33 found
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  1.  67
    The Truth-Conduciveness Problem of Coherentism and a Sellarsian Explanatory Coherence Theory.Byeong D. Lee - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):63-79.
    According to the truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism, the coherence theory of justification can hardly show that coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This problem is generally conceived as the most recalcitrant problem with the coherence theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that it does not pose a serious problem for a certain version of coherentism, namely a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory of justification combined with the deflationary theory of truth. On this version of coherentism, our epistemic goal is to (...)
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  2.  36
    A Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms.Byeong D. Lee - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):528-543.
    According to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the norms governing its application. But this view faces some serious objections. In particular, according to Rosen, Glüer and Wikforss, this view leads to a vicious regress of norms. The purpose of this paper is to defend a version of the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts (...)
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  3.  14
    A Coherentist Justification of Epistemic Principles and Its Merits.Byeong D. Lee - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):533-551.
    The problem of epistemic circularity involved in justifying fundamental epistemic principles is one of the fundamental problems of epistemology. One important way out of this problem is a Sellarsian social practice theory of justification, according to which we are justified in accepting an epistemic principle if we can answer all objections raised against it in our social practice of demanding justification and responding to such demands. The main goal of this paper is to show that this social practice theory can (...)
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  4.  29
    Gupta on Sellars’s Theory of Perception.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (4):701-724.
    RÉSUMÉRécemment, Anil Gupta a soulevé plusieurs objections importantes à l’encontre de la théorie de la perception de Wilfrid Sellars. Cet article se donne pour objectif de défendre la théorie de Sellars contre ces objections. J’admets que certains aspects de sa théorie posent problème. Il y a, par exemple, de bonnes raisons de rejeter la thèse de Sellars selon laquelle le référent ultime d’une saisie perceptive est une impression sensible. Néanmoins, je soutiens qu’une explication sellarsienne de la perception reste une approche (...)
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  5. Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
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  6.  99
    Moore’s Paradox And Self-Ascribed Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370.
    Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents (...)
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  7.  28
    Ginsborg on a Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):56-74.
    According to a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the use of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the relevant conceptual norms. Recently, Ginsborg raises two important objections against this view. According to her, the normativity Brandom ascribes to concepts lacks the internalist or first-person character of normativity that Kant’s view demands, and the relevant normativity belongs properly not to concepts as such, (...)
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  8.  67
    A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction.Byeong D. Lee - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):95-115.
    ABSTRACT: Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle and the constructivist view of the concept of epistemic justification, (...)
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  9.  59
    BonJour’s Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and his Explanatory Account.Byeong D. Lee - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (2):287-304.
    BonJour affirme qu’il a trouvé un moyen de sortir du dilemme sellarsien de la justification non-doxastique. Dans cet article, je soutiens trois thèses afin de montrer que sa solution alléguée échoue. Tout d’abord, il y a deux exigences pour qu’une raison soit bonne, et la notion de prise de conscience non-conceptuelle de l’expérience sensorielle développée par BonJour donne lieu à un dilemme sérieux en ce qui concerne ces exigences. Deuxièmement, il tire son idée de la soi-disant «prise de conscience constitutive (...)
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  10.  56
    A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge.Byeong D. Lee - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):565-.
    Robert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop (...)
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  11.  40
    Fales’s Defense of the Given and Requirements for Being a Reason.Byeong D. Lee - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1217-1235.
    Fales defends the doctrine of the given against the Sellarsian dilemma. On his view, sensory experiences, to which one has direct access, can justify basic beliefs. He upholds this view by way of defending an expansive conception of inference, according to which a broadly inferential relation can hold between sensory experiences and perceptual beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to show that Fales’s defense of the given fails. For this purpose, I argue that there are two requirements for being (...)
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  12.  51
    Shoemaker on second-order belief and self-deception.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  13.  35
    The Moral Law as a Fact of Reason and Correctness Conditions for the Moral Law.Byeong D. Lee - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):47-66.
    In the second Critique, Kant claims that the moral law is given as a fact of reason. In this paper, contra the standard view, I argue that there is a non-dogmatic way of defending this claim. And Kant’s principle of morality is widely taken to be a formal principle. How then can such a formal principle be reconciled with our substantial moral end? In this paper, I also argue that Kant’s principle of morality can be construed as a formal principle (...)
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  14.  22
    A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge.Byeong D. Lee - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):565-582.
    ABSTRACT: Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance will a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal will a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to (...)
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  15.  8
    An Inferentialist Account of Fictional Names.Byeong D. Lee - 2022 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 29 (3):290–326.
    The goal of this paper is to present and defend an inferentialist account of the meaning of fictional names on the basis of Sellars-Brandom’s inferentialist semantics and a Brandomian anaphoric theory of reference. On this inferentialist account, the meaning of a fictional name is constituted by the relevant language norms which provide the correctness conditions for its use. In addition, the Brandomian anaphoric theory of reference allows us to understand reference in terms of anaphoric word-word relations, rather than substantial word-world (...)
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  16.  18
    Levine on Brandom’s Account of Objectivity.Byeong D. Lee - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):35-55.
    On Brandom’s view, we can understand objectivity in terms of the view that what is objectively correct potentially transcends any given attitude. But Levine challenges this view. He distinguishes between two questions of objectivity: ‘How do we grasp the concept of objectivity?’ and ‘What determines the difference between what is correct and what is merely taken to be correct?’ And he argues that Brandom’s account of objectivity fails to address the second question of objectivity. Furthermore, based on classical pragmatist views, (...)
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  17.  18
    Broome on Enkrasia and Akrasia.Byeong D. Lee - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 254:175-189.
    John Broome defends what he calls ‘Enkrasia’, which is roughly this: Rationality requires of you that if you believe that you ought to do A, you intend to do A. He provides two arguments for Enkrasia. First, he argues for what he calls ‘enkratic reasoning’: ‘I ought to do A. So I shall do A’. Second, he also provides the following line of argument: Enkrasia is the requirement not to be akratic; akrasia is irrational; so Enkrasia is a rational requirement. (...)
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  18.  16
    Knowledge as Objectively Justified Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):397-414.
    According to Lehrer’s defeasibility account of knowledge, we can understand knowledge as undefeated justified true belief. But this account faces many serious problems. One important problem is that from one’s subjective point of view, one can hardly bridge the gap between one’s personal justification and objective truth. Another important problem is that this account can hardly accommodate the externalist intuition that the epistemic status of a belief is not entirely determined by factors that are internal to the subject’s perspective. The (...)
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  19.  74
    Finkelstein on the difference between conscious and unconscious belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
    ABSTRACT: In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief On his proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone’s belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without (...)
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  20.  55
    Finkelstein on the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
    RésuméDans un récent article, D. H. Finkelstein propose une nouvelle distinction entre croyance consciente et inconsciente. Suivant cette proposition, la croyance de quelqu'un est consciente s'il a la capacité de l'exprimer tout simplement en se l'attribuant; sa croyance est inconsciente s'il n'en a pas la capacité. Dans cet article, je fais valoir que cette proposition est inadéquate, et je propose ensuite une nouvelle distinction. Suivant cette distinction, la croyance de quelqu'un est consciente s'il s'attribue cette croyance sans s'appuyer sur aucun (...)
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  21.  5
    Reliabilism and First- and Second-Order Skepticism.Byeong D. Lee - 2016 - Philosophical Analysis 35:27-49.
    One reliabilist option against the problem of bootstrapping is to argue that circular reasoning is bad, but reliabilism can avoid circular reasoning. Vogel dismisses this option on the grounds that reliabilists need circular reasoning in order to circumvent skepticism. Briesen argues, however, that although reliabilists need circular reasoning to block second-order skepticism, they do not need it to block first-order skepticism. But I argue in this paper that reliabilists cannot legitimately reject first-order skepticism unless they can block second-order skepticism. In (...)
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  22.  28
    A Coherentist Justification of Induction.Byeong D. Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):35-52.
    In this paper I offer a coherentist justification of induction along the lines of a Sellarsian coherence theory. On this coherence theory, a proposition is justified if we can answer all objections raised against it in our social practice of demanding justification and responding to such demands. On the basis of this theory of justification, I argue that we are justified in accepting the uniformity of nature partly because we have no alternative but to accept it for rationally pursuing our (...)
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  23.  71
    On Davidson’s Semantic Anti-Sceptical Argument.Byeong D. Lee - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):529-535.
  24.  2
    The Bayesian Account of the Defect in Moorean Reasoning.Byeong D. Lee - 2018 - Logique Et Analyse 241:43-55.
    Many Bayesians such as White and Silins have argued that Moorean reasoning is defective because it is a case where probabilistic support fails to transmit across the relevant entailment. In this paper, I argue against their claim. On the Bayesian argument, a skeptical hypothesis is that you are a brain in a vat that appears to have hands. To disclose the defect in Moorean reasoning, the Bayesian argument is supposed to show that its appearing to you as if you have (...)
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  25.  95
    Douven on Putnam's model-theoretic argument.Byeong D. Lee - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):7--12.
    The model-theoretic argument, which Putnam employs to argue againstmetaphysical realism, has faced serious objections of many realist opponents.Igor Douven in his recent paper offers a new interpretation of the model-theoreticargument, which avoids the previous objections. The purpose of this paper is toshow that Douven's reconstruction of Putnam's argument is not successful, andhence that the realist objections still stand.
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  26. Horwich on the Value of Truth.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):263–279.
    On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed (...)
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  27. The paradox of belief instability and a revision theory of belief.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. Understanding this paradox is very important because belief is a central notion of psychologically motivated semantic theories in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science, and this paradox poses serious problems for these theories. In this dissertation I criticize previous proposals and offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. -/- My revision theory of belief is in many respects an application of Gupta's and (...)
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  28.  39
    Kroon on rationality and epistemic paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):169-174.
  29.  51
    Burge on Epistemic Paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):337 - 348.
    In his papers ‘Semantic Paradox ’ and ‘The Liar Paradox: Tangles and Chains,’ Tyler Burge provides a hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox. And in his paper ‘Epistemic Paradox ’ Burge extends his hierarchy approach to the epistemic paradox of belief instability, which I shall explain shortly. Although Burge's views on the Liar paradox have been widely criticized, his views on the paradox of belief instability have not received notable attention. In this paper I shall argue that Burge's proposal is (...)
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  30.  49
    Davidson's Slingshot Argument Revisited.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):541-550.
    RÉSUMÉ: Utilisant ce qu'on appelle l'argument du lance-pierres, Davidson soutient que la théorie correspondantiste de la vérité est intenable. Cet argument dépend de deux présuppositions, dont l'une est qu'une phrase vraie ne devrait pas, par substitution de termes singuliers coréférentiels, en venir à correspondre à quelque chose de différent. Je propose dans cet article un argument nouveau pour montrer que cette supposition n'est pas plausible, particulièrement lorsqu'elle s'applique à des énoncés d'identité, ceux-là mêmes dont dépend pour sa formulation l'argument du (...)
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  31.  36
    The knower paradox revisited.Byeong D. Lee - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):221-232.
    The article states that the Knower paradox exposes the circularity of the conceptualization of knowledge. The article provides an explanation of the Knower paradox for the purpose of demonstrating how the paradox arises. A modification to the concept of knowledge is presented to solve the paradox and structure knowledge.
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  32.  22
    Kitcher’s Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):1-11.
    Le défi le plus important auquel doivent faire face les tenants d’une conception déflationniste de la vérité est l’argument de l’action réussie. Celui-ci fut défendu par Kitcher : afin de rendre compte d’une action réussie, il faudrait expliquer pourquoi une et une même action peut être à la fois psychologiquement et effectivement pertinente. Pour lui, seule la vérité-adéquation permet de répondre à cette exigence. Dans cet article, je soutiens qu’afin de rendre compte d’une action réussie, il convient d’expliquer en quoi (...)
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  33.  2
    Gertler's acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge and internalist requirements for reasons.Byeong D. Lee - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Gertler argues that, in some introspective judgments about experience, phenomenal reality intersects with one's grasp of that reality to the effect that one can have knowledge by acquaintance. This new version of the acquaintance theory depends on the idea that some introspective judgments about experience can be justified by the fact that the phenomenal property of an experience is a component of the introspective judgment about the experience. The goal of this paper is to show that even this most promising (...)
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