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Bryon Cunningham [4]Bryon J. Cunningham [1]
  1. The Reemergence of 'Emergence'.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S63-S75.
    A variety of recent philosophical discussions, particularly on topics relating to complexity, have begun to reemploy the concept of 'emergence'. Although multiple concepts of 'emergence' are available, little effort has been made to systematically distinguish them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of higher-order properties that (inter alia) distinguishes three classes of emergent properties: (1) ontologically basic properties of complex entities, such as the mythical vital properties, (2) fully configurational properties, such as mental properties as they are conceived of (...)
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    The Reemergence of 'Emergence'.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):62-75.
    A variety of recent philosophical discussions, particularly on topics relating to complexity, have begun to reemploy the concept of 'emergence'. Although multiple concepts of 'emergence' are available, little effort has been made to systematically distinguish them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of higher-order properties that distinguishes three classes of emergent properties: ontologically basic properties of complex entities, such as the mythical vital properties, fully configurational properties, such as mental properties as they are conceived of by functionalists and computationalists, (...)
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    A Prototypical Conceptualization of Mechanisms.Bryon Cunningham - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:79-91.
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  4. Subduing Subjectivity and Capturing Qualia: A Reply to First-Person Isolationism in the Philosophy of Mind.Bryon J. Cunningham - 2000 - Dissertation, Emory University
    The current orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind can be thought of as a kind of third-person imperialism, viz. the view that consciousness, like other natural phenomena, will yield to scientific explanation at some level of analysis. Among its dissenters are a group of antireductionists and antimaterialists who advocate a kind of first-person isolationism, viz. the view that consciousness, unlike other natural phenomena, will fail to yield to scientific explanation at any level of analysis. In its various forms, the latter (...)
     
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    Capturing Qualia: Higher-Order Concepts and Connectionism.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):29-41.
    Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classifications of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scientific explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or subjective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, complex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental states from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanations. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, these higher-order classifications are compatible (...)
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