In the twentieth century, philosophy (especially within the United States) embraced the notion of disciplinary expertise: philosophical research consists of working with and writing for other philosophers. Projects that involve non-philosophers earn the deprecating title of “applied” philosophy. The University of North Texas (UNT) doctoral program in philosophy exemplifies the possibility of a new model for philosophy, where graduate students are trained in academic philosophy and in how to work with scientists, engineers, and policy makers. This “field” (rather than “applied”) (...) approach emphasizes the inter- and transdisciplinary nature of the philosophical enterprise where theory and practice dialectically inform one another. UNT’s field station in philosophy at Cape Horn, Patagonia, Chile is one site for developing this ongoing experiment in the theory and practice of interdisciplinary philosophic research and education. (shrink)
In this article I present two arguments from Brian Hebblethwaite for the conclusion that multiple incarnations are impossible, as well as the analyses of those arguments provided by three other thinkers: Oliver Crisp, Peter Kevern, and Robin Le Poidevin. I argue that both of Hebblethwaite's arguments are unsound.
Abstract In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.
The paper presents generalizations of results on so-called Horn logic, well-known in universal algebra, to the setting of fuzzy logic. The theories we consider consist of formulas which are implications between identities (equations) with premises weighted by truth degrees. We adopt Pavelka style: theories are fuzzy sets of formulas and we consider degrees of provability of formulas from theories. Our basic structure of truth degrees is a complete residuated lattice. We derive a Pavelka-style completeness theorem (degree of provability equals (...) degree of truth) from which we get some particular cases by imposing restrictions on the formulas under consideration. As a particular case, we obtain completeness of fuzzy equational logic. (shrink)
We describe which subdirectly irreducible flat algebras arise in the variety generated by an arbitrary class of flat algebras with absorbing bottom element. This is used to give an elementary translation of the universal Horn logic of algebras, and more generally still, partial structures into the equational logic of conventional algebras. A number of examples and corollaries follow. For example, the problem of deciding which finite algebras of some fixed type have a finite basis for their quasi-identities is shown (...) to be equivalent to the finite identity basis problem for the finite members of a finitely based variety with definable principal congruences. (shrink)
The paper studies closure properties of classes of fuzzy structures defined by fuzzy implicational theories, i.e. theories whose formulas are implications between fuzzy identities. We present generalizations of results from the bivalent case. Namely, we characterize model classes of general implicational theories, finitary implicational theories, and Horn theories by means of closedness under suitable algebraic constructions.
There is a modal relative of Euthyphro’s dilemma that goes like this: are necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them because they’re true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as contingent as God’s free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you try to split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in God’s nature, (...)Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I will argue that Leftow’s argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature. (shrink)
There have been a number of publications in recent years on generalising the AGM paradigm to the Horn fragment of propositional logic. Most of them focused on adapting AGM contraction and revision to the Horn setting. It remains an open question whether the adapted Horn contraction and Horn revision are inter-definable as in the AGM case through the Levi and Harper identities. In this paper, we give a positive answer by providing methods for generating contraction and (...) revision from their dual operations. Noticeably, we cannot apply the Levi and Harper identities directly in such methods as the Horn fragment does not fully support negation. To overcome this difficulty, a Horn approximation technique called Horn strengthening is used. We show that Horn contraction generated from Horn revision is always plausible whereas Horn revision generated from Horn contraction is, in general, implausible and, to regain plausibility, the generating contraction has to be properly restricted. (shrink)
It is well known that the model categories of universal Horn theories are locally presentable, hence essentially algebraic . In the special case of quasivarieties a direct translation of the implicational syntax into the essentially equational one is known . Here we present a similar translation for the general case, showing at the same time that many relationally presented Horn classes are in fact quasivarieties.
The paper deals with fuzzy Horn logic which is a fragment of predicate fuzzy logic with evaluated syntax. Formulas of FHL are of the form of simple implications between identities. We show that one can have Pavelka-style completeness of FHL w.r.t. semantics over the unit interval [0, 1] with left-continuous t-norm and a residuated implication, provided that only certain fuzzy sets of formulas are considered. The model classes of fuzzy structures of FHL are characterized by closure properties. We also (...) give comments on related topics proposed by N. Weaver. (shrink)
Essays on Wittgensteinian Themes Dedicated to Brian McGuinness Joachim Schulte, Göran Sundholm. PREFACE For thirty-five years the international community of philosophers have known Brian McGuinness as a major authority on the ...
Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...) many other Nash equilibria besides the one in which both players bid 1/2. At the same time, these behaviors seem to indicate that people are sometimes inclined to be cooperative, fair, and just. In his stimulating new book, Brian Skyrms sets himself the task of showing why these inclinations evolved, or how they might have evolved, under the pressure of natural selection. The goal is not to justify our ethical intuitions, but to explain why we have them.2.. (shrink)
Brian Z. Tamanaha has written extensively on realism in jurisprudence, but in his Realistic Theory of Law (2018), he uses "realism" in a commonplace way to ground a rough outline of legal history. While he refers to his method as genealogical, he does not acknowledge the complex tensions in the development of the philosophical use of that term from Nietzsche to Foucault, and the complex epistemological issues that separate them. While the book makes many interesting points, the methodological concerns (...) outweigh them in the overall assessment of the value of the work. (shrink)
In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.
I have argued that a proponent of the Frankfurt Cases as showing that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is false can successfully reply to the Dilemma Defense. In their 2013 paper, Widerker and Goetz offer a critique of my view, especially as regards the deterministic horn of the dilemma. Here I clarify my strategy of response to the Dilemma Defense and reply to the critique developed by Widerker and Goetz.
What does it mean to be conservative? What could it mean in the arts? Whoever merely conserves works of art may be a collector but is not an artist. Brahms’s trio op. 40 conserves the hand horn idiom. Yet its aesthetics will not be captured by the opposition of ‘conservative’ versus ‘progressive’. What is superior in terms of technology, Brahms maintained, need not be superior in terms of art.
As the author of Justice as Impartiality, I am not ashamed to admit that I was delighted by the liveliness of the discussion generated by it at the meeting on which this symposium is based. I am likewise grateful to the six authors for finding the book worthy of the careful attention that they have bestowed on it. Between them, the symposiasts take up many more points than I can cover in this response. I shall therefore focus on some themes (...) that cluster round the contractual device that I associate with the notion of justice as impartiality. Is it necessary? If it is not necessary is it nevertheless useful? Within an overall contractual framework is the form of contract that I propose uniquely justifiable? And does the form of contract that I defend generate the implications that I claim for it? (shrink)
We show that a finitely generated protoalgebraic strict universal Horn class that is filter-distributive is finitely based. Equivalently, every protoalgebraic and filter-distributive multidimensional deductive system determined by a finite set of finite matrices can be presented by finitely many axioms and rules.
In teaching jurisprudence, I typically distinguish between two different families of theories of adjudication—theories of how judges do or should decide cases. “Formalist” theories claim that the law is “rationally” determinate, that is, the class of legitimate legal reasons available for a judge to offer in support of his or her decision justifies one and only one outcome either in all cases or in some significant and contested range of cases ; and adjudication is thus “autonomous” from other kinds of (...) reasoning, that is, the judge can reach the required decision without recourse to nonlegal normative considerations of morality or political philosophy. I also note that “formalism” is sometimes associated with the idea that judicial decision-making involves nothing more than mechanical deduction on the model of the syllogism—Beccaria, for example, expresses such a view. I call the latter “Vulgar Formalism” to emphasize that it is not a view to which anyone today cares to subscribe. (shrink)
Horn's rule says that messages can be kept ambiguous if only a single interpretation is plausible. Speakers only perform costly disambiguation to convey surprising information. This paper shows that, while non?cooperative game theory cannot justify Horn's rule, evolutionary game theory can. In order to model the evolution of signalling, the pooling equilibrium needs to be one's starting point. But in such an equilibrium, the plausible interpretation is made, and the receiver is therefore already predisposed to interpret absence of (...) a signal as referring to a plausible event. From there on, a marked signal referring to an implausible event can evolve. At the same time, the paper identifies an exception to Horn's rule. If giving a plausible interpretation for an implausible event is very costly, then in the pooling equilibrium the implausible interpretation is always made. In this exceptional case, only an inefficient separating equilibrium disobeying Horn's rule can evolve. (shrink)
William Hasker replies to my arguments against Social Trinitarianism, offers some criticism of my own view, and begins a sketch of another account of the Trinity. I reply with some defence of my own theory and some questions about his.
Can we explain why some propositions are necessary? Blackburn (Fact, science, and value. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987) has presented a dilemma aimed at showing that the necessity of a proposition cannot be explained either in the case where the explanans is another necessary proposition (necessity horn) or in the case where the explanans is a contingent proposition (contingency horn). Blackburn’s dilemma is intended to show that necessary truth is an explanatorily irreducible kind of truth: there is nothing that explains (...) why propositions are necessary, nothing that makes necessary necessary truths. In this paper, I criticize the contingency horn of Blackburn’s dilemma. On the one hand, I show that the official reconstruction of the horn uses a principle that is incompatible with the notion of explanation plausibly needed to explain why propositions are necessary; on the other, I show that a simpler formulation of the horn, which does not make use of such a controversial principle, makes essential use of principles that are incompatible with the idea that possibilities can have explanatory roles. I then defend the view that possibilities can have explanatory roles, and that the explanatory role of possibilities is best represented, within possible worlds, as the existence of trans-world relations of explanation. (shrink)
The question at issue is to develop a computational interpretation of Girard's Linear Logic [Girard, 1987] and to obtain efficient decision algorithms for this logic, based on the bottom-up approach. It involves starting with the simplest natural fragment of linear logic and then expanding it step-by-step. We give a complete computational interpretation for the Horn fragment of Linear Logic and some natural generalizations of it enriched by the two additive connectives: and &. Within the framework of this interpretation, it (...) becomes possible to explicitly formalize and clarify the computational aspects of the fragments of Linear Logic in question and establish exactly the complexity level of these fragments. In particular, the simplest natural Horn fragment of Linear Logic is proved to be NP-complete. As a corollary, we obtain the affirmative solution for the problem ): whether the multiplicative fragment of linear logic is NP-complete. (shrink)
In "the semantics of singular terms," brian loar described and criticized a "causal" theory of reference and offered a new "description" theory. It is argued that the particular causal theory described is not to be found in the papers by donnellan and kripke cited as evidence for it, And is a straw man. Further "prima facie", Loar's new description theory fails to meet kripke's noncircularity condition. Should loar attempt to meet it, His theory is likely to run foul of (...) kripke's usual "arguments from ignorance and error" against description theories. (shrink)
Linear Logic was introduced by Girard as a resource-sensitive refinement of classical logic. In this paper we establish strong connections between natural fragments of Linear Logic and a number of basic concepts related to different branches of Computer Science such as Concurrency Theory, Theory of Computations, Horn Programming and Game Theory. In particular, such complete correlations allow us to introduce several new semantics for Linear Logic and to clarify many results on the complexity of natural fragments of Linear Logic. (...) As a main corollary, any non-deterministic and concurrent computation is proved to be simulated directly within the framework of each of these systems. (shrink)
Eschewing a Marxist interpretation of the French Revolution, Jeff Horn’s work is nonetheless interesting in stressing the widespread prevalence of machine-breaking by workers in France as compared to England during industrialisation. Likewise notable is Horn’s argument that the resultant state-intervention forced France onto a path of industrialisation which differed from England’s and which has been underestimated. Breaking with the revisionist consensus, Horn further demonstrates that the effect of the Revolution was positive for French economic development. Refreshing in (...) its stress on working-class militancy, Horn’s work nonetheless exaggerates the influence of machine-breaking on French economic change as compared to other forms of working-class struggle, the slow pace of primitive accumulation and the resistance to industrialisation by small-scale urban producers. (shrink)
In ‘The ethics of belief and Christian faith as commitment to assumptions’, Rik Peels attacks the views that I advanced in ‘Christianity and the ethics of belief’. Here, I rebut his criticisms of the claim that it is wrong to believe without sufficient evidence, of the contention that Christians are committed to that claim, and of the notion of that faith is not belief but commitment to assumptions in the hope of salvation. My original conclusions still stand.
Espen Hammer’s exceptionally fine book explores modern temporality, its problems and prospects. Hammer claims that how people experience time is a cultural/historical phenomenon, and that there is a peculiarly modern way of experiencing time as a series of present moments each indefinitely leading to the next in an ordered way. Time as measured by the clock is the paradigmatic instance of this sense of time. In this perspective time is quantifiable and forward-looking, and the present is dominated by the future. (...) Hammer argues that this manner of experiencing time provides a way of living that brings with it not only the basis for great successes in technology, but also great costs—specifically, what he calls the problems of transience and of meaning. Hammer goes about his task by considering the ways some of the great modern philosophers have characterized present-day temporality and have responded to the problems he has identified. Specifically, he considers what Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Habermas, Bloch, and Adorno provide in response to our peculiarly modern predicaments. The book is remarkable for its clarity and perceptiveness, but in the process in crucial places it simplifies the matters at hand or fails to push its insights as far as it ought, and in the end promises more than it can deliver. In this it betrays a rationalist confidence in the power of reason that founders on what in many ways remains a mystery. (shrink)
In his recent article, ‘A Gift to Theology? Jean-Luc Marion's ‘Saturated Phenomena’ in Christological Perspective’, Brian Robinette has critiqued Marion's phenomenology for confining theology to a one-sided approach to Christology, one that stresses only the passive, mystical reception of Christ. To correct this imbalance, Robinette brings Marion into dialogue with those more active Christologies or ‘prophetical-ethical’ liberation theologies of Gustavo Gutierrez, Johann Baptist Metz and others that stress a life-praxis focused on confronting evil and suffering. In this essay I (...) am arguing that Robinette has not fully developed the ‘logic’ of Marion's phenomenology of the ‘call and the gifted’, in which both a passive and an active element are operative. I explore more fully that very dynamic phenomenological process of the call-and-the-gifted as developed in Marion's work Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Once viewed in Christological perspective, and especially in light of Christ's death and resurrection, Marion's phenomenology entails an ethical trope consistent with the mission of Christ as rendered in Scriptural revelation, and thus the gap between Marion's work and the prophetical-ethical theologies of Gutierrez and Baptist Metz becomes narrowed. (shrink)
In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein proposes a bold new systematic strategy for developing social ontology. He explores the history and current state of the art and provides pointed critiques of leading theories in the field. His framework, incompassing frames that provide principles for grounding social facts, is developed in some detail across a variety of social practices and applied to revealing real world as well as hyporthetical examples. If Epstein's account holds, it should provide new directions and standards (...) of inquiry in both social sciecne and social philiosophy. (shrink)
Brian Trainor argues that the current hostility of political theorists towards the idea of the common good is in part due to the influence of Isaiah Berlin's concept of `value pluralism', or the incommensurability of basic human values. I agree with Trainor's opposition to the `agonistic' interpretation of pluralism, associated with thinkers like Chantal Mouffe. However, it is not the case that the only alternative to the pluralism— agonism thesis is the monist defence of a thick common good advocated (...) by Trainor. Between these extremes there is a middle way that accepts the deep plurality of values in Berlin's sense, but recognizes a case for a thin conception of the common good — that is, a liberal political framework. (shrink)
In this interview Prof. Brian Leftow answers questions concerning the causes of the emergence of Analytic Philosophical Theology within the analytic tradition; the advantages of maintaining the traditional picture of perfect being theology with regards to divine attributes; his conception about the origin of necessary truths; the problem of evil; and the importance for universities of investing in research on philosophical theology.
I am grateful to Alan Madry and Joel Richeimer for their intelligent and stimulating critique of my article “Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication.” It is the most interesting commentary I have seen on the paper, and I have learned much from it. It may facilitate discussion, and advance debate, to state with some clarity where exactly we agree and disagree. I leave to the footnotes discussion of certain minor points where Madry and Richeimer are guilty of some critical overreaching.
Brian Loar argues that we can account for the conceptual independence of coextensive terms purely psychologically, by appealing to conceptual rather than semantic differences between concepts, and that this leaves room for assuming that phenomenal and physical concepts can be coextensive on a posteriori grounds despite the fact that both sorts of concepts refer directly . I argue that Loar does not remove the mystery of the coextensiveness of those concepts because he does not offer any explanation of why (...) they should be coextensive. Secondly, I argue that even if we grant that phenomenal and physical concepts can be coextensive on a posteriori grounds, we are committed to holding that there are two different and essential modes of presentation of phenomenal properties, the physical and the phenomenal, and that this precludes us from seeing phenomenal properties as essentially physical in an unrelativized sense. (shrink)
Brian Leiter and Peter Kail have delivered thoughtful critiques of my book, Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century.1 It is a great pleasure to respond to these critiques, since they raise some crucial issues with regard to Nietzsche’s understanding of naturalism and normativity. On the one hand, there are many areas of agreement: Nietzsche’s philosophical project is best understood along the lines of naturalism; developments in the nineteenth-century life sciences, broadly speaking, play a crucial (...) role in the formation of Nietzsche’s naturalism; and Nietzsche’s relationship to both Darwin and Darwin’s neo-Kantian interpreters is more complex than generally assumed. On the... (shrink)