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Bruce Mangan [21]Bruce Burridge Mangan [1]
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Profile: Bruce Mangan
  1. Sensation's Ghost: The Nonsensory Fringe of Consciousness.Bruce Mangan - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not (...)
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  2.  14
    Taking Phenomenology Seriously: The "Fringe" and its Implication for Cognitive Research.Bruce Mangan - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2):89-108.
    Evidence and theory ranging from traditional philosophy to contemporary cognitive research support the hypothesis that consciousness has a two-part structure: a focused region of articulated experience surrounded by a field of relatively unarticulated, vague experience.William James developed an especially useful phenomenological analysis of this "fringe" of consciousness, but its relation to, and potential value for, the study of cognition has not been explored. I propose strengthening James′ work on the fringe with a functional analysis: fringe experiences work to radically condense (...)
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    Some Philosophical and Empirical Implications of the Fringe.Bruce Mangan - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2):142-154.
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    What Feeling Is the “Feeling of Knowing?”.Bruce Mangan - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):538-544.
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    The Uncanny Valley as Fringe Experience.Bruce Mangan - 2015 - Interaction Studies 16 (2):193-199.
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    Dennett, Consciousness, and the Sorrows of Functionalism.Bruce Mangan - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):1-17.
    Little is gained, and much lost, by casting an empirical theory of consciousness in a "functionalist" philosophical mold. Consciousness Explained is an instructive failure. It resurrects various behaviorist dogmas; it denies consciousness any distinct cognitive ontology; it obliquely adopts many long-standing research positions relating parallel and sequential processing to consciousness, yet denies the core assumption which produced this research; it takes parallel processing to be incompatible with educated common-sense views of consciousness , while in fact parallel processing is compatible with (...)
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  7. Cognition, Fringe Consciousness, and the Legacy of William James.Bruce Mangan - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 671--685.
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    Representation, Rightness and the Fringe.Bruce Mangan - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (9):75-82.
    So the central question here is phenomenological: What is the nature of the aesthetic zap? For it is this experience, or its promise, which gives art such a deep hold on human life. But the issue of representation, while secondary, is still pregnant with cognitive implications: Why is representation, of all the devices available to an artist, more likely to shift the odds in favour of eliciting and/or intensifying aesthetic experience? Assuming a Darwinian view of our species, it is likely (...)
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  9.  16
    The Fringe: A Case Study in Explanatory Phenomenology.Bruce Mangan - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):2-3.
    William James’ greatest achievement is, arguably, his analysis of the fringe -- or, as he sometimes called it, transitive experience. In trying to understand this vague, elusive, often peripheral aspect of consciousness, James broke new ground. But in so doing he also began to lay down the first stratum of a radically new methodology, one that intersects first- and third-person findings in such a way that each is able to interrogate the other, and so further our understanding of both.
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  10.  83
    Against Functionalism: Consciousness as an Information-Bearing Medium.Bruce Mangan - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. pp. 135-141.
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    It Don't Mean a Thing If It Ain't Got That Swing.Bruce Mangan - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (6-7):6-7.
    In ‘The Science of Art’ Ramachandran and Hirstein have written a vigorous, thought provoking paper. It raises many issues, but in the interest of brevity, I can only consider a few of them here.
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  12.  27
    Language and Experience in the Cognitive Study of Mysticism. Commentary on Forman.Bruce Mangan - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):250-252.
    [first paragraph]: Robert Forman's theory outlined in `Mysticism, language and the via negativa' reacts against an earlier account of mysticism which he calls constructivism'. Constructivism grew from a book of collected papers, Mysticism and philosophical analysis , contributed to and edited by Steven Katz. According to Forman, `the constructivist approach is, roughly, that of the historian [of ideas]' . But this characterization is much too generous.
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  13.  67
    Volition and Property Dualism.Bruce Mangan - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):29-34.
    My overall aim here is to intersect two issues central to Max Velmans' wide-ranging paper. The first concerns one of the most vexing problems in consciousness research — how best to approach the terms 'mental' and 'physical'. The second looks at the phenomenology of volition, and the degree to which information presumably necessary for making voluntary conscious decisions is, or is not, present in consciousness. Velmans offers three general reasons to motivate his position: the physical world is 'causally closed' to (...)
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  14.  25
    New Science for Old.Bruce Mangan & Stephen Palmer - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):480.
  15.  17
    Epi-Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
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    Empirical Status of Block's Phenomenal/Access Distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.
    P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”.
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    What's New Here?Bruce Mangan - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):160-161.
    O'Brien & Opie's (O&O's) theory demands a view of unconscious processing that is incompatible with virtually all current PDP models of neural activity. Relative to the alternatives, the theory is closer to an AI than a parallel distributed processing (PDP) perspective, and its treatment of phenomenology is ad hoc. It raises at least one important question: Could features of network relaxation be the “switch” that turns an unconscious into a conscious network?
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  18.  3
    Berkeley CA, USA. Email: Mangan@ Cogsci. Berkeley. Edu.Bruce Mangan - 1999 - In J. Shear & Francisco J. Varela (eds.), The View From Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic. pp. 249.
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  19. Peer Commentary and Responses 249.Bruce Mangan - 1999 - In J. Shear & Francisco J. Varela (eds.), The View From Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic. pp. 6--2.
     
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