167 found
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  1.  50
    Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.
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  2.  56
    Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - Yale University Press.
  3.  60
    Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand (...)
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  4. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure.Brian Skyrms - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much (...)
     
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  5. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
  6.  26
    Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
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  7. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic.Brian Skyrms - 1966 - Dickenson Pub. Co..
    Preface. I. BASICS OF LOGIC. Introduction. The Structure of Simple Statements. The Structure of Complex Statements. Simple and Complex Properties. Validity. 2. PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC. Introduction. Arguments. Logic. Inductive versus Deductive Logic. Epistemic Probability. Probability and the Problems of Inductive Logic. 3. THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Hume’s Argument. The Inductive Justification of Induction. The Pragmatic Justification of Induction. Summary. IV. THE GOODMAN PARADOX AND THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Regularities and Projection. The Goodman Paradox. The Goodman (...)
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  8. Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):604-606.
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  9.  37
    Choice and Chance.Brian Skyrms - 1966 - Belmont, Calif., Dickenson Pub. Co..
  10.  55
    Signals.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.
  11.  19
    The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.
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  12. Higher Order Degrees of Belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.
     
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  13. Self-Assembling Networks.Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms & Aydin Mohseni - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):1-25.
    We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...)
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  14.  16
    Causal Necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):329-335.
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  15. Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling.Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin Zollman - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  16.  42
    Propositional Content in Signals.Brian Skyrms & Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 74:34-39.
    Propositional content arises from the practice of signaling with information transfer when a signaling process settles into some sort of a pattern, and eventually what we call meaning or propositional content crystallizes out. We give an evolutionary account of this process.
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  17. Tractarian Nominalism.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):199 - 206.
  18.  72
    Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.
    The question of coherence of rules for changing degrees of belief in the light of new evidence is studied, with special attention being given to cases in which evidence is uncertain. Belief change by the rule of conditionalization on an appropriate proposition and belief change by "probability kinematics" on an appropriate partition are shown to have like status.
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  19.  39
    Self-Assembling Games.Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):329-353.
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
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  20. Causal Decision Theory.Brian Skyrms - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):695-711.
  21.  24
    Probabilistic Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):447.
  22.  18
    Sex and Justice.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):305-320.
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  23.  49
    Self-Assembling Games.Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms - unknown
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
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  24.  99
    Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays is on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams's work the contributions extend his ideas in (...)
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  25. Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.
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  26. Bargaining With Neighbors.Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588-598.
  27. The Explication of "X Knows That P".Brian Skyrms - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):373-389.
  28. The Flow of Information in Signaling Games.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.
    Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.
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  29. Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics.Brian Skyrms - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (5):323 - 332.
  30. A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation.Brian Skyrms - unknown
    This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected on April 27, 1999.
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  31.  39
    Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.Brian Skyrms, Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle & and Stanislav Volkov - manuscript
    We consider the following signaling game. Nature plays first from the set {1, 2}. Player 1 (the Sender) sees this and plays from the set {A, B}. Player 2 (the Receiver) sees only Player 1’s play and plays from the set {1, 2}. Both players win if Player 2’s play equals Nature’s play and lose otherwise. Players are told whether they have won or lost, and the game is repeated. An urn scheme for learning coordination in this game is as (...)
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  32.  46
    Updating, Supposing, and Maxent.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.
  33.  58
    EPR: Lessons for Metaphysics.Brian Skyrms - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):245-255.
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  34.  15
    Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588.
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  35.  7
    Inventing New Signals.Jason McKenzie Alexander, Brian Skyrms & Sandy L. Zabell - 2012 - Dynamic Games and Applications 2 (1):129-145.
    Amodel for inventing newsignals is introduced in the context of sender–receiver games with reinforcement learning. If the invention parameter is set to zero, it reduces to basic Roth–Erev learning applied to acts rather than strategies, as in Argiento et al.. If every act is uniformly reinforced in every state it reduces to the Chinese Restaurant Process—also known as the Hoppe–Pólya urn—applied to each act. The dynamics can move players from one signaling game to another during the learning process. Invention helps (...)
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  36.  72
    Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.
    The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be (...)
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  37.  60
    A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments?Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):320-328.
    Maher (1992b) advances an objection to dynamic Dutch-book arguments, partly inspired by the discussion in Levi (1987; in particular by Levi's case 2, p. 204). Informally, the objection is that the decision maker will "see the dutch book coming" and consequently refuse to bet, thus escaping the Dutch book. Maher makes this explicit by modeling the decision maker's choices as a sequential decision problem. On this basis he claims that there is a mistake in dynamic coherence arguments. There is really (...)
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  38.  47
    Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games.Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms & Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-19.
    We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with (...)
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  39. The Stag Hunt.Brian Skyrms - 2001 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2):31 - 41.
    If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." Rousseau's story of the hunt leaves many questions open. What are the values of a hare and of an individual's share of the deer given a successful hunt? What is the probability that (...)
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  40.  50
    Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
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  41.  95
    Logical Atoms and Combinatorial Possibility.Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (5):219-232.
  42.  35
    Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.
  43.  64
    The Structure of Radical Probabilism.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.
    Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.
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  44.  7
    Science and Subjectivity.Brian Skyrms - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (24):794-799.
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  45.  40
    Return of the Liar: Three-Valued Logic and the Concept of Truth.Brian Skyrms - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (2):153-161.
  46.  60
    Maximum Entropy Inference as a Special Case of Conditionalization.Brian Skyrms - 1985 - Synthese 63 (1):55 - 74.
  47.  41
    The Value of Knowledge.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14:245-266.
  48.  66
    Evolution of Moral Norms.William Harms & Brian Skyrms - unknown
    Moral norms are the rules of morality, those that people actually follow, and those that we feel people ought to follow, even when they don’t. Historically, the social sciences have been primarily concerned with describing the many forms that moral norms take in various cultures, with the emerging implication that moral norms are mere arbitrary products of culture. Philosophers, on the other hand, have been more concerned with trying to understand the nature and source of rules that all cultures ought (...)
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  49.  56
    Carnapian Inductive Logic for Markov Chains.Brian Skyrms - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):439 - 460.
    Carnap's Inductive Logic, like most philosophical discussions of induction, is designed for the case of independent trials. To take account of periodicities, and more generally of order, the account must be extended. From both a physical and a probabilistic point of view, the first and fundamental step is to extend Carnap's inductive logic to the case of finite Markov chains. Kuipers (1988) and Martin (1967) suggest a natural way in which this can be done. The probabilistic character of Carnapian inductive (...)
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  50.  44
    Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms.Brian Skyrms & Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):265-273.
    In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society . We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this ‘irrational’ behavior might result from a single norm which governs behavior in multiple games. (...)
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