A number of claims are closely connected with, though logically distinct from, animalism. One is that organisms cease to exist when they die. Two others concern the relation of the brain, or the brainstem, to animal life. One of these holds that the brainstem is necessary for life—more precisely, that (say) my cat's brainstem is necessary for my cat's life to continue. The other is that it is sufficient for life—more precisely, that so long as (say) my cat's brainstem continues (...) to function, so too does my cat. I argue against these claims. (shrink)

Consider the view that coming into existence is bad for us. Can we hold this and yet deny that ceasing to exist would be good for us? I argue that we can. First, many animals have lives such that they would be better off not existing. Second, if persons and babies are distinct things then the same is true of babies. Third, even if persons and babies are not distinct things – rather they are phases that human beings go through (...) – still it is bad for babies that they come into existence. So it was bad for us to come into existence. But most of us now enjoy worthwhile lives. So it would be bad for us, now, to cease to exist. (shrink)

The ever-present possibility of death forces upon us the question of life's meaning and for this reason death has been a central concern of philosophers throughout history. From Socrates to Heidegger, philosophers have grappled with the nature and significance of death. In "Annihilation", Christopher Belshaw explores two central questions at the heart of philosophy's engagement with death: what is death; and is it bad that we die? Belshaw begins by distinguishing between literal and metaphorical uses of the term and offers (...) a unified and biological account of death, denying that death brings about non-existence. How our death relates to the death of the brain is explored in detail. Belshaw considers the common-sense view that death is often bad for us by examining the circumstances that might make it bad as well as the grounds for thinking that one death can be worse than another. In addition, Belshaw explores whether we can be harmed after we die and before we were born. The final chapters explore whether we should prevent more deaths and whether, via cryonics, brain transplants, data storage, we might cheat death. Throughout Belshaw shows how questions of personhood and life's value are bound up with our views on the sense and significance of death. "Annihilation's" in-depth analysis and insightful exposition will be welcomed not only by philosophers working on the metaphysics of death but also by students and scholars alike looking for a foundation for discussions of the ethics of abortion, euthanasia, life-support and suicide. (shrink)

The ever-present possibility of death forces upon us the question of life's meaning and for this reason death has been a central concern of philosophers throughout history. From Socrates to Heidegger, philosophers have grappled with the nature and significance of death. In "Annihilation", Christopher Belshaw explores two central questions at the heart of philosophy's engagement with death: what is death; and is it bad that we die? Belshaw begins by distinguishing between literal and metaphorical uses of the term and offers (...) a unified and biological account of death, denying that death brings about non-existence. How our death relates to the death of the brain is explored in detail. Belshaw considers the common-sense view that death is often bad for us by examining the circumstances that might make it bad as well as the grounds for thinking that one death can be worse than another. In addition, Belshaw explores whether we can be harmed after we die and before we were born. The final chapters explore whether we should prevent more deaths and whether, via cryonics, brain transplants, data storage, we might cheat death. Throughout Belshaw shows how questions of personhood and life's value are bound up with our views on the sense and significance of death. "Annihilation's" in-depth analysis and insightful exposition will be welcomed not only by philosophers working on the metaphysics of death but also by students and scholars alike looking for a foundation for discussions of the ethics of abortion, euthanasia, life-support and suicide. (shrink)

In this book Christopher Belshaw draws on earlier work concerning death, identity, animals, immortality, extinction, and builds a large-scale argument on the value and meaning of life. Rejecting suggestions that life is sacred or intrinsically valuable, he argues instead that its value varies, and varies considerably, both within and between different kinds of things. So in some case we might have reason to improve or save a life, while in others that reason will be lacking. The book's central section focuses (...) on just one key question; that of whether we ever have reason to start lives. Not only is it denied that there is any such reason, but some sympathy is afforded to the anti-natalist contention that there is always reason against. The final chapters deal with meaning. Support is given to the sober and familiar view wherein meaning derives from an enthusiasm for, and some success with, the pursuit of worthwhile projects. Now suppose we are immortal. Or suppose, in contrast, that we face imminent extinction. Would either of these threaten meaning? The claim here is that the force of such threats is often exaggerated. The Value and Meaning of Life is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, ethics and religion, and will be of interest to all those concerned with how to live, and to how to think about the lives of others. (shrink)

This chapter examines the connection between value and desire with regard to death. It argues that having categorical desires is a necessary condition for death to be bad for those who die, and that the degree to which death is bad bears a close relation to the number and strength of those desires. The chapter also analyzes the principles espoused by Jeff McMahan in his book “The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.”.

Nozick's thought experiment is less effective than is often believed. Certainly, there could be reasons to enter the machine. Possibly, life there might be among the best of all those available. Yet we need to distinguish between two versions. On the first, I retain my beliefs, memories, dispositions, some knowledge. On the second, all these too are determined by the scientists. Nozick alludes to both versions. But only on the first will machine life have appeal.

_10 Good Questions about Life and Death_ makes us think again about some of the most important issues we ever have to face. Addresses the fundamental questions that many of us ask about life and death. Written in an engaging and straightforward style, ideal for those with no formal background in philosophy. Focuses on commonly pondered issues, such as: Is life sacred? Is it bad to die? Is there life after death? Does life have meaning? And which life is best? (...) Encourages readers to think about and respond to the human condition. Features case studies, thought-experiments, and references to literature, film, music, religion and myth. (shrink)

Immortality—living forever and avoiding death—seems to many to be desirable. But is it? It has been argued that an immortal life would fairly soon become boring, trivial, and meaningless, and is not at all the sort of thing that any of us should want. Yet boredom and triviality presuppose our having powerful memories and imaginations, and an inability either to shake off the past or to free ourselves of weighty visions of the future. Suppose, though, that our capacities here are (...) limited, so that our temporal reach is fairly significantly constrained. Then, I argue, these alleged problems with immortality will recede. Moreover, similar limitations might help us in the actual world, where life is short. If we cannot see clearly to its end points, both ahead and behind, life will seem longer. (shrink)

This introduction to the philosophy of the environment examines current debates on how we should think about the natural world and our place within it. The subject is examined from a determinedly analytic philosophical perspective, focusing on questions of value, but taking in attendant issues in epistemology and metaphysics as well. The book begins by considering the nature, extent and origin of the environmental problems with which we need to be concerned. Chapters go on to consider familiar strategies for dealing (...) with environmental problems, and then consider what sort of things are of direct moral concern, examining in turn at animals, non-sentient life-forms, natural but non-living things and deep ecology. The final part of the book investigates notions of value, natural beauty and the place of human beings in the scheme of things. (shrink)

This introduction to the philosophy of the environment examines current debates on how we should think about the natural world and our place within it. The subject is examined from a determinedly analytic philosophical perspective, focusing on questions of value, but taking in attendant issues in epistemology and metaphysics as well. The book begins by considering the nature, extent and origin of the environmental problems with which we need to be concerned. Chapters go on to consider familiar strategies for dealing (...) with environmental problems, and then consider what sort of things are of direct moral concern, examining in turn at animals, non-sentient life-forms, natural but non-living things and deep ecology. The final part of the book investigates notions of value, natural beauty and the place of human beings in the scheme of things. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Mind View The Body View Taking Sides Do Numbers Count? Is It All or Nothing? A Solution? And a Problem? Who's Who?

This short and shapely book amply delivers its main promise, to discuss and offer views on a handful of central issues concerning the nature and importance of death. It does this with dry humour, unyielding attention to clarity and conciseness, and simple but highly effective structuring throughout.An introductory chapter sets out what you will and what you will not get. It aims to defend the more or less pervasive preoccupation with metaphysics, and outlines the chapters to follow. Ch. 2 contrasts (...) animalism with the psychological view, comes down overall in favour of the former, but incorporates into it some of the teeth of the latter. In ch. 3 Johansson defends the termination thesis, or the view that with death we cease to exist. Ch. 4 considers Epicureanism about death. It gives the Epicurean a number of shots at defending the view that death is not bad, but concludes that even the best of these falls short. This is followed in ch. 5 by a discussion of Lucretius' symmetry argument – we do not regret not having been born earlier, so why regret that we shall not die later? The view put forward here is that our not being born earlier is bad, but, unlike death, bad in an ‘innocent’ way. In the final chapter Johansson asks whether we should be especially concerned about our own deaths, explores the links with reductionist/non‐reductionist debates, and concludes that whatever your stance here, special concern is irrational. For reasons of space I shall say no more about this last chapter, but I shall offer something on the others. (shrink)

What is harm? I offer an account that involves the victim’s either suffering some adverse intrinsic change or being prevented from enjoying some beneficial intrinsic change. No one is harmed, I claim, in virtue of relational changes alone. Thus (excepting for contrived cases), there are neither posthumous harms nor, in life, harms of the undiscovered betrayal, slander, reputation-damaging variety. Further, two widespread moves in the philosophy of death are rejected. First, death and posthumous are not to be assimilated—death does bring (...) about adverse internal change and harms us straightforwardly. Second, Pitcher-type accounts of posthumous harm are criticized—posthumous events can thwart the satisfaction of my interests, but I am not harmed either just when this occurs or, earlier, when I first acquire or invest in those interests. We have other ways of describing what is going on. (shrink)

Although many people believe that more people would be better, arguments intended to show this are unconvincing. I consider one of Parfit's arguments for a related conclusion, that even when both are worth living, we ought to prefer the better of two lives. Were this argument successful, or so I claim, then it would follow that more people would be better. But there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives. Nor is an attempted rejoinder effective. We can agree (...) that there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives, and yet still maintain there are reasons for improving lives. (shrink)

In Life's Dominion Dworkin argues that the debate about abortion is habitually misconstrued. Substantial areas of agreement are overlooked, while areas of disagreement are, mistakenly, seen as central. If we uncover a truer picture, then hope of a certain accord may no longer seem vain. I dispute many of these claims. Dworkin argues that both sides in the debate are united in believing that life is sacred, or intrinsically valuable. I disagree. I maintain that only in a very attenuated sense (...) of intrinsic value will this be agreed upon. I consider how an account of such value might be further fleshed out, but suggest, if this is done on any plausible lines, agreement will fall away. Dworkin argues, also, that the issue of personhood, does not, contrary to widespread belief, keep the parties apart. Again I disagree. We need to distinguish the question of whether there is in fact dispute over this issue from that of whether there is, in truth, good reason for dispute. And I argue that, rightly or wrongly, the issue of personhood remains central. Dworkin suggests that the purported proximity between the two sides offers some hope of an eventual reconciliation. At least, they will agree to differ, accepting that in this area freedom of choice is paramount. I am sceptical. Even this measure of reconciliation depends upon conservatives giving up positions which, I argue, they will continue to maintain. There is a further point. Dworkin appears to be, in many ways, cautiously optimistic. I appear, in contrast, to be pessimistic. I argue, however, that only so long as we do disagree over matters of substance is there much hope that our differences might be resolved. (shrink)

This book explores many of the issues that arise when we consider persons who are in pain, who are suffering, and who are nearing the end of life. Suffering provokes us into a journey toward discovering who we are and forces us to rethink many of the views we hold about ourselves.

This chapter contains section titled: God Art and Nature Betrayal Virtual Reality Where Are We Now? Does Reality Matter?

Kripke’s opponents claim that gold, in all possible worlds, is a yellow metal. They believe that the atomic number can vary from world to world. Kripke inverts this, holding that while gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with atomic number 79, its surface properties may vary widely from world to world. Both views are flawed, but of the two, the rival is to be preferred. There is a better view. Gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with (...) atomic number 79. And it is, in all possible worlds, a yellow meta!. Only insofar as they give rise to familiar and important surface properties is there reason to maintain that structural properties are at the essence or nature of things. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:141 HUME AND DEMONSTRATIVE KNOWLEDGE Little could be clearer than that Hume's sceptical arguments concerning induction and causation depend to some considerable extent on his contention that there can be no demonstrative arguments for matters of fact. An understanding of his use of the terms 'demonstration', 'demonstrative reasoning' etc., would seem to be a prerequisite for a satisfactory appraisal of those arguments. What is almost as clear, however, is (...) that these terms have so far evaded much critical discussion and, with one notable exception, it seems to be assumed that we know well enough what they mean. That exception is David Stove, whose book on Hume contains, among many good things, a boldly provocative discussion of these terms in relation to the sceptical argument. Stove has interesting things to say about the terms: I don't think that he is quite right, but then neither is he straightforwardly wrong. I shall present his account, and the one to which he is opposed, and then, after criticising both, I shall try to show why the truth lies elsewhere, and why we begin to approach Hume correctly only when we temper our fascination with the purely formal structures of argument. Inductive scepticism is, of course, that scepticism which claims that there can be neither knowledge nor reasonable beliefs about unobserved matters of fact. Thus inductive arguments, those arguments which attempt to ground beliefs in unobserved matters of fact are, under this scepticism, claimed to 142 be bad arguments. Deductively valid arguments are, of course, often good, but it seems that they are unable to be utilised in justifying beliefs in unobserved matters of fact. The problem of induction is thus that of explaining how these non-valid inductive arguments can be forceful, and Hume's scepticism about induction resides in his believing and arguing, or appearing to believe and to argue, that they cannot. Hume himself does not, however, use the terms 'inductive', 'deductive' and their cognates. Some translation has therefore been employed in getting from his writings to the rough and ready sketch of the problem of induction as presented above. Stove spends some considerable time on this, and there is surely nothing wrong with his careful glossing of Humes 'moral' and 'probable' arguments by our term 'induetive '. There are, however, good reasons to tread carefully where 'demonstrative' is concerned. Stove's remarks here are somewhat contentious, and before giving his version of what Hume's term means, I shall present what may be accounted the standard view. While Hume does not use the term 'deductive', he does make freguent use of 'demonstration' and its derivatives, and he uses these in such a way as to suggest that a gloss via our term 'deduction' will not be far off the mark. Consider, for example, the following passage: Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience. We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of anything, is an 143 undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended argument against it. (T 89) His point here seems to be that as alternative states of affairs remain possible, and are thus compatible with all the evidence upon which is based the hypothesis about continuing uniformity, it cannot be claimed that the persistence of such uniformity is established by argument. A similar account will be given of the following passage from the Enquiry: When a man says, I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, Similar sensible gualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative.... (E 37) It is tempting to understand Hume here as once again... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Past The Present Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind Ethics Philosophy and Culture.

This chapter contains section titled: Why Think Life is Meaningless? Are These Reasons Any Good? Lives and Meanings It's Up to You Getting It Right Getting It Wrong Some Complications Meaning and Absurdity Does Meaning Matter? Is It All Meaningless?

This chapter contains section titled: Some Distinctions Against the Badness of Death Who Can Believe It? Some Puzzles Experience Parallels Death and Deprivation Is it Bad to Die?

This chapter contains section titled: Lives Attitudes Conditions Values Religion, Reason, and a Pair of Views A Reverence for Life A Ban on Killing Religion Revisited Is Life Sacred?

Could I have had different parents? In practice, no, but in principle, yes. And could I have been born at a different time? Again, in practice no, but in principle, yes. These are, perhaps, common sense verdicts on such questions. But they go against what may be seen as some prevailing philosophical orthodoxies. I defend versions of the common sense verdicts, and argue against the orthodoxies here.

This chapter contains section titled: Feeble Versions Robust Versions The Body View Who's Who? The Soul View The Reincarnation View Is There an Afterlife? Might I Live On?

Featuring essays from leading philosophical scholars, __12 Modern Philosophers__ explores the works, origins, and influences of twelve of the most important late 20th Century philosophers working in the analytic tradition. Draws on essays from well-known scholars, including Thomas Baldwin, Catherine Wilson, Adrian Moore and Lori Gruen Locates the authors and their oeuvre within the context of the discipline as a whole Considers how contemporary philosophy both draws from, and contributes to, the broader intellectual and cultural milieu.

This chapter contains section titled: Where Can I Find Answers? Is Life Sacred? Is It Bad to Die? Which Deaths Are Worse? Might I Live On? Should I Take the Elixir of Life? Who's Who? Is It All Meaningless? Should There Be More, and Better, People? Does Reality Matter?

Christopher Belshaw responds to Paul Wainwright’s Comment "'Undercover nurse' struck off the professional register for misconduct".

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents Preface.

This chapter contains section titled: Variant Lives The Best Life An Immortal Life A Human Life Further Finessing A Get‐out Clause Should I Take the Elixir of Life?

This chapter contains section titled: More People Good Starts Different People Better People Links Better Lives? Should There Be More, and Better, People?

My intentions here are fourfold. First, I aim to provide an overview of the ethics-related activities that are regularly taking place in our universities today, looking initially at teaching in particular, and then considering the broader picture. Second, I want to consider what professional ethics does and should involve, and to raise certain questions about the relation between its concerns and the sorts of teaching the university can legitimately provide. Third, the current emphasis in professional ethics with the virtues, a (...) focus borrowed from academic philosophy is, I’ll argue, not altogether well suited to what is needed from professional activities and expertise. I end, fourth, with some suggestions, first, as to how a compromise moral theory might better suit the needs of the professions and, second, how professionals might best involve themselves in ethical debate and decision-making. (shrink)