39 found
Order:
See also
Brie Gertler
University of Virginia
  1. Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    "Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  2. Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   124 citations  
  3. Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2010 - Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  4. Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.
    I elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more detailed picture of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  5. Introspecting Phenomenal States.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  6.  45
    Agency and Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Agency. Routledge.
    This chapter concerns self-knowledge of our mental states, with a focus on how we know our own beliefs and intentions. It examines the agentialist approach to self-knowledge, which is driven by the idea that believing or intending on the basis of reasons is something that we DO, and hence involves agency. Agentialists maintain that, because beliefs and intentions are exercises of agency, self-knowledge of these attitudes differs fundamentally from self-knowledge of states that we simply undergo, such as sensations. Specifically, agentialists (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  8. Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker?Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.
    Externalism about mental content is now widely accepted. It is therefore surprising that there is no established definition of externalism. I believe that this is a symptom of an unrecognized fact: that the labels 'mental content externalism' -- and its complement 'mental content internalism' -- are profoundly ambiguous. Under each of these labels falls a hodgepodge of sometimes conflicting claims about the organism's contribution to thought contents, the nature of the self, relations between the individual and her community, and the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. Overextending the Mind.Brie Gertler - 2007 - In Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind. Routledge. pp. 192--206.
    Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  10. Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments About the Mind.Brie Gertler - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):22-49.
    My aim here is threefold: to show that conceptual facts play a more significant role in justifying explanatory reductions than most of the contributors to the current debate realize; to furnish an account of that role, and to trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11. Arguing About the Mind.Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.) - 2007 - Routledge.
    _Arguing About the Mind_ is an accessible, engaging introduction to the core questions in the philosophy of mind. This collection offers a selection of thought-provoking articles that examine a broad range of issues from the mind and body relation to animal and artificial intelligence. Topics addressed include: the problem of consciousness; the nature of the mind; the relationship between the mind, body and world; the notion of selfhood; pathologies and behavioural problems; animal, machine and extra-terrestrial intelligence. The editors provide lucid (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  12. A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.Brie Gertler - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.
    This paper calls into question the viability of materialist reduction of the phenomenal. I revisit the 'Knowledge Argument', which claims that there is information about the phenomenal which is not reducible to, nor even inferable from, information about the physical. I demonstrate the failure of the two chief strategies for blocking the Knowledge Argument: analyzing phenomenal knowledge as an ability, and construing it as knowledge of facts which are ontologically reducible to physical facts. Materialist reduction of the phenomenal is, thus, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  13. Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler (ed.) - 2003 - Ashgate.
    When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  14. Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 62-86.
    Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that those who endorse (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates About the Ontology of Consciousness.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    A primary goal of this chapter is to highlight neglected epistemic parallels between dualism and physicalism. Both dualist and physicalist arguments employ a combination of empirical data and armchair reflection; both rely on considerations stemming from how we conceptualize certain phenomena; and both aim to establish views that are compatible with scientific results but go well beyond the deliverances of empirical science. -/- I begin the chapter by fleshing out the distinctive commitments of dualism, in a way that illuminates the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):125-46.
    It is often said that we can know our own thoughts more directly or with more certainty than anyone else can know them. And this disparity is usually taken to be principled, in that we would not be the rational, reflective beings that we are without it. My aim is to trace the consequences of a principled disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge for what may be termed the “mechanics ” of self-knowledge . I use a new thought experiment to show (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  17. Self-Knowledge for Humans, by Quassim Cassam. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):269-280.
    With this provocative book, Quassim Cassam aspires to reorient the philosophical study of self-knowledge so as to bring its methodology and subject matter into line with recognizably human concerns. He pursues this reorientation on two fronts. He proposes replacing what he sees as the field’s standard subject, an ideally rational being he calls Homo Philosophicus, with a more realistic Homo Sapiens. And he proposes shifting the field’s primary focus from ‘narrow epistemological concerns’ to issues reflecting ‘what matters to humans’, such (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Introspection.Brie Gertler - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 76-111.
    Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  19. Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20. The Knowledge Argument.Brie Gertler - 2005 - In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan.
    The definitive statement of the Knowledge Argument was formulated by Frank Jackson, in a paper entitled “Epiphenomenal Qualia” that appeared in The Philosophical Quarterly in 1982. Arguments in the same spirit had appeared earlier (Broad 1925, Robinson 1982), but Jackson’s argument is most often compared with Thomas Nagel’s argument in “What is it Like to be a Bat?” (1974). Jackson, however, takes pains to distinguish his argument from Nagel’s. This entry will follow standard practice in focusing on Jackson’s argument, though (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion: A Reply to Michael Tye.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):689-694.
    The claim that there is an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties is perhaps the leading current challenge to materialist views about the mind. Tye tries to block this challenge, not by providing an explanation to bridge the gap but by denying that phenomenalphysical identities introduce an explanatory gap. Since an explanatory gap exists only if there is something unexplained that needs explaining, and something needs explaining only if it can be explained , there is no gap. Tyes strategy (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. We Can't Know a Priori That H2O Exists. But Can We Know a Priori That Water Does?Brie Gertler - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):44-47.
    Goldberg (2003) defends externalism from Boghossian's (1998) version of the "armchair knowledge" objection. I argue here that, while Goldberg's challenge blocks a different version of this objection, it does not directly block Boghossian's version. And Goldberg's approach is not promising as a response to Boghossian's version of the armchair knowledge objection.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24.  89
    How to Draw Ontological Conclusions From Introspective Data.Brie Gertler - 2003 - In Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. pp. 233.
  25. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced.Brie Gertler - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 202-216.
  26.  31
    The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):235-238.
    In self-attributing beliefs and desires, we exploit a method that is different from our methods for attributing such states to others. On one traditional diagnosis, this difference stems from the subject’s exclusive access to introspective evidence. Gallois rejects the “access to evidence” model of the epistemic difference between self-knowledge and other-knowledge; in this ambitious book he provides a non-introspectivist alternative account of first-person authority. His intriguing proposal is that rational subjects can know their consciously held propositional attitudes without observing their (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. The Role of Ignorance in the Problem of Consciousness: Critical Review of Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2006).Brie Gertler - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):378-393.
    The plain man thinks that material objects must certainly exist, since they are evident to the senses. Whatever else may be doubted, it is certain that anything you can bump into must be real; this is the plain man’s metaphysic. This is all very well, but the physicist comes along and shows that you never bump into anything: even when you run your hand along a stone wall, you do not really touch it. When you think you touch a thing, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. The Relationship Between Phenomenality and Intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness.Brie Gertler - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Charles Siewert offers a persuasive argument to show that the presence of certain phenomenal features logically suffices for the presence of certain intentional ones. He claims that this shows that phenomenal features are inherently intentional. I argue that he has not established the latter thesis, even if we grant the logical sufficiency claim. For he has not ruled out a rival alternative interpretation of the relevant data, namely, that intentional features are inherently phenomenal.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. The Subject's Point of View – Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.
    Farkas’ ambitious agenda is to advance a strongly internalist account of the mental. She makes impressive strides towards achieving this goal. Along the way, she presents important new arguments on a number of topics, including: how best to understand the ‘twin’ cases used in debates about content, the alleged incompatibility of content externalism and privileged access, and the prospects for defending Frege’s claim that sense determines reference. In this review, I survey a number of her arguments and raise some questions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Introduction to Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2003 - In Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  91
    Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis:From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Brie Gertler - 1999 - Ethics 110 (1):202-205.
  32.  87
    Can Feminists Be Cartesians?Brie Gertler - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (1):91-112.
    I defend one leading strand of Descartes's thought against feminist criticism. I will show that Descartes's “first-person” approach to our knowledge of minds, which has been criticized on feminist grounds, is at least compatible with key feminist views. My argument suggests that this strand of Cartesianism may even bolster some central feminist positions.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  85
    Functionalism’s Methodological Predicament.Brie Gertler - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):77-94.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  43
    Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Johannes Roessler and Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology , Oxford, 2003, 400pp, $29.95 (pbk), ISBN 019924562..
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  31
    Tienson’s Challenge to Content Externalism.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):60-65.
    In this commentary, I examine John Tienson’s argument that reflection on the epistemic situation of the Cartesian meditator suggests that intentional content is narrow. My aim is to show how his argument is closely connected to another prominent objection to externalism—the McKinsey argument.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  24
    Review of John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness[REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (1).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  9
    Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds.Brie Gertler - 2004 - ProtoSociology 20:261-284.
    I will present a conceptual argument for a simulationist answer to (2). Given that our conception of mental states is employed in attributing mental states to others, a simulationist answer to (2) supports a simulationist answer to (1). I will not address question (3). Answers to (1) and (2) do not yield an answer to (3), since (1) and (2) concern only our actual practices and concepts. For instance, an error theory about (1) and (2) would say that our practices (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. An Introspectivist View of the Mental.Brie Gertler - 1997 - Dissertation, Brown University
    My dissertation has three interrelated aims: to defend introspectivism, the view that the deliverances of introspection should be basic data for philosophical theories of the mind, from pivotal objections which inspire the currently prevailing anti-introspectivist approach to mentality; to advance a substantive account of introspection; and to lay the groundwork for a more general theory about the mental. ;I begin by analyzing a host of philosophical problems about the mind; in each, I isolate the source of perplexity in an epistemic (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Internalism, Externalism, and Accessibilism.Brie Gertler - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-knowledge, and Skepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-141.
    Feldman and Conee (2001) observed that the term “internalism”, as used in epistemology, is ambiguous. It sometimes denotes the view that justification supervenes on factors within the thinker (“mentalism”), whereas at other times it refers to the view that justification is accessible to the thinker (“accessibilism”). As used in the debate about mental content, “internalism” corresponds to mentalism. Strikingly, however, it is the question of accessibilism that is the target of many internalist and externalist arguments. In this paper I argue (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark