“No man can see farther into a generalization than his knowledge of detail extends.” That saying of William James is true of all the branches of science; but it has a special value for students of social philosophy. Social life is so obviously a matter of personal experience that an academic Robinson Crusoe may easily be less competent in his knowledge of detail than a business man, if the business man thinks at all. This is not a compliment to the (...) business man, nor an insult to the academic scholar; for the majority of those who deal with practical issues seem to be far more incompetent than the majority of scholars. But it is essential for social philosophy that practical experience of some kind should be used. Indeed, just as a student of chemistry nowadays depends at every step upon experiment, so a student of social life should take care to play a part in some form of active social life, whether as directing, co-operating, or obeying. One cannot get chemistry out of books; still less can one find social philosophy there. Therefore the number of books written or read is no criterion of the vigour of social philosophy in any generation—it is so easy to write books about other books, and so easy to read the same material many times. (shrink)

Poppies in a field of corn may annoy a farmer and rejoice an artist. Clearly they are not in their right place, if the standard of judgment be immediate utility; but it is better that they should be accidentally there than nowhere at all to be found. The political organization of social life and, still more obviously, the economic, does not promote devotion to other purposes than those which appear to be practical in the eyes of men who cannot see (...) very well. To suppose, for example, that beauty or truth is not useful is the result of philosophical nearsightedness. But there are some men, women, and children who are moved deeply by beauty and the divine whose emotion is not easily understood in political terms and is altogether unintelligible in terms of exchange-value. (shrink)

Philosophers less subtle than those of the Middle Ages feel no difficulty about such words as “and” or such phrases as “member of”; but even to write “man and society” has committed us to an assumption which may not be justifiable, and to say that men are “members” of a community or of a trade union is so alarming a metaphor that it would startle Duns Scotus. It is unwise, however, to ask philosophers what they mean when they feel very (...) passionately about what they say, for the confusion becomes even greater than it was if passion gets into explanation. It is supposed to be obvious that men exist and that States and Trade Unions and Churches exist; and who would be so foolish as to raise difficulties about the difference between existence and essence? Many who claim to be scientists with regard to politics or economics suppose it to be obvious that there is an “essence” called “public opinion” or “the will of the people” or “utility”; and what Occamite would now dare to say that entities are not to be multiplied? (shrink)