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C. S. Jenkins [29]Claude Jenkins [18]C. S. I. Jenkins [13]Carrie Jenkins [7]
Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins [4]Carol L. Jenkins [2]C. L. Jenkins [1]Carol Mayo Jenkins [1]

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  1. Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?C. S. Jenkins - 2011 - The Monist 94 (2):267-276.
  2. Entitlement and Rationality.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):25-45.
    This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.
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  3. Merely Verbal Disputes.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):11-30.
    Philosophers readily talk about merely verbal disputes, usually without much or any explicit reflection on what these are, and a good deal of methodological significance is attached to discovering whether a dispute is merely verbal or not. Currently, metaphilosophical advances are being made towards a clearer understanding of what exactly it takes for something to be a merely verbal dispute. This paper engages with this growing literature, pointing out some problems with existing approaches, and develops a new proposal which builds (...)
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  4.  70
    Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Carrie Jenkins presents a new account of arithmetical knowledge, which manages to respect three key intuitions: a priorism, mind-independence realism, and empiricism. Jenkins argues that arithmetic can be known through the examination of empirically grounded concepts, non-accidentally accurate representations of the mind-independent world.
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  5. Disposition Impossible.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):732-753.
    Are there dispositions which not only do not manifest, but which could not manifest? We argue that there are dispositions to Ф in circumstances C where C is impossible, and some where Ф is impossible. Furthermore, postulating these dispositions does useful theoretical work. This paper describes a number of cases of dispositions had by objects even though those dispositions are not possibly manifest, and argues for the importance of these dispositions.
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  6. On Putting Knowledge 'First'.Jonathan Ichikawa & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
    There is a New Idea in epistemology. It goes by the name of ‘knowledge first,’ and it is particularly associated with Timothy Williamson’s book Knowledge and Its Limits. In slogan form, to put knowledge first is to treat knowledge as basic or fundamental, and to explain other states—belief, justification, maybe even content itself—in terms of knowledge, instead of vice versa. The idea has proven enormously interesting, and equally controversial. But deep foundational questions about its actual content remain relatively unexplored. We (...)
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  7. Realism and Independence.C. S. Jenkins - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):199 - 209.
    I argue that mind-independence realism should be characterised in terms of what I call 'essential', rather than 'modal', independence from our mental lives. I explore the connections between the two kinds of independence, and argue that characterizations in terms of essence respect more intuitions about what realism is, harmonize better with standard characterizations of anti-realism, and avert the threat of subversion from Blackburn's quasi-realist.
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  8. What Is Ontological Realism?C. S. Jenkins - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):880-890.
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  9. Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):693-701.
    In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more (...)
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  10. Romeo, René, and the Reasons Why: What Explanation Is.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):61-84.
  11.  5
    Intuition, ‘Intuition’, Concepts and the A Priori.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2014 - In Booth Anthony Robert & P. Rowbottom Darrell (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter attempts to put structure on some of the different philosophical uses of ‘intuition’. It argues that ‘intuition’-hood is associated with four bundles of symptoms: a commonsensicality bundle; an a prioricity and immediacy bundle, and a metaphilosophical bundle. Tentatively suggesting that the word ‘intuition’ as used by philosophers is best regarded as ambiguous, the chapter offers a much simpler view concerning the meaning of ‘intuition’ in philosophy. With some of the attacks on ‘intuition’ as an epistemic source explored, the (...)
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  12. Backwards Explanation.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):103 - 115.
    We discuss explanation of an earlier event by a later event, and argue that prima facie cases of backwards event explanation are ubiquitous. Some examples: (1) I am tidying my flat because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow. (2) The scarlet pimpernels are closing because it is about to rain. (3) The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon. We then look at various ways people might attempt to explain away these prima facie cases by arguing (...)
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  13. A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):436–450.
    forthcoming in Philosophy Compass. This is a paper which aims both to survey the field and do some work at its cutting edge.
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  14. Knowledge and Explanation.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):137-164.
    There is surely something right about Craig’s view: we are unlikely to succeed in any attempt to analyse away the intricacies in our concept of knowledge. We cannot realistically hope to uncover a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p which are in all cases either clearly satisfied or clearly not satisfied. Nor, I suspect, is it possible to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge which are widely accepted as being more securely understood than knowledge (...)
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  15.  2
    Signifyin Within African American Classical Music: Linking Gates, Hip‐Hop, and Perkinson.Christopher Jenkins - 2019 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (4):391-400.
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  16. Concepts, Experience and Modal Knowledge1.C. S. Jenkins - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):255-279.
    forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (ed.s), The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press. Presents a concept-grounding account of modal knowledge.
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  17. Boghossian and Epistemic Analyticity.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):113-127.
    Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, (...)
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  18.  6
    The Truth Fairy and the Indirect Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel Y. Elstein & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2020 - In Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: pp. 344-360.
    Friends of Wright-entitlement cannot appeal to direct epistemic consequentialism (believe or accept what maximizes expected epistemic value) in order to account for the epistemic rationality of accepting Wright-entitled propositions. The tenability of direct consequentialism is undermined by the “Truth Fairy”: a powerful being who offers you great epistemic reward (in terms of true beliefs) if you accept a proposition p for which you have evidence neither for nor against. However, this chapter argues that a form of indirect epistemic consequentialism seems (...)
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  19.  69
    What Is Love? An Incomplete Map of the Metaphysics.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):349--364.
  20. Knowledge of Arithmetic.C. S. Jenkins - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):727-747.
    The goal of the research programme I describe in this article is a realist epistemology for arithmetic which respects arithmetic's special epistemic status (the status usually described as a prioricity) yet accommodates naturalistic concerns by remaining fundamentally empiricist. I argue that the central claims which would allow us to develop such an epistemology are (i) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (ii) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts are accurate mental representations of elements (...)
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  21.  95
    Justification Magnets.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):93-111.
    David Lewis is associated with the controversial thesis that some properties are more eligible than others to be the referents of our predicates solely in virtue of those properties’ being more natural; independently, that is, of anything to do with our patterns of usage of the relevant predicates. On such a view, the natural properties act as ‘reference magnets’. In this paper I explore (though I do not endorse) a related thesis in epistemology: that some propositions are ‘justification magnets’. According (...)
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  22. Serious Verbal Disputes: Ontology, Metaontology, and Analyticity.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):454-469.
    This paper builds on some important recent work by Amie Thomasson, wherein she argues that recent disputes about the existence of ordinary objects have arisen due to eliminiativist metaphysicians’ misunderstandings. Some, she argues, are mistaken about how the language of quantification works, while others neglect the existence and significance of certain analytic entailments. Thomasson claims that once these misunderstandings are cleared away, it is trivially easy to answer existence questions about ordinary objects using everyday empirical methods of investigation. She reveals (...)
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  23.  41
    The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond.C. S. Jenkins - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 302--319.
    Addresses the question of why we find Fitch's knowability 'paradox' argument surprising.
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  24.  90
    Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up Call.C. S. Jenkins - 2005 - Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):194-201.
    This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken.
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  25. Epistemic Norms and Natural Facts.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):259 - 272.
    in American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3), July 2007, pp. 259-72. Argues that epistemically normative claims are made true by the same facts as, but do not mean the same as, certain natural-sounding claims.
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  26.  78
    Maximising, Satisficing and Context.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):451-468.
  27. Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
    Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.
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  28. The Nature of Normativity.C. S. Jenkins - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):156-166.
    This is a big-picture book, 2 written with a breadth of focus which I find admirable. It exhibits what's come to be known as the ‘intersubdiscplinary’ approach to philosophy, which is not restricted by traditional boundaries within the discipline but rather proceeds with an eye to all sorts of areas of philosophy where relevant arguments, results, analogies and strategies might be lurking. I approve of this way of doing philosophy; it seems to me that all too often that wheels are (...)
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  29.  11
    True, False, Paranormal and Designated: A Reply to Beall.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):80-83.
  30.  54
    Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects.Ali Abasnezhad & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):278-283.
    Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes–Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes–Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliver genuinely vague objects, it in fact provides (...)
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  31.  55
    True, False, Paranormal and Designated: A Reply to Beall.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):80 - 83.
  32. The Philosophy of Flirting.C. S. Jenkins - manuscript
    I attempt to give necessary and sufficient conditions for when an act of flirtation has taken place.
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  33. What Love Is And What It Could Be.Carrie Jenkins - forthcoming - Basic Books.
    This book unpicks the conceptual, ideological, and metaphysical tangles that get in the way of understanding romantic love. -/- Written for a general audience, What Love Is And What It Could Be explores different disciplinary perspectives on love, in search of the bigger picture. It presents a "dual-nature" theory: romantic love is simultaneously both a biological phenomenon and a social construct. The key philosophical insight comes in explaining why this a coherent—and indeed a necessary—position to take. -/- The deep motivation (...)
     
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  34.  79
    Modal Monogamy.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
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  35.  93
    The Traditional Conception of the a Priori.Masashi Kasaki & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2725-2746.
    In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition as they might seem at first glance.
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  36.  70
    Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):67 - 73.
    We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).
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  37.  66
    Anti-Realism and Epistemic Accessibility.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):525-551.
    I argue that Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist’s commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal apparatus (...)
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  38.  54
    The Manuscripts of Bede. [REVIEW]Claude Jenkins - 1945 - The Classical Review 59 (1):20-21.
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  39.  42
    The Importance of Being Designated: A Comment on Caret and Cotnoir.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):244-247.
  40. The Rules of Flirtation.Carrie Jenkins - 2006 - The Philosophers' Magazine 36 (36):37-40.
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  41.  45
    Critical Notice of Spandrels of Truth by J.C. Beall.C. S. Jenkins - 2010 - Philosophical Books 51 (4):245-254.
  42.  99
    Reflective Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):305-325.
    Abstract This paper examines the kind of epistemic circularity which, according to Ernest Sosa, is unavoidably entailed whenever one has what he calls ?reflective? knowledge (that is, knowledge that p such that the knower reflectively endorses the reliability of the epistemic sources by which she came to her belief that p). I begin by describing the relevant kind of circularity and its role in Sosa's epistemology, en route presenting and resisting Sosa's arguments that this kind of circularity is not vicious. (...)
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  43.  6
    Attenuation of Nursing-Related Ovarian Suppression and High Fertility in Well-Nourished, Intensively Breast-Feeding Amele Women of Lowland Papua New Guinea.Carol M. Worthman, Carol L. Jenkins, Joy F. Stallings & Daina Lai - 1993 - Journal of Biosocial Science 25 (4):425-443.
    SummaryIntense, sustained nursing lengthens inter-birth intervals and is causally linked with low natural fertility. However, in traditional settings, the effects of such nursing on fertility are difficult to disentangle from those of nutrition. Results from an prospective, direct observational study of reproductive function in well-nourished Amele women who nurse intensively and persistently but who also have high fertility are here presented. Endocrine measures show that ovarian activity resumes by median 11·0 months postpartum. Median duration of postpartum amenorrhoea is 11·3 months, (...)
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  44.  76
    Kripkenstein and the Cleverly Disguised Mules.C. S. Jenkins - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (2):88-99.
  45.  25
    R. C. Goldschmidt: Paulinus' Churches at Nola. Texts, Translations and Commentary. Pp. Vi+ 204. Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1940. Paper, 9s.6d.Net. [REVIEW]Claude Jenkins - 1946 - The Classical Review 60 (2):97-97.
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  46.  62
    Review: The Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW]C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1141-1147.
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  47.  22
    Jew and Christian in the Early Roman Empire. [REVIEW]Claude Jenkins - 1948 - The Classical Review 62 (1):27-28.
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  48.  33
    Sister Margaret Mary Fox: The Life and Times of St. Basil the Great as Revealed in His Works. Pp. Xvi+176. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1939. Paper, $2. [REVIEW]Claude Jenkins - 1940 - The Classical Review 54 (01):53-54.
  49.  52
    Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell. [REVIEW]C. S. Jenkins - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):232-238.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  50.  16
    Knowing Our Own Hearts: Self‐Reporting and the Science of Love.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):226-242.
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