Burt C. Hopkins presents the first in-depth study of the work of Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein on the philosophical foundations of the logic of modern symbolic mathematics. Accounts of the philosophical origins of formalized concepts—especially mathematical concepts and the process of mathematical abstraction that generates them—have been paramount to the development of phenomenology. Both Husserl and Klein independently concluded that it is impossible to separate the historical origin of the thought that generates the basic concepts of mathematics from their (...) philosophical meanings. Hopkins explores how Husserl and Klein arrived at their conclusion and its philosophical implications for the modern project of formalizing all knowledge. (shrink)
As the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl has been hugely influential in the development of contemporary continental philosophy. In _The Philosophy of Husserl_, Burt Hopkins shows that the unity of Husserl’s philosophical enterprise is found in the investigation of the origins of cognition, being, meaning, and ultimately philosophy itself. Hopkins challenges the prevailing view that Husserl’s late turn to history is inconsistent with his earlier attempts to establish phenomenology as a pure science and also the view of Heidegger and Derrida, (...) that the limits of transcendental phenomenology are historically driven by ancient Greek philosophy. Part 1 presents Plato’s written and unwritten theories of _eidê_ and Aristotle’s criticism of both. Part 2 traces Husserl’s early investigations into the formation of mathematical and logical concepts and charts the critical necessity that leads from descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology. Part 3 investigates the movement of Husserl’s phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity. Part 4 presents the final stage of the development of Husserl’s thought, which situates monadological intersubjectivity within the context of the historical _a priori_ constitutive of all meaning. Part 5 exposes the unwarranted historical presuppositions that guide Heidegger’s fundamental ontological and Derrida’s deconstructive criticisms of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. _The Philosophy of Husserl_ will be required reading for all students of phenomenology. (shrink)
The article explores the relationship between the philosopher and historian of mathematics Jacob Klein’s account of the transformation of the concept of number coincident with the invention of algebra, together with Husserl’s early investigations of the origin of the concept of number and his late account of the Galilean impulse to mathematize nature. Klein’s research is shown to present the historical context for Husserl’s twin failures in the Philosophy of Arithmetic: to provide a psychological foundation for the proper concept of (...) number, and to show how this concept of number functions as the mathematical foundation of universal arithmetic. This context establishes that Husserl’s failures are ultimately rooted in the historical transformation of number documented in Klein’s research, from its premodern meaning as the unity of a multitude of determinate objects to its modern meaning as a symbolic representation with no immediate relation to a concrete multiplicity. The argum... (shrink)
The article explores the relationship between the philosopher and historian of mathematics Jacob Klein’s account of the transformation of the concept of number coincident with the invention of algebra and Husserl’s early investigations of the origin of the concept of number and his late account of the Galilean impulse to mathematize nature. Klein’s research is shown to present the historical context for Husserl’s twin failures in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, to provide a psychological foundation for the proper concept of number (...) and to show how this concept of number functions as the mathematical foundation of universal arithmetic. The argument is advanced that one significant result of bringing together Klein’s and Husserl’s thought on these issues is the need to fine-tune Husserl’s Crisis project of desedimenting the mathematization of nature. Specifically, Klein’s research shows that “a ‘sedimented’ understanding of numbers” “is superposed upon the first stratum of ‘sedimented’ geometrical ‘evidences’” uncovered by Husserl’s fragmentary analyses of geometry in the Crisis. In addition, then, to the task of “the intentional-historical reactivation of the origin of geometry” recognized by Husserl as intrinsic to the reactivation of the origin of mathematical physics, Klein discloses a second task, that of “the reactivation” of the “complicated network of sedimented significances” that “underlies the ‘arithmetical’ understanding of geometry.”. (shrink)
Two of Husserl’s most important, though fragmentary texts from the final phase of his thought, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and “The Origin of Geometry as an Intentional-Historical Problem,” focus on the themes of history and the life-world. It is well known that prior to these works Husserl sought to establish transcendental phenomenology as both a factually and an historically pure eidetic science. Thus the interpreter of the whole of Husserl’s thought is faced with the question of (...) whether his later focus on history and the life-world represents a significant departure from his previous thought. In what follows, I shall defend the thesis that it does not. Specifically, I shall argue that the completion of Husserl’s project of realizing the goal of First Philosophy in transcendental phenomenology renders necessary the turn both to history and to the life-world. In connection with this, I shall argue further that the peculiar phenomenological character of this necessity demands that the ‘concepts’ of history and life-world operative in Husserl’s last texts are taken to be inseparably rooted in a more original phenomenon. Husserl conceives this more original phenomenon as the crisis situation of the exemplars of European humanity, the philosophers, who, as the “functionaries of mankind” are faced with the “breakdown” situation of our time, with the “breakdown” of science itself. (shrink)
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
CONTENTS Carlo Ierna: The Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy. Part 1: From ber den Begriff der Zahl to Philosophie der Arithmetik Robin Rollinger: Scientific Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Logic: The Standpoint of Paul Linke\ Nicholas deWarren:The Significance of Stern's "PrSsenzzeit" for Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness Sen Overgaard: Being There: Heidegger's Formally Indicative Concept of "Dasein" Panos Theodorou: Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl's Analysis of 'Nature-Thing' in Ideas II Nam-In-Lee: Phenomenology of Feeling in Husserl and Levinas Wai-Shun Hung:Perception and Self-Awareness in (...) Merleau-Ponty:The Problem of the Tacit Cogito in the Phenomenology of Perception Ivan Chvatfk: Plato's Phaedo as an Aesopian Fable about the Immortal Soul Joshua Kates: Two Versions of Husserl's Late History: Jacob Klein and Jacques Derrida and the Problem of Modernity L. William Stern: Mental Presence-Time Edmund Husserl: Lecture on the Concept of Number Martina Stieler: Memories of Edmund Husserl Sen Overgaard: Transcendental Phenomenology and the Question of Transcendence: A Discussion of Damian Byers's Intentionality and Transcendence Damian Byers: Method and Discovery in Phenomenology: A Reply to Sen Overgaard Sen Overgaard: Inside Phenomenology: A Reply to Damian Byers. (shrink)
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl’s groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
"The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy Volume VI" includes important contributions by both established and emerging scholars working in the phenomenological tradition, together with first-time English translations of texts and documents whose phenomenological relevance transcends their considerable historical significance.
I compare Plato’s and Husserl’s accounts of the non-original appearance and the original with a focus on their methodologies for distinguishing between them and the phenomenological—i.e., the answer to the question of the what and how of their appearance—criteria that drive their respective methodologies. I argue that Plato’s dialectical method is phenomenologically superior to Husserl’s reflective method in the case of phantasmata that function as apparitions. Plato’s method has the capacity to discern the apparition on the basis of criteria that (...) appeal solely to its appearance, whereas Husserl’s method presupposes a non-apparent primitive distinction between the original qua primal impression and the phantasm as its reproductive modification. On the basis of Plato’s methodological superiority in this regard, I sketch a reformulation of the Husserlian approach to appearances guided by the original interrogative context of Plato’s dialectical account of the distinction between true and false appearances, eikones and phantasmata. (shrink)
I present the first systematic account in the literature of a Husserlian response to Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s account of the pre-givenness of both the absolute stream of lived-experience and its essencesEssences to reflectionReflections. My response is presented within the broader context of what I argue is Heidegger’s misappropriation of Natorp’s critique of the phenomenological limits of reflectionReflections in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology and the misguided French attempt to address Heidegger’s critique by introducing the dialectical notion of “pre-reflectivePre-reflective” consciousness to (...) phenomenology. My Husserlian response shows that Husserl’s account of reflectionReflections in Ideas I is able to rebut Natorp’s critical claims that transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology cannot access the streaming of the stream of lived-experience without “stilling” its flow and that a gap in Husserl’s account of the transformation of the natural phenomenonPhenomenon of reflectionReflections into transcendental reflectionReflections provides justification for Natorp’s criticism of the ambiguity of Husserl’s account in Ideas I of the givennessGivennesses of the essenceEssences of lived-experience investigated by transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology. (shrink)
James F. Sheridan Allegheny College As we come to the end of the century, an attentive student of con temporary European philosophy will no doubt be startled by a volume titled Husserl in Contemporary Context. Such philosophers are most likely to believe that Hussed has now been declared II classical" rather than a contemporary thinker or, worse, simply old fashioned. Access to Hussed today will most likely come through the allegedly definitive critiques of his work by Heidegger and Derrida and (...) to a lesser extent through the readings of his work by Levinas and Merleau Ponty although Merleau-Ponty himself has been declared old fashioned by some postmodems. Hence, if by II contemporary" one understands the problematic set by the work of the late Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, et. al., Hussed's work seems strange indeed in such a contemporary context, seems better understood as the last gasp of philosophy dominated by metaphysics and thus fit only for inclusion in courses in the history of philosophy. (shrink)
The paper argues that the ontology of Self behind Descartes’s paradigmatic modern account of passion is an obstacle to interpreting properly the account Socrates gives in the Symposium of the truth of Eros’s origin, nature, and gift to the philosophical initiate into his truth. The key to interpreting this account is located in the relation between Eros and the arithmos-structure of the community of kinds, which is disclosed in terms of the Symposium’s dramatic mimesis of the two Platonic sources of (...) being, the One Itself and the indeterminate dyad. This interpretation’s focus is the vulgar and philosophical dimensions of the phallic pun at the beginning of the dialogue. Both dimensions of the dialogue’s opening joke manifest the appearance of Eros in the dialogue as a distorted imitation of the koinonia of the greatest kinds: Being, Rest, Motion, the Same, and the Other. (shrink)
De acuerdo con la así llamada concepción platonista de la naturalezade las entidades matemáticas, las afirmaciones matemáticas son análogas alas afirmaciones acerca de objetos físicos reales y sus relaciones, con la diferencia decisiva de que las entidades matemáticas no son ni físicas ni espaciotemporalmente individuales, y, por tanto, no son percibidas sensorialmente. El platonismo matemático es, por lo tanto, de la misma índole que el platonismo en general, el cual postula la tesis de un mundo ideal de entidades –eídē– que (...) a la vez están separadas y son el fundamento cognitivo y ontológico del mundo real de cosas físicas que poseen propiedades espacio-temporales. Mientras que la no-identidad entre la concepción platonista de las entidades matemáticas y el platonismo del Platón “histórico” es frecuentemente reconocida tácita o explícitamente tanto por sus defensores como por sus críticos, su conexión con la crítica del Aristóteles “histórico” a la filosofía de Platón frecuentemente no es reconocida. Este artículo llama la atención sobre la conexión de Aristóteles con el así llamado platonismo tradicionalmente concebido y reconstruye un aspecto crucial de su crítica a la tesis originaria del chōrismós platónico que se pierde de vista a menos que se reconozca el objetivo verdadero de su crítica, la descripción platónica igualmente originaria de los números eidéticos.According to the so-called Platonistic conception of the nature of mathematical entities, mathematical statements are analogous to statements about real physical objects and their relations, with the one decisive difference that mathematical entities are neither physical nor individuated spatio-temporally and, thus, not perceived sensuously. Mathematical Platonism is therefore of a piece with Platonism in general, which posits the thesis of an ideal world of entities –eídē– that are both separate from and the cognitive and ontological foundations of the real world of physical things possessing spatio-temporal properties. While the non-identity of the Platonistic conception of mathematical entities with the Platonism of the “historical” Plato is usually either tacitly or explicitly acknowledged by its defenders and critics alike, its connection with the “historical” Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s philosophy usually goes unacknowledged. This paper both calls attention to Aristotle’s connection with the so-called Platonism traditionally conceived and reconstructs a crucial aspect of his critique of the original Platonic chōrismós thesis, an aspect that is missed unless the true target of this critique, the equally original Platonic account of eidetic numbers, is recognized. (shrink)
This essay articulates obstacles to an interpretation of the whole proper to Plato’s philosophy that are rooted in the general methodical principle of traditional hermeneutics, and then addresses them by a novel hermeneutic application of Husserl’s transcendental and eidetic reductions. This application involves disclosing the transcendental phenomena of the texts of Plato’s dialogues on the basis of the former and articulating their phenomenological essence in accord with the latter. A meta-hermeneutical argument for what Plato himself might have thought is then (...) ventured, which takes as its point of departure both the transcendental phenomena of his texts and Aristotle’s report that eide for him were in some sense arithmoi. (shrink)
What is at stake for Jacob Klein in François Vieta’s analytical art is the birth of both the “modern concept of ‘number’ [Zahl], as it underlies symbolic calculi” and the expanded, in contrast to ancient Greek science, scope of the generality of mathematical science itself. Of the former, Klein writes that it “heralds a general conceptual transformation which extends over the whole of modern science”. The latter, he says, lends the “treatment” [πραγματεία] at issue in the ancient Greek mathematical idea (...) of a “‘general treatment’ [καθόλου πραγματεία]” “a completely new sense” “within the system of ‘science.’” The generality of this new sense will concern both the method and object of science in what will come to be known as universal mathematics. This transformation of the basic concept and scope, initially of mathematics and then of “the system of knowledge in general”, “concerns first and foremost the concept of ἀριθμόσ itself”. As a result of “its transfer into a new conceptual dimension” —i.e., into the dimension in which both “the concept of ‘number’ [Zahl]... is itself... as is that which it means” “symbolic in nature”—a transfer that “becomes visible” “for the first time in Vieta’s ‘general analytic,’” there follows “a thoroughgoing modification of the means and aims of science.” Klein maintains that what this modification involves is “best characterized by a phrase... in which Vieta expresses the ultimate problem, the problem proper, of his ‘analytical art’: ‘Analytical art appropriates to itself by right the proud problem of problems, which is: TO LEAVE NO PROBLEM UNSOLVED’.”. (shrink)
This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing (...) approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative approaches to the unconscious is attended to and such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious. (shrink)
Dallas Willard’s contribution to phenomenology is presented in terms of his articles on, and translations into English of, Edmund Husserl’s early philosophical writings, which single-handedly prevented them from falling into oblivion, both literally and philosophically. Willard’s account of Husserl’s “negative critique” of formalized logic in those writings, and argument for its contemporary relevance, is presented and largely endorsed.
“Back to Husserl: Reclaiming the Traditional Philosophical Context ofthe Phenomenological ‘Problem’ of the Other: Leibniz’s Monadology”. The internalmotivation that led Husserl to revise his early view of the pure Ego as empty ofessential content is traced to the end of explicating his reformulation of phenomenologyas the egology of the concrete transcendental Ego. The necessity ofrecasting transcendental phenomenology as a transcendental idealism that followsfrom this reformulation is presented and the appearance of transcendentalsolipsism of this idealism exposed as unfounded. That the ground (...) of this exposureis Husserl’s phenomenological appropriation of Leibniz’s metaphysical insightsinto the problem of accounting for the plurality of monads, and, therefore, not theCartesian problem of the other mind, is presented as the key to reclaiming thetraditional philosophical context of the phenomenological problem of the other. (shrink)
The problem of ‘collective unity’ in the transcendental philosophies of Kant and Husserl is investigated on the basis of number’s exemplary ‘collective unity’. To this end, the investigation reconstructs the historical context of the conceptuality of the mathematics that informs Kant’s and Husserl’s accounts of manifold, intuition, and synthesis. On the basis of this reconstruction, the argument is advanced that the unity of number – not the unity of the ‘concept’ of number – is presupposed by each transcendental philosopher in (...) their accounts of the transcendental foundation of manifold, intuition, and synthesis. This presupposition is ultimately traced to Kant’s and Husserl’s responses to Hume’s philosophy of human understanding and the critical limits of what Kant calls the ‘qualitative’ unity of transcendental consciousness. These critical limits are exposed in both philosophers’ attempts to account for that ‘qualitative’ unity on the basis of the ‘quantitative’ unity of number. (shrink)
The dissertation endeavors to study the controversial relationship of the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger by investigating their respective treatments of intentionality. Husserl's reflective and Heidegger's hermeneutical accounts of intentionality are brought into bold phenomenal relief in order to secure the phenomenal basis underlying their conflicting views of both the character and status of this phenomenon. Specifically, the study discusses Husserl's reflective exhibition of intentionality in terms of its manifestation of the phenomenally original essence of lived-experiences, and Heidegger's immanent critique (...) of the same in terms of its manifestation of phenomenally derivative understanding of Being. ;The discussion shows that Husserl finds the reflective securing of intentionality to manifest the most original phenomenal manifestation of die Sachen selbst, while Heidegger finds the hermeneutical securing of the same to manifest the temporalization of Dasein's being-in-the-world. The issues underlying the discrepancies of these two phenomenological findings are brought into relief with a discussion of the philosophical "prerogatives" of each thinker's understanding of phenomenology. These issues emerge in terms of the Heideggerian 'prerogative' of the hermeneutical advance regard toward Being, and the Husserlian 'prerogative' of the reflective seeing of the phenomenological regard. The study finds that the unavoidable opposition of the phenomenal content of these issues has its basis in the character and status each accords to the essence of the phenomenon of "reflection." The study concludes with a consideration of the phenomenal warrant of what comes forward as die Sachen selbst of the Husserlian 'prerogative' of the ontologically neutral reflective uncovering of the phenomenon of transcendental subjectivity and the Heideggerian 'prerogative' of the hermeneutical disclosure of the ontico-ontological disclosedness of the unreflective phenomenon of Being. (shrink)
CONTENTS Rudolf Bernet: Husserl's Transcendental Idealism Revisited Ian Angus: In Praise of Fire: Responsibility, Manifestation, Polemos, Circumspection Dieter Lohmar: Husserl's Hesitant Revisionism in the Field of Logic Torsten Pietrek: A Reconstruction of Phenomenological Method for Metaethics Renaud Barabas: Sensing and Creating: Phenomenology and the Unity of Aesthetics Christian Lotz: Recollection, Mourning and the Absolute Past. Husserl, Freud and Derrida Karlheinz Ruhstorfer: Adieu: Derrida's God and the Beginning of Thinking Rosemary R. P. Lerner: Husserl vs. Neo-Kantianism Revisited: On Skepticism, Foundationalism, and (...) Intuition Sebastian Luft: A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Subjective and Objective Spirit: Husserl, Natorp and Cassirer Marcus Brainard: Husserl on Nature and Spirit Edmund Husserl: On Smoking Johannes Daubert: Notes from Husserl's Mathematical-Philosophical Exercises, ed. and intro. Mark van Atten and Karl Schuhmann Dorion Cairns: On Eugen Fink's "The Problem of Husserl's Phenomenology". (shrink)
CONTENTS An Editor's Introduction INTRODUCTORY CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW HEIDEGGER'S ACADEMIC CAREER 1909-1930 A. Background B. Lehrveranstaltungen/University Education and Teaching C. Heidegger's Early Occasional Writings: A Chronological Bibliography PART I: STUDENT YEARS 1. Curricula Vitae 2. Two Essays for The Academician o Authority and Freedom o On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics 3. The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy 4. Recent Research in Logic 5. Meßkirch's Triduum: A Three-day Meditation on the War 6. Question and Judgment 7. The Concept of Time (...) in the Science of History 8. The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus : Supplements o Author's Notice o Conclusion: The Problem of Categories 9. On Schleiermacher's Second Speech "On the Essence of Religion" PART II: EARLY FREIBURG PERIOD 10. Letter to Engelbert Krebs on his Philosophical Conversion 11. Letter to Karl L÷with on his Philosophical Identity 12. Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch 13. Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews 14. Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation PART III: THE MARBURG PERIOD 15. The Problem of Sin in Luther 16. The Concept of Time 17. Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle 18. Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview 19. On the Essence of Truth, Pentecost Monday 20. Letter Exchange with Karl L÷with on Being and Time 21. "Phenomenology," Draft B, with Heidegger's Letter to Husserl 22. "Heidegger, Martin": Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Bultmann APPENDICES: SUPPLEMENTS BY HEIDEGGER'S CONTEMPORARIES Appendix I: Academic Evaluations of Heidegger by his Teachers and Peers A. Evaluation of Martin Heidegger's Dissertation by Arthur Schneider B. Evaluation of Dr. Heidegger's Habilitation by Heinrich Rickert C. Nomination for Associate Professor at G÷ttingen D. Nomination for Associate Professor at Marburg E. Nomination for Professor at Marburg F. Nomination for Husserl's Chair at Freiburg Appendix II: Husserl and Heidegger A. Their Correspondence to and about Each Other B. "For Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday" Appendix III: Karl L÷with's Impressions of Husserl and Heidegger, 1926-1927 Annotated Glossary Bibliography of GA-Editions of the Lecture Courses Select Secondary Bibliography. (shrink)
CONTENTS James G. Hart: Wisdom, Knowledge, and Reflective Joy: Aristotle and Husserl Wayne Martin: Judgment Stroke-Truth Predicate: Frege and the Phenomenology of Judgment David R. Cerbone: Distance and Proximity in Phenomenology: Husserl and Heidegger Ra·l GutiTrrez: "The Logic of Decadence": Deficient Forms of Government in the Republic Heribert Boeder: Derrida's Endgame Jacques Derrida: Phenomenology and the Closure of Metaphysics Hans Rainer Sepp: Jan Patocka and Cultural Difference Carl Friedrich Gethmann: Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Logical Intuitionism: On Oskar Becker's Mathematical Existence Essays (...) in Honor of Heribert Boeder by Dennis J. Schmidt, Claus-Artur Scheier, Klaus Erich Kaehler, Franco Volpi, Martfn Zubirfa, Burt Hopkins, and Marcus Brainard Edmund Husserl: The Idea of a Philosophical Culture Johannes Daubert: Notes from Husserl's Mathematical-Philosophical Exercises, ed. and intro. Mark van Atten and Karl Schuhmann Jacob Klein: On Aristotle Eugen Fink and Jan Patocka: On the Phenomenological Reduction. (shrink)
CONTENTS An Editor's Introduction INTRODUCTORY CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW HEIDEGGER'S ACADEMIC CAREER 1909-1930 A. Background B. Lehrveranstaltungen/University Education and Teaching C. Heidegger's Early Occasional Writings: A Chronological Bibliography PART I: STUDENT YEARS 1. Curricula Vitae 2. Two Essays for The Academician o Authority and Freedom o On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics 3. The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy 4. Recent Research in Logic 5. Meßkirch's Triduum: A Three-day Meditation on the War 6. Question and Judgment 7. The Concept of Time (...) in the Science of History 8. The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus : Supplements o Author's Notice o Conclusion: The Problem of Categories 9. On Schleiermacher's Second Speech "On the Essence of Religion" PART II: EARLY FREIBURG PERIOD 10. Letter to Engelbert Krebs on his Philosophical Conversion 11. Letter to Karl L÷with on his Philosophical Identity 12. Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch 13. Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews 14. Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation PART III: THE MARBURG PERIOD 15. The Problem of Sin in Luther 16. The Concept of Time 17. Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle 18. Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview 19. On the Essence of Truth, Pentecost Monday 20. Letter Exchange with Karl L÷with on Being and Time 21. "Phenomenology," Draft B, with Heidegger's Letter to Husserl 22. "Heidegger, Martin": Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Bultmann APPENDICES: SUPPLEMENTS BY HEIDEGGER'S CONTEMPORARIES Appendix I: Academic Evaluations of Heidegger by his Teachers and Peers A. Evaluation of Martin Heidegger's Dissertation by Arthur Schneider B. Evaluation of Dr. Heidegger's Habilitation by Heinrich Rickert C. Nomination for Associate Professor at G÷ttingen D. Nomination for Associate Professor at Marburg E. Nomination for Professor at Marburg F. Nomination for Husserl's Chair at Freiburg Appendix II: Husserl and Heidegger A. Their Correspondence to and about Each Other B. "For Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday" Appendix III: Karl L÷with's Impressions of Husserl and Heidegger, 1926-1927 Annotated Glossary Bibliography of GA-Editions of the Lecture Courses Select Secondary Bibliography. (shrink)
Many of the contributions to this volume are based on research originally presented at the historic first meeting in the United States of Japanese and American phenomenologists that took place at Seattle University in the Summer of 1991. In addition, other contributions have been added in order to supplement and complement the themes of the work presented at this meeting. Owing both to the vagaries of fate and the finitude of time, the publication of these essays has taken much longer (...) than was originally intended. Nevertheless, this delay is more than offset by the inclusion in one volume of both phenomenological thematics and phenomenological authors who do not usually appear together. (shrink)
_The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
_The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
_The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
_The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
'The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy' provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.
"NYPPP" provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.