that his general challenge might motivate countenancing rational requirements on processes like reasoning. However, so long as such diachronic requirements are merely derivative of more (...)
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  16.  4
    Summary.Brian Hedden - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):569-571.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comReasons without Persons is a defence of a time-slice-centric conception of rationality, on which the locus of rationality, to speak metaphorically, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended person. On this view, the relationship between two time-slices of a single agent is not different in kind, as far as rational evaluation is concerned, from the relationship between two (...)
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