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Briana Toole [6]Briana Marie Toole [1]
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Briana Toole
Claremont McKenna College
  1. From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression.Briana Toole - 2019 - Hypatia 34 (4):598-618.
    Standpoint epistemology is committed to a cluster of views that pays special attention to the role of social identity in knowledge‐acquisition. Of particular interest here is the situated knowledge thesis. This thesis holds that for certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know that p depends on some nonepistemic facts related to the epistemic agent's social identity. In this article, I examine two possible ways to interpret this thesis. My first goal here is to clarify (...)
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  2. Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology.Briana Toole - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):47-65.
    Standpoint epistemology, the view that social identity is relevant to knowledge-acquisition, has been consigned to the margins of mainstream philosophy. In part, this is because the principles of standpoint epistemology are taken to be in opposition to those which guide traditional epistemology. One goal of this paper is to tease out the characterization of traditional epistemology that is at odds with standpoint epistemology. The characterization of traditional epistemology that I put forth is one which endorses the thesis of intellectualism, the (...)
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  3. Recent Work in Standpoint Epistemology.Briana Toole - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):338-350.
    Within the last decade, burgeoning interest in the intersection of epistemology and social issues has generated a new set of research questions. These questions range from the relevance of social identity, to peer disagreement, to debates on the significance of moral considerations to epistemic evaluations, to discussions of our epistemic practices and how those practices exclude certain agents and certain bodies of knowledge. Central in this new and emerging body of work is the realization that epistemology has more to do (...)
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  4.  52
    What Lies Beneath: The Epistemic Roots of White Supremacy.Briana Toole - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Elizabeth Edenberg (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 76-94.
    Our ability to dismantle white supremacy is compromised by the fact that we don’t fully appreciate what, precisely, white supremacy is. In this chapter, I suggest understanding white supremacy as an epistemological system – an epistemic frame that serves as the foundation for how we understand and interact with the world. The difficulty in dismantling an epistemological system lies in its resilience – a system’s capacity to resist change to its underlying structure while, at the same time, offering the appearance (...)
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  5. Masculine Foes, Feminist Woes: A Response to Down Girl.Briana Toole - 2019 - APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy.
    In her book, Down Girl, Manne proposes to uncover the “logic” of misogyny, bringing clarity to a notion that she describes as both “loaded” and simultaneously “politically marginal.” Manne is aware that full insight into the “logic” of misogyny will require not just a “what” but a “why.” Though Manne finds herself largely devoted to the former task, the latter is in the not-too-distant periphery. -/- Manne proposes to understand misogyny, as a general framework, in terms of what it does (...)
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  6.  18
    Believing is Seeing: Feminist Philosophy, Knowledge, and Perception.Briana Toole - 2021 - In Elly Vintiadis (ed.), Philosophy by Women 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and Its Value. Routledge. pp. 161-168.
    “Seeing is believing!”, or so the old adage goes. Roughly, the idea expressed by the adage is this: one needs to see x before one is willing to believe that x exists. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which it is more apt to say that believing is seeing​. Expanding on the work of feminist epistemologists and critical race scholars, I consider a number of cases in which one needs to believe that x exists before one can see (...)
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