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Brian P. Mclaughlin [92]Brian Paul Mclaughlin [1]
  1. The Computational Brain.Patricia S. Churchland, Terrence J. Sejnowksi & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):137.
  2. There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
  3. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work.Jerry A. Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1990 - Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
  4.  14
    The Skewed View From Here.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):231-299.
    The paper offers a partial, broad-stroke sketch of visual perception, and argues that certain kinds of normal visual misperceptions are systematic and widespread.
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  5. On the Matter of Robot Minds.Brian P. McLaughlin & David Rose - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.
    The view that phenomenally conscious robots are on the horizon often rests on a certain philosophical view about consciousness, one we call “nomological behaviorism.” The view entails that, as a matter of nomological necessity, if a robot had exactly the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as a phenomenally conscious being, then the robot would be phenomenally conscious; indeed it would have all and only the states of phenomenal consciousness that the phenomenally conscious being in question has. We experimentally (...)
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  6. In Defense of New Wave Materialism: A Response to Horgan and Tienson.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
  7. Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 97-154.
     
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  8. Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172.
    Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including (...)
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  9.  94
    Varieties of Supervenience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1995 - In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16--59.
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  10.  4
    Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Brian P. McLaughlin & Fred Dretske - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):641.
  11.  59
    Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.
    00 Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as ...
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  12. True Colours.Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):335-340.
    (Tye 2006) presents us with the following scenario: John and Jane are both stan- dard human visual perceivers (according to the Ishihara test or the Farnsworth test, for example) viewing the same surface of Munsell chip 527 in standard conditions of visual observation. The surface of the chip looks “true blue” to John (i.e., it looks blue not tinged with any other colour to John), and blue tinged with green to Jane.1 Tye then in effect poses a multiple choice question.
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  13. The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
     
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  14. Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Ernest Lepore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) - 1985 - Blackwell.
  15.  88
    Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.
  16. Introduction.Tim Crane & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):211-15.
    Jerry Fodor, by common agreement, is one of the world’s leading philosophers. At the forefront of the cognitive revolution since the 1960s, his work has determined much of the research agenda in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology for well over 40 years. This special issue dedicated to his work is intended both as a tribute to Fodor and as a contribution to the fruitful debates that his work has generated. One philosophical thesis that has dominated Fodor’s (...)
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  17. Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism?Brian P. Mclaughlin - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  18. Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):209-30.
  19.  98
    Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson.Vann Mcgee & Brian P. Mclaughlin - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (1):123-136.
  20.  92
    The Lessons of the Many.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):129-151.
  21.  35
    Review of Sydney Shoemaker, Physical Realization[REVIEW]Brian P. McLaughlin - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
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  22.  23
    Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 431--444.
  23. Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
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  24. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind.Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.) - 2007 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  25.  73
    The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (2):163-190.
  26.  49
    McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  27. Consciousness, Type Physicalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.
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  28. The Truth About 'the Truth About True Blue'.Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):162–166.
    It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in (...)
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  29. A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response to Block's Harder Problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.
    widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that we are phenomenally consciousness, and that there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated in nonphenomenal terms . 1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject.
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  30.  37
    Why Not Color Physicalism Without Color Absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.
    We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.
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  31.  7
    There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy.Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
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  32.  30
    Dretske and His Critics.Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.) - 1991 - Blackwell.
  33. Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materialism. [REVIEW]Brian P. Mclaughlin - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):206-214.
  34. The Contributions of U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart to the Identity Theory of Consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin & Ronald J. Planer - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 103-128.
  35. On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    [Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is true.
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  36. The Representational Vs. The Relational View of Visual Experience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:239-262.
    In Reference and Consciousness, John Campbell attempts to a make a case that what he calls of visual experience, a view that he champions, is superior to what he calls . I argue that his attempt fails. In section 1, I spell out the two views. In section 2, I outline Campbell's case that the Relational View is superior to the Representational View and offer a diagnosis of where Campbell goes wrong. In section 3, I examine the case in detail (...)
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  37.  62
    Perception, Causation, and Supervenience.Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):569-592.
    While a necessary condition for perceiving a physical object is that the object cause the perceiver to undergo a sense experience, this condition is not sufficient. causal theorists attempt to provide a sufficient condition by placing constraints on the way the object causes the perceiver's experience. i argue that this is not possible since the relationship between a perceiver's experience and an object in virtue of which the perceiver perceives the object does not supervene on any of the ways in (...)
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  38.  35
    On Punctate Content and on Conceptual Role.Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):653-660.
  39.  49
    Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):93-118.
    [Brian P. McLaughlin] In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the (...)
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  40. Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge.Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 285--320.
  41. Self-Knowledge, Externalism and Scepticism: II--David Owens, Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume.David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):119-142.
    [FIRST PARAGRAPHS]The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world. Professor McLaughlin asks whether these hypotheses are coherent and thus whether they can tell us anything about what are entitled to believe, or to claim to know. He concludes that, semantic externalism notwithstanding, these hypotheses are both coherent and threatening. I shall not question this conclusion but I do wonder whether the fate of (...)
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  42.  1
    Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Ernest Lepore & Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (1):120-123.
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  43.  22
    Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 36.
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  44.  39
    Dennett's Logical Behaviorism.Brian P. McLaughlin & John O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):189-258.
  45. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  46. Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1985 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
     
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  47.  31
    Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1992 - Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.
    Smolensky's (1995) proposal for a connectionist explanation of systematicity doesn't work.
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  48. Lewis on What Distinguishes Perception From Hallucination.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1996 - In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
     
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  49.  7
    Tye on Connectionism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 185 (S1):185-193.
  50. Actions and Events, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Ernest Lepore & Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):542-544.
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