El trabajo desarrolla una crítica y una propuesta sobre el uso de la calificación de vulnerable desde una perspectiva de género. A partir de un análisis crítico del concepto de autonomía clásica, se propone como científicamente más productiva la noción de autonomía relacional, que se considera más apta para explicar las acciones humanas reales, de personas no idealizadas, y se revela capaz de dar sentido al caso de las acciones relativamente constreñidas. Desde esta perspectiva se aborda el análisis de algunos (...) casos reales de aplicación del derecho donde la calificación de vulnerabilidad aplicada al contexto se muestra útil para identificar un espacio de derecho positivo perjudicial para las mujeres o las minorías. (shrink)

Based on the personal experience of the author, who is involved in theatre projects with women convicts, the article moves across issues of detention, migration, and precarity. Foucault's concept of governmentality is instrumental in describing the arbitrary exercise of power on incarcerated people and their precarious living conditions. Life in jail is especially uncertain for clandestine migrants. In the article, recollections from the rehearsals of the show / racconti del corpo (Tales of the body) alternate with images and quotes from (...) the play, poems by women convicts, and reflections on detention as the ultimate condition of precarity for migrant women. (shrink)

È frequente in Borges il riferimento a Dante come a uno degli scrittori fondamentali per la creazione della propria poetica. I suoi Saggi danteschi e, in particolare, Il falso problema di Ugolino, consentono di rintracciare alcuni degli aspetti più pregnanti del legame che Borges stabilisce tra sé e lo scrittore toscano e di fare luce su alcuni dei principi chiave che guidano la poetica borgesiana. In particolare, l’episodio di Ugolino e, più precisamente, il verso , in cui Dante trasmette l’eterna (...) oscillante immagine di Ugolino [che] divora e non divora gli amati cadaveri, costituisce per Borges una delle massime espressioni di un principio estetico fondamentale per la propria poetica: la capacità di esprimere i fatti tramite allusioni – evitando quindi di limitarne le possibili infinite biforcazioni – piuttosto che attraverso la mera esposizione circostanziata. (shrink)

Riassunto: Al centro di questo lavoro è l’analisi di due disturbi acquisiti del linguaggio: l’afasia di Broca e l’afasia di Wernicke. Tradizionalmente, tali disturbi sono stati interpretati come deficit che colpiscono le funzioni legate, rispettivamente, alla produzione articolatoria e alla comprensione del parlato in seguito a lesioni in due specifiche regioni cerebrali: nel caso dell’afasia di Broca, la terza circonvoluzione frontale sinistra; nel caso dell’afasia di Wernicke, la porzione posteriore del giro temporale superiore sinistro. Per tale ragione, queste due regioni (...) cerebrali, a cui ci si riferisce anche nei termini di area di Broca e area di Wernicke, sono state considerate le sedi neuroanatomiche della produzione e comprensione del linguaggio. Questo articolo mostra che, alla luce delle ricerche condotte negli ultimi decenni: non è più possibile sul piano dei deficit linguistici continuare a considerare l’afasia di Broca e l’afasia di Wernicke come disturbi unitari; non è più possibile continuare a sostenere l’esclusiva localizzazione delle funzioni di produzione e comprensione del linguaggio nelle due regioni cerebrali ad esse classicamente associate. Parole chiave: Afasia di Broca; Afasia di Wernicke; Area di Broca; Area di Wernicke; Disturbi del linguaggio; Localizzazione cerebrale; Neuroscienze Broca’s and Wernicke’s Aphasias in the Light of Contemporary Neuroscience: This paper analyzes two acquired language disorders: Broca’s aphasia and Wernicke’s aphasia. It has been commonly suggested that these disorders respectively affect functions related to speech production and language comprehension and they have been understood to result from two specific types of brain lesions: Broca’s aphasia from lesions in the third left frontal convolution; Wernicke’s aphasia from lesions in the posterior section of the left superior temporal gyrus. For this reason, these cerebral regions, also known as Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area, have long been viewed as the neuroanatomical correlates of language production and comprehension. This paper shows that in light of current research: with regard to language disorders, it is no longer possible to conceive of Broca’s and Wernicke's aphasias as unitary disorders; with regard to the cerebral localization of linguistic functions, it no longer possible to suggest that Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas are the only regions involved in speech production and comprehension. Keywords: Broca’s Aphasia; Wernicke’s Aphasia; Broca’s Area; Wernicke’s Area; Language Impairments; Cerebral Localization; Neuroscience. (shrink)

Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our (...) environment? How does perception bring about conscious mental states? How does a perceptual system accomplish the feat of converting varying informational input into mental representations of invariant features in our environment? -/- This book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research. So it develops an account of perception that provides an answer to the first two questions, while being sensitive to scientific accounts that address the third question. The key idea is that perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities - for example the capacity to discriminate instances of red from instances of blue. Perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence are each analyzed in terms of this basic property of perception. Employing perceptual capacities constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content. The primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over their derivative employment in hallucination and illusion grounds the epistemic force of perceptual experience. In this way, the book provides a unified account of perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence. (shrink)

chapter on perception and bias including implicit bias.

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces (...) a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision. (shrink)

My replies to Errol Lord, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton's commentaries on The Rationality of Perception (2017).

This paper proposes that the question “What should I believe?” is to be answered in the same way as the question “What should I do?,” a view I call Equal Treatment. After clarifying the relevant sense of “should,” I point out advantages that Equal Treatment has over both simple and subtle evidentialist alternatives, including versions that distinguish what one should believe from what one should get oneself to believe. I then discuss views on which there is a distinctively epistemic sense (...) of should. Next I reply to an objection which alleges that non-evidential considerations cannot serve as reasons for which one believes. I then situate Equal Treatment in a broader theoretical framework, discussing connections to rationality, justification, knowledge, and theoretical vs. practical reasoning. Finally, I show how Equal Treatment has important implications for a wide variety of issues, including the status of religious belief, philosophical skepticism, racial profiling and gender stereotyping, and certain issues in psychology, such as depressive realism and positive illusions. (shrink)

In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every scientific argument, I argue, relies on philosophical assumptions. If the scientific argument succeeds, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means there could be a philosophical argument against common sense, each of whose premises is just as worthy (...) of belief as the scientist’s philosophical assumptions. If so, then the purely philosophical argument will also succeed. In part two I consider three motivations, each of which comprises a distinct philosophical methodology, for the opposing view: (1) the Moorean idea that common sense enjoys greater plausibility than philosophy; (2) case judgments should trump general principles; (3) reflective equilibrium and conservatism. I argue that all three motivations fail. (shrink)

There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s (...) environment. The chapter starts by motivating content externalism. It then argues that hallucinations are best understood in terms of a deficiency of veridical perceptual experiences. The chapter discusses the consequences of this thesis by developing a view of hallucinations that is committed to externalism about content. (shrink)

An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.

In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.

Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties.

I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.

I discuss the roles of journalism in aspirational democracies, and argue that they generate set of pressures on attention that apply to people by virtue of the type of society they live in. These pressures, I argue, generate a problem of democratic attention: for journalism to play its roles in democracy, the attentional demands must be met, but there are numerous obstacles to meeting them. I propose a principle of salience to guide the selection and framing of news stories that (...) I argue may help address the puzzle: the public-as-protagonist principle. -/- . (shrink)

Apin's cabinet of printed curiosities -- Thinking through plural images of logic -- The visible order of student lecture notebooks -- Visual thinking in logic notebooks and Alba amicorum -- The generation of art as the generation of philosophy.

Part 1. Energetic disturbances -- Energetic clutter gutter -- Energetic residue -- Energetic interference -- Personal atmosphere -- House anatomy -- Part 2. Plugging in -- creative clearing power -- Spiritual assistance -- Energy measurement (energy testing/dowsing) -- Part 3. Energy-clearing solutions (steps and protocols) -- House energy-clearing treatment (steps and protocol) -- Distance house energy-clearing treatment -- Business energy-clearing treatment -- Personal energy-clearing treatment (steps and protocol) -- Energy-clearing protocols for children, pets, and more!

This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...) with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 2, Page 434-453, March 2022.

Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can (...) play a role in bringing about belief without being a motivating reason for belief, thereby leaving room for practical considerations to serve as motivating reasons. I present two ways in which this can happen. First, agents can use evidence as a mere means by which to believe, with practical considerations serving as motivating reasons for belief, just as we use tools (e.g. a brake pedal) as mere means by which to do something (e.g. slow down) which we are motivated to do for practical reasons. Second, evidence can make it possible for one to choose whether or not to believe – a choice one can then make for practical reasons. These arguments push the debate between the evidentialist and the pragmatist into new territory. It is no longer enough for an evidentialist to insist that belief is impossible without evidence. Even if this is right, the outcome of the debate remains unsettled. It will hang on the ability of the evidentialist to respond to the new pragmatist strategy presented here. (shrink)

I. L'absence du monde humain -- II. Techno-nature élémentaire -- III. Résider dans la techno-imagination.

Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons (...) for action. Since the existence of genuine pragmatic reasons for action is common ground between the Evidentialist and the Pragmatist, this problem for the New Evidentialist arguments is fatal. The upshot is that the deadlock between these two positions is restored: neither side can claim to be in possession of an argument that could convince the other. As it happens, I myself favor Pragmatism about reasons for belief, and although I don't claim to be able to convince a committed Evidentialist, I do make a prima facie case for Pragmatism by describing particular scenarios in which it seems to be true. I then go on to develop my own preferred version of the view: Robust Pragmatism, according to which a consideration never constitutes a reason for believing a proposition purely in virtue of being evidence for it. (shrink)

The rapidly growing research on hybrid organizations in recent years suggests that these organizations may have particular abilities to facilitate institutional change. This article contributes to our understanding of change and, in particular, sustainable transformation in society by highlighting the importance of organizational forms. Looking more closely at the role of hybrid organizations in processes of path generation, we analyze the conditions under which hybrid organizations may enable path generation. A retrospective exploratory case study of the Swedish hybrid organization The (...) Natural Step confirms how hybrids can take part in- and may facilitate the early phases of path generation: assimilation and coalescence. The conclusion drawn is that hybrids have multivocal abilities that enable them to earn trust and authority to open up “neutral” spaces for orientation and connection between actors in separated sub-paths, and that this in turn may ease tensions and trigger dialogue and exchange, also between former opponents. Yet, as also seen in the case, this enabling position of the hybrid may be both fragile and temporary. (shrink)

This book reconstructs the impact of Plato's words for the modern reader. In the Republic, Plato presented his schematization of human intellectual development, and called for collaboration between writer and reader. The response presented in this book results in a new theoretical framework for engaging with Plato's dialogues. Susanna Saracco analyzes the epistemic function of Plato's written words and explores Plato's higher order pedagogy, in which students are not mere learners and teachers are not the depositories of the truth.

Yoga 365 presents a year's worth of daily readings that invite yoga lovers of every skill level to bring the inspiration they experience on their mats into their everyday lives. Each entry explores a mind-body theme such as balance, strength, and resilience in a short, illuminating paragraph that can be enjoyed in the morning or at bedtime, incorporated into a yoga session, or read on the go. Featuring a serenely beautiful hardcover and a spacious, color-washed interior, the package is as (...) calming in the hand as the readings are to the eye. Yogis will find it to be a motivating tool for personal growth and a lighthearted, gift-worthy way to share the joys of their practice with others. (shrink)

The introduction of social distancing, as part of efforts to try and curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, has brought about drastic disruption to the world of the performing arts. In the UK the majority of professional orchestral musicians are freelance and therefore self-employed. These players, previously engaged in enjoyable, busy, successful, portfolio careers, are currently unable to earn a living carrying out their everyday work of performing music, and their future working lives are surrounded by great uncertainty. The (...) aim of the present study was to examine how established professional musicians are experiencing this period, and to look for similarities and differences between the experiences of musicians in the middle of their performing careers, with those of older players. Single semi-structured interviews were carried out over Zoom with 24 freelance, self-employed orchestral musicians; 12 mid-career musicians aged 35–45, and 12 seasoned musicians aged 53 and over. Thematic analysis identified themes common to both groups: the loss of a much-loved performing career, missing music making and colleagues, and anxiety about the future of the music profession. It also identified differences between the two groups: challenges to their identity as a musician, the extent of their anxiety about finances, the extent of their emotional distress, attitudes toward practicing and engaging in collaborative music making, and confusion over future career plans. Findings are discussed with reference to lifespan models of musicians' career development, the PERMA model of wellbeing, and the concept of resilience. (shrink)

A number of Bayesians claim that, if one has no evidence relevant to a proposition P, then one's credence in P should be spread over the interval [0, 1]. Against this, I argue: first, that it is inconsistent with plausible claims about comparative levels of confidence; second, that it precludes inductive learning in certain cases. Two motivations for the view are considered and rejected. A discussion of alternatives leads to the conjecture that there is an in-principle limitation on formal representations (...) of belief: they cannot be both fully accurate and maximally specific. (shrink)