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Profile: Bruno Whittle (Glasgow University)
  1.  33
    Bruno Whittle (forthcoming). Self-Referential Propositions. Synthese:1-15.
    Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will befall (...)
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  2.  18
    Bruno Whittle (forthcoming). Proving Unprovability. Review of Symbolic Logic.
    This paper addresses the question: given some theory T that we accept, is there some natural, generally applicable way of extending T to a theory S that can prove a range of things about what it itself (i.e. S) can prove, including a range of things about what it cannot prove, such as claims to the effect that it cannot prove certain particular sentences (e.g. 0 = 1), or the claim that it is consistent? Typical characterizations of Gödel’s second incompleteness (...)
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  3. Bruno Whittle (2004). Dialetheism, Logical Consequence and Hierarchy. Analysis 64 (4):318–326.
    I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to the position itself.
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  4. Bruno Whittle (2010). There Are Brute Necessities. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):149-159.
    A necessarily true sentence is 'brute' if it does not rigidly refer to anything and if it cannot be reduced to a logical truth. The question of whether there are brute necessities is an extremely natural one. Cian Dorr has recently argued for far-reaching metaphysical claims on the basis of the principle that there are no brute necessities: he initially argued that there are no non-symmetric relations, and later that there are no abstract objects at all. I argue that there (...)
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  5.  44
    Bruno Whittle (forthcoming). Hierarchical Propositions. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-17.
    The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...)
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  6. Bruno Whittle (2009). Epistemically Possible Worlds and Propositions. Noûs 43 (2):265-285.
    Metaphysically possible worlds have many uses. Epistemically possible worlds promise to be similarly useful, especially in connection with propositions and propositional attitudes. However, I argue that there is a serious threat to the natural accounts of epistemically possible worlds, from a version of Russell’s paradox. I contrast this threat with David Kaplan’s problem for metaphysical possible world semantics: Kaplan’s problem can be straightforwardly rebutted, the problems I raise cannot. I argue that although there may be coherent accounts of epistemically possible (...)
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  7.  54
    Bruno Whittle (2012). Belief, Information and Reasoning. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.
    Here are two plausible ideas about belief. First: beliefs are our means of storing information. Second: if we believe something, then we are willing to use it in reasoning. But in this paper I introduce a puzzle that seems to show that these cannot both be right. The solution, I argue, is a new picture, on which there is a kind of belief for each idea. An account of these two kinds of belief is offered in terms of two components: (...)
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  8.  24
    Bruno Whittle (2015). On Infinite Size. In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 9. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-19.
    Cantor showed that there are infinite sets that do not have one-to-one correspondences between them. The standard understanding of this result is that it shows that there are different sizes of infinity. This paper challenges this standard understanding, and argues, more generally, that we do not have any reason to think that there are different sizes of infinity. Two arguments are given against the claim that Cantor established that there are different such sizes: one involves an analogy between Cantor’s result (...)
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  9.  19
    Bruno Whittle (2015). Reply to Vann McGee's 'Whittle's Assault on Cantor’s Paradise'. In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 9. Oxford University Press. pp. 33-41.
    This is a reply to Vann McGee’s response to my paper, ‘On Infinite Size’.
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  10.  10
    Bruno Whittle (forthcoming). Truth, Hierarchy and Incoherence. In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), The Relevance of the Liar. Oxford University Press.
    Approaches to truth and the Liar paradox seem invariably to face a dilemma: either appeal to some sort of hierarchy, or declare apparently perfectly coherent concepts incoherent. But since both options lead to severe expressive restrictions, neither seems satisfactory. The aim of this paper is a new approach, which avoids the dilemma and the resulting expressive restrictions. Previous approaches tend to appeal to some new sort of semantic value for the truth predicate to take. I argue that such approaches inevitably (...)
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  11. Bruno Whittle (2015). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 9. Oxford University Press.
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