4 found
See also
Bruno Guindon
Simon Fraser University
  1. Sources, reasons, and requirements.Bruno Guindon - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
    This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  2. Sources, raisons et exigences.Bruno Guindon - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):152-165.
    Il existe de nombreuses sources d’exigences. Certaines exigences sont normatives dans la mesure où elles impliquent des affirmations concernant ce que nous avons raison de croire, faire, désirer, etc. À ce titre, les exigences morales sont parmi les meilleures candidates. Si la morale exige que l’on tienne notre promesse, il semble que nous avons une raison de la tenir. Cependant, ce ne sont pas toutes les exigences qui sont normatives en ce sens. Le catholicisme exige que l’on assiste à la (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  69
    The Importance of Evaluating the Perspectival.Matt Bedke & Bruno Guindon - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):132-144.
    Errol Lord has proposed a novel theory of rationality, what he calls Reasons Responsiveness. The theory makes rationality depend on an interesting mix of how well an agent responds to their perspective and the factivity of that perspective. In short, it says that what it is to be rational is to respond correctly to possessed objective normative reasons. To get a sense of the view it helps to first introduce some alternatives.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
  4.  82
    Rationality has its reasons, of which reason knows not: A vindication of the normativity of rationality.Bruno Guindon - unknown
    There is a growing consensus, long maintained by Derek Parfit, that there is an important distinction between what we have reason to do on the one hand, and what it is rational for us to do on the other. Philosophers are now realising that there is a conceptual distinction between rationality and normativity. Given this distinction, it thus becomes a substantive question whether rationality is genuinely normative; that is, whether there is any reason to do what rationality requires. While some (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation