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  1.  31
    The Truth-Conduciveness Problem of Coherentism and a Sellarsian Explanatory Coherence Theory.Byeong D. Lee - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):63-79.
    According to the truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism, the coherence theory of justification can hardly show that coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This problem is generally conceived as the most recalcitrant problem with the coherence theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that it does not pose a serious problem for a certain version of coherentism, namely a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory of justification combined with the deflationary theory of truth. On this version of coherentism, our epistemic goal is to (...)
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  2.  82
    Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
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  3.  41
    A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge.Byeong D. Lee - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):565-.
    ABSTRACT: Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance will a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal will a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to (...)
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  4.  39
    A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction.Byeong D. Lee - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):95-115.
    ABSTRACT: Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle and the constructivist view of the concept of epistemic justification, (...)
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  5.  32
    BonJour’s Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and His Explanatory Account.Byeong D. Lee - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (2):287-304.
    BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour’s notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called “constitutive awareness of content” from his conception of conscious occurrent belief. But this conception also faces an (...)
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  6.  26
    Fales’s Defense of the Given and Requirements for Being a Reason.Byeong D. Lee - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1217-1235.
    Fales defends the doctrine of the given against the Sellarsian dilemma. On his view, sensory experiences, to which one has direct access, can justify basic beliefs. He upholds this view by way of defending an expansive conception of inference, according to which a broadly inferential relation can hold between sensory experiences and perceptual beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to show that Fales’s defense of the given fails. For this purpose, I argue that there are two requirements for being (...)
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  7.  3
    A Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms.Byeong D. Lee - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    ABSTRACTAccording to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that th...
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  8.  69
    Moore's Paradox and Self-Ascribed Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370.
    Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents (...)
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  9.  2
    Gupta on Sellars’s Theory of Perception.Byeong D. Lee - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-24.
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  10.  50
    Finkelstein on the Difference Between Conscious and Unconscious Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
    ABSTRACT: In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief On his proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone’s belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without (...)
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  11.  14
    A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge.Byeong D. Lee - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):565-582.
    ABSTRACT: Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance will a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal will a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to (...)
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  12.  25
    Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  13.  13
    The Moral Law as a Fact of Reason and Correctness Conditions for the Moral Law.Byeong D. Lee - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):47-66.
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  14.  31
    On Davidson’s Semantic Anti-Sceptical Argument.Byeong D. Lee - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):529-535.
  15.  72
    Douven on Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument.Byeong D. Lee - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):7--12.
    The model-theoretic argument, which Putnam employs to argue againstmetaphysical realism, has faced serious objections of many realist opponents.Igor Douven in his recent paper offers a new interpretation of the model-theoreticargument, which avoids the previous objections. The purpose of this paper is toshow that Douven's reconstruction of Putnam's argument is not successful, andhence that the realist objections still stand.
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  16.  15
    Finkelstein on the Distinction Between Conscious and Unconscious Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
    ABSTRACT: In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief On his proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone’s belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without (...)
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  17.  23
    Kroon on Rationality and Epistemic Paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):169-174.
  18.  38
    Burge on Epistemic Paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):337 - 348.
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  19.  9
    Davidson's Slingshot Argument Revisited.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):541-550.
    RÉSUMÉ: Utilisant ce qu'on appelle l'argument du lance-pierres, Davidson soutient que la théorie correspondantiste de la vérité est intenable. Cet argument dépend de deux présuppositions, dont l'une est qu'une phrase vraie ne devrait pas, par substitution de termes singuliers coréférentiels, en venir à correspondre à quelque chose de différent. Je propose dans cet article un argument nouveau pour montrer que cette supposition n'est pas plausible, particulièrement lorsqu'elle s'applique à des énoncés d'identité, ceux-là mêmes dont dépend pour sa formulation l'argument du (...)
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  20.  26
    Davidson's Slingshot Argument Revisited.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):541-.
    RÉSUMÉ: Utilisant ce qu'on appelle l'argument du lance-pierres, Davidson soutient que la théorie correspondantiste de la vérité est intenable. Cet argument dépend de deux présuppositions, dont l'une est qu'une phrase vraie ne devrait pas, par substitution de termes singuliers coréférentiels, en venir à correspondre à quelque chose de différent. Je propose dans cet article un argument nouveau pour montrer que cette supposition n'est pas plausible, particulièrement lorsqu'elle s'applique à des énoncés d'identité, ceux-là mêmes dont dépend pour sa formulation l'argument du (...)
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  21.  29
    The Knower Paradox Revisited.Byeong D. Lee - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):221-232.
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  22.  12
    Kitcher’s Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):1-11.
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  23.  5
    Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (2):279-290.
    RÉSUMÉ: L'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux semble entrer en conflit avec l'occurrence de certaines illusions sur soi-même. Sydney Shoemaker avance une suggestion intéressante pour régler ce type de conflit. Selon cette suggestion, on peut expliquer l'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux en maintenant que les croyances positives de second ordre sont toujours correctes, tandis qu'on peut expliquer les illusions au sujet de soi-même en termes de croyances négatives (...)
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