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Brian Loar [44]Brian F. Loar [1]
  1.  15
    Mind and Meaning.Brian Loar - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
    Is linguistic meaning to be accounted for independently of the states of mind of language users, or can it only be explained in terms of them? If the latter, what account of the mental states in question avoids circularity? In this book Brian Loar offers a subtle and comprehensive theory which both preserves the natural priority of the mind in explanations of meaning, and gives an independent characterisation of its features. It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often (...)
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  2.  66
    Phenomenal States (Second Version). In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere, Eds).Brian Loar - 1997 - In Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
  3. Phenomenal States.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
  4. Phenomenal States II.Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
  5. Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.
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  6.  61
    Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press. pp. 219.
  7. Social Content and Psychological Content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
     
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  8. Qualia, Properties, Modality.Brian Loar - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 1 (1):113-29.
  9.  40
    Review: David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Brian Loar - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465 - 472.
  10. The Semantics of Singular Terms.Brian Loar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.
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  11. 13 Thinking About Qualia.Brian Loar - 2007 - In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. pp. 451.
  12. Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  13.  70
    Subjective Intentionality.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.
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  14.  36
    David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Brian Loar - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465-472.
  15. Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions.Brian Loar - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.
  16.  95
    Reference From the First Person Perspective.Brian Loar - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:53-72.
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  17. Comments on John Campbell, Molyneux's Question.Brian Loar - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:319-324.
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  18.  44
    Names in Thought.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):169 - 185.
  19. Can We Explain Intentionality?Brian Loar - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
     
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  20.  58
    Reference and Propositional Attitudes.Brian Loar - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (1):43-62.
    Frege and quine notwithstanding, Some singular terms in belief contexts have normal reference but do not admit truth-Preserving substitution of co-Referential terms. The conditions of a sentence's being true of a sequence of referents may be partially determined by its singular terms; substitution may change those conditions, While preserving genuine reference. On one reading, 'n believes that f is g' is true iff n believes of the f that it is the f and is g.
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  21.  20
    Conceptual Role and Truth-Conditions: Comments on Harman's Paper: "Conceptual Role Semantics".Brian Loar - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (3):272-283.
  22. Ramsey's Theory of Belief and Truth.Brian Loar - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49--69.
     
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  23.  25
    Names and Descriptions: A Reply to Michael Devitt.Brian Loar - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):85 - 89.
  24.  46
    Is There a Good Epistemological Argument Against Concept-Externalism.Brian Loar - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:213-217.
  25.  47
    Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us?Brian Loar - 1999 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when they (...)
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  26.  34
    Self-Interpretation and the Constitution of Reference.Brian Loar - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:51-74.
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  27.  38
    Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us?Brian Loar - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when they (...)
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  28.  62
    Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties?Brian Loar - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 4:74-92.
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  29. Two Kinds of Content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. pp. 121--139.
     
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  30.  7
    Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58.
  31.  47
    Must Beliefs Be Sentences?Brian Loar - 1982 - Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643.
    Two naturalistic explications of propositional attitudes and their contents are distinguished: the language of thought based theory, on which beliefs are relations to sentences in the language of thought; and the propositional attitude based theory, on which beliefs are functional states of a functional system that does not imply a language of thought, although consistent with it. The latter theory depends on interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles; if these are not available, the language of thought theory has the advantage. But the (...)
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  32.  36
    The Varities of Reference.Brian Loar - 1984 - Philosophical Books 25 (1):46-51.
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  33.  1
    Mind and Meaning.William G. Lycan & Brian Loar - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):282.
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  34.  1
    Words and Deeds.Brian Loar & David Holdcroft - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):303.
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  35. Subjective Intentionality.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.
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  36.  9
    Syntax, Functional Semantics, and Referential Semantics.Brian F. Loar - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):89.
  37.  8
    Reply to Fodor and Harman.Brian Loar - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:662 - 666.
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  38.  33
    Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays by Brian Loar.Katalin Balog, Stephanie Beardman & Brian Loar (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    One of the most important problems of modern philosophy concerns the place of subjectivity in a purely physical universe. Brian Loar was a major contributor to the discussion of this problem for over four decades. This volume brings together his most important and influential essays in the philosophy of language and of mind.
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  39. Elimination Versus Nonreductive Physicalism.Brian Loar - 1992 - In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
     
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  40. Language, Thought, and Meaning.Brian Loar - 2006 - In Michael Devitt (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Malden Ma: Blackwell.
     
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  41. Mind and Meaning.Brian Loar - 1985 - Noûs 19 (1):99-105.
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  42. Sentence Meaning.Brian Loar - 1972
     
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  43. Truth Beyond All Verification.Brian Loar - 1987 - In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Martinus Nijhoff. pp. 81--116.
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  44. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics.Brian Loar - 1999 - Philosophy Documentation Center.
     
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  45. Directives and Norms [Manuscript by Brian Loar].Alf Ross & Brian Loar - 1968 - Humanities Press.
     
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