164 found
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  1.  46
    Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.
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  2. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure.Brian Skyrms - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much (...)
     
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  3.  54
    Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand (...)
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  4.  52
    Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - Yale University Press.
  5.  52
    Signals.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.
  6.  22
    Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
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  7. Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):604-606.
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  8. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
     
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  9. .Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In The Role of Causal Factors in Rational Decision. Yale University Press.
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  10.  36
    Self-Assembling Games.Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):329-353.
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
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  11. Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling.Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin Zollman - 2009 - Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  12.  11
    Causal Necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):329-335.
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  13. Bargaining With Neighbors.Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588-598.
  14. Self-Assembling Networks.Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms & Aydin Mohseni - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):1-25.
    We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...)
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  15.  16
    The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.
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  16.  46
    Self-Assembling Games.Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms - unknown
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
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  17. Higher Order Degrees of Belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.
  18.  13
    Sex and Justice.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):305-320.
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  19.  39
    Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.Brian Skyrms, Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle & and Stanislav Volkov - manuscript
    We consider the following signaling game. Nature plays first from the set {1, 2}. Player 1 (the Sender) sees this and plays from the set {A, B}. Player 2 (the Receiver) sees only Player 1’s play and plays from the set {1, 2}. Both players win if Player 2’s play equals Nature’s play and lose otherwise. Players are told whether they have won or lost, and the game is repeated. An urn scheme for learning coordination in this game is as (...)
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  20.  65
    Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.
    The question of coherence of rules for changing degrees of belief in the light of new evidence is studied, with special attention being given to cases in which evidence is uncertain. Belief change by the rule of conditionalization on an appropriate proposition and belief change by "probability kinematics" on an appropriate partition are shown to have like status.
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  21. A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation.Brian Skyrms - unknown
    This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected on April 27, 1999.
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  22. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic.Brian Skyrms - 1966 - Dickenson Pub. Co..
  23.  6
    Inventing New Signals.Jason McKenzie Alexander, Brian Skyrms & Sandy L. Zabell - 2012 - Dynamic Games and Applications 2 (1):129-145.
    Amodel for inventing newsignals is introduced in the context of sender–receiver games with reinforcement learning. If the invention parameter is set to zero, it reduces to basic Roth–Erev learning applied to acts rather than strategies, as in Argiento et al.. If every act is uniformly reinforced in every state it reduces to the Chinese Restaurant Process—also known as the Hoppe–Pólya urn—applied to each act. The dynamics can move players from one signaling game to another during the learning process. Invention helps (...)
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  24.  20
    Probabilistic Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):447.
  25.  34
    Choice and Chance.Brian Skyrms - 1966 - Belmont, Calif., Dickenson Pub. Co..
  26.  35
    Propositional Content in Signals.Brian Skyrms & Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 74:34-39.
    Propositional content arises from the practice of signaling with information transfer when a signaling process settles into some sort of a pattern, and eventually what we call meaning or propositional content crystallizes out. We give an evolutionary account of this process.
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  27.  45
    Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games.Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms & Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-19.
    We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with (...)
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  28. Tractarian Nominalism.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):199 - 206.
  29.  91
    Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays is on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams's work the contributions extend his ideas in (...)
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  30.  9
    Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588.
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  31. Causal Decision Theory.Brian Skyrms - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):695-711.
  32.  98
    The Flow of Information in Signaling Games.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.
    Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.
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  33.  91
    The Stag Hunt.Brian Skyrms - 2001 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2):31 - 41.
    If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." Rousseau's story of the hunt leaves many questions open. What are the values of a hare and of an individual's share of the deer given a successful hunt? What is the probability that (...)
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  34. Pragmatics and Empiricism.Brian Skyrms - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):514-516.
     
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  35. Models and Reality—A Review of Brian Skyrms’s Evolution of the Social Contract.Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, Branden Fitelson, Elliott Sober & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...)
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  36. The Dynamics of Norms.Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, (...)
     
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  37.  49
    Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
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  38.  71
    Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.
    The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be (...)
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  39.  58
    A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments?Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):320-328.
    Maher (1992b) advances an objection to dynamic Dutch-book arguments, partly inspired by the discussion in Levi (1987; in particular by Levi's case 2, p. 204). Informally, the objection is that the decision maker will "see the dutch book coming" and consequently refuse to bet, thus escaping the Dutch book. Maher makes this explicit by modeling the decision maker's choices as a sequential decision problem. On this basis he claims that there is a mistake in dynamic coherence arguments. There is really (...)
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  40.  41
    Updating, Supposing, and Maxent.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.
  41. Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.
  42.  11
    Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust.Brian Skyrms & Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 265.
  43.  90
    Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information.Brian Skyrms - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (3):407-428.
    Pre‐play signals that cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre‐play signals in an evolutionary setting for Assurance, or Stag Hunt, games and for a Bargaining game. The evolutionary game with signals is found to have dramatically different dynamics from the same game without signals. Signals change stability properties of equilibria in the base game, create new polymorphic equilibria, and change the basins (...)
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  44.  71
    Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers.Brian Skyrms - manuscript
    To coordinate action, information must be transmitted, processed, and utilized to make decisions. Transmission of information requires the existence of a signaling system in which the signals that are exchanged are coordinated with the appropriate content. Signaling systems in nature range from quorum signaling in bacteria [Schauder and Bassler, Kaiser ], through the dance of the bees [Dyer and Seeley ], birdcalls [Hailman, Ficken, and Ficken, Gyger, Marler and Pickert, Evans, Evans, and Marler, Charrier and Sturdy ], and alarm calls (...)
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  45.  93
    Logical Atoms and Combinatorial Possibility.Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (5):219-232.
  46. Sex and Justice.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):305-320.
  47.  19
    Learning to Signal with Probe and Adjust.Brian Skyrms - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):139-150.
    This is an investigation of the emergence of signaling using one kind of trial and error learning: probe and adjust.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about (...)
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  48.  41
    Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Game theory based on rational choice is compared with game theory based on evolutionary, or other adaptive, dynamics. The Nash equilibrium concept has a central role to play in both theories, even though one makes extremely strong assumptions about cognitive capacities and common knowledge of the players, and the other does not. Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the two theories. These differences are illustrated in a number of games that model types of interaction that are key ingredients for (...)
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  49.  57
    EPR: Lessons for Metaphysics.Brian Skyrms - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):245-255.
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  50. The Explication of "X Knows That P".Brian Skyrms - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):373-389.
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