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Brian Loar [44]Brian F. Loar [1]
  1. Phenomenal States.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
  2.  42
    Mind and Meaning.Brian Loar - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
    Is linguistic meaning to be accounted for independently of the states of mind of language users, or can it only be explained in terms of them? If the latter, what account of the mental states in question avoids circularity? In this book Brian Loar offers a subtle and comprehensive theory that both preserves the natural priority of the mind in explanations of meaning, and gives an independent characterisation of its features. the nature of meaning and its relation to the mind (...)
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  3. Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.
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  4.  67
    Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts.Brian Loar - 1979 - Philosophical Review 91 (3):488-493.
    John Searle's Speech Acts made a highly original contribution to work in the philosophy of language. Expression and Meaning is a direct successor, concerned to develop and refine the account presented in Searle's earlier work, and to extend its application to other modes of discourse such as metaphor, fiction, reference, and indirect speech arts. Searle also presents a rational taxonomy of types of speech acts and explores the relation between the meanings of sentences and the contexts of their utterance. The (...)
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  5. Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press. pp. 219.
  6. Social Content and Psychological Content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
     
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  7. Phenomenal States (Second Version). In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere, Eds).Brian Loar - 1997 - In Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
  8.  14
    Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Brian Loar - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):273-280.
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  9. Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia.Brian Loar - 2002 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  10. Phenomenal States II.Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
  11. Qualia, Properties, Modality.Brian Loar - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):113-129.
  12. The Semantics of Singular Terms.Brian Loar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.
  13.  49
    David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Brian Loar - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465-472.
    David Chalmers’s book is impressive in many ways. I admire the great skill, incisiveness and breadth of vision with which he conducts his argument. Many of his controversial theses and intuitions I find congenial. Unfortunately I do not believe the book’s central thesis, namely, that facts about consciousness are not physical facts. Much of the book is devoted either to establishing this, or to considering how things stand in the light of it. Let me quote a passage in which Chalmers’s (...)
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  14.  58
    David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Brian Loar - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465 - 472.
    David Chalmers’s book is impressive in many ways. I admire the great skill, incisiveness and breadth of vision with which he conducts his argument. Many of his controversial theses and intuitions I find congenial. Unfortunately I do not believe the book’s central thesis, namely, that facts about consciousness are not physical facts. Much of the book is devoted either to establishing this, or to considering how things stand in the light of it. Let me quote a passage in which Chalmers’s (...)
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  15. Mind and Meaning.Brian Loar - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):157-159.
     
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  16.  94
    Subjective Intentionality.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.
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  17. 13 Thinking About Qualia.Brian Loar - 2007 - In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. pp. 451.
  18. Reference From the First Person Perspective.Brian Loar - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:53-72.
  19. Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions.Brian Loar - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.
  20.  81
    Reference and Propositional Attitudes.Brian Loar - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (1):43-62.
    Frege and quine notwithstanding, Some singular terms in belief contexts have normal reference but do not admit truth-Preserving substitution of co-Referential terms. The conditions of a sentence's being true of a sequence of referents may be partially determined by its singular terms; substitution may change those conditions, While preserving genuine reference. On one reading, 'n believes that f is g' is true iff n believes of the f that it is the f and is g.
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  21.  9
    Subjective Intentionality.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.
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  22.  52
    Names in Thought.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):169 - 185.
  23. Can We Explain Intentionality?Brian Loar - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
     
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  24.  36
    Conceptual Role and Truth-Conditions: Comments on Harman's Paper: "Conceptual Role Semantics".Brian Loar - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (3):272-283.
  25. Language, Thought, and Meaning.Brian Loar - 2006 - In Michael Devitt (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Malden Ma: Blackwell.
     
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  26. Comments on John Campbell, "Molyneux's Question".Brian Loar - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:319-324.
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  27. Two Kinds of Content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. pp. 121--139.
     
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  28.  34
    Names and Descriptions: A Reply to Michael Devitt.Brian Loar - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):85 - 89.
  29. Ramsey's Theory of Belief and Truth.Brian Loar - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49--69.
     
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  30.  10
    Words and Deeds.Brian Loar & David Holdcroft - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):303.
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  31.  62
    Must Beliefs Be Sentences?Brian Loar - 1982 - Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643.
    Two naturalistic explications of propositional attitudes and their contents are distinguished: the language of thought based theory, on which beliefs are relations to sentences in the language of thought; and the propositional attitude based theory, on which beliefs are functional states of a functional system that does not imply a language of thought, although consistent with it. The latter theory depends on interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles; if these are not available, the language of thought theory has the advantage. But the (...)
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  32.  26
    Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  33.  99
    Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties?Brian Loar - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 4:74-92.
  34.  58
    Is There a Good Epistemological Argument Against Concept-Externalism.Brian Loar - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:213-217.
  35.  60
    Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us?Brian Loar - 1999 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when they (...)
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  36.  42
    Self-Interpretation and the Constitution of Reference.Brian Loar - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:51-74.
  37.  41
    The Varities of Reference.Brian Loar - 1984 - Philosophical Books 25 (1):46-51.
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  38.  48
    Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us?Brian Loar - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when they (...)
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  39. Elimination Versus Nonreductive Physicalism.Brian Loar - 1992 - In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
     
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  40. Truth Beyond All Verification.Brian Loar - 1987 - In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Martinus Nijhoff. pp. 81--116.
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  41. Must Beliefs Be Sentences?Brian Loar - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627-643.
    Two naturalistic explications of propositional attitudes and their contents are distinguished: the language of thought based theory, on which beliefs are relations to sentences in the language of thought; and the propositional attitude based theory, on which beliefs are functional states of a functional system that does not imply a language of thought, although consistent with it. The latter theory depends on interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles; if these are not available, the language of thought theory has the advantage. But the (...)
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  42.  21
    Syntax, Functional Semantics, and Referential Semantics.Brian F. Loar - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):89-90.
  43.  10
    Reply to Fodor and Harman.Brian Loar - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:662 - 666.
  44. Sentence Meaning.Brian Loar - 1972
     
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  45. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics.Brian Loar - 1999 - Philosophy Documentation Center.
     
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