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Cory Juhl [21]Cory F. Juhl [7]C. Juhl [4]Carsten Juhl [3]
Cory Francis Juhl [1]C. F. Juhl [1]
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Profile: Chantell Juhl
  1. Finetuning, Many Worlds, and the 'Inverse Gambler's Fallacy'.Cory Juhl - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):337–347.
    A number of authors have claimed that the fact that our universe seems ’fine-tuned’ is evidence that there are many universes. Ian Hacking (1987) raised doubts about inferences to many sequential universes. More recently, Roger White has argued that it is a fallacy to infer that there are many universes, whether existing all at once or sequentially, from the fact that ours is fine-tuned. The upshot of our discussion will be that Hacking is right about the existence of certain fallacious (...)
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  2. Fine-Tuning is Not Surprising.Cory Juhl - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):269–275.
    This paper is a response to Stephen Leeds’s "Juhl on Many Worlds". Contrary to what Leeds claims, we can legitimately argue for nontrivial conclusions by appeal to our existence. The ’problem of old evidence’, applied to the ’old evidence’ that we exist, seems to be a red herring in the context of determining whether there is a rationally convincing argument for the existence of many universes. A genuinely salient worry is whether multiversers can avoid illicit reuse of empirical evidence in (...)
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  3.  3
    On the Empirical Inaccessibility of Higher-Level Modality and its Significance for Cosmological Fine-Tuning.Cory Juhl & Brian Knab - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    In this paper we propose that cosmological fine-tuning arguments, when levied in support of the existence of Intelligent Designers or Multiverses, are much less interesting than they are thought to be. Our skepticism results from tracking the distinction between merely epistemic or logical possibilities on one hand and nonepistemic possibilities, such as either nomological or metaphysical possibilities, on the other. We find that fine-tuning arguments readily conflate epistemic or logical possibilities with nonepistemic possibilities and we think that this leads to (...)
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  4. Fine-Tuning and Old Evidence.Cory Juhl - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):550–558.
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  5. Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry.Cory Juhl - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.
    The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianism is "inductively incomplete" for such agents. Finally a consistency proof shows (...)
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  6.  84
    A Context-Sensitive Liar.Cory F. Juhl - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):202–204.
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  7. The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction.Cory F. Juhl - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):857-863.
    , Hans Reichenbach made a bold and original attempt to ‘vindicate’ induction. He proposed a rule, the ‘straight rule’ of induction, which would guarantee inductive success if any rule of induction would. A central problem facing his attempt to vindicate the straight rule is that too many other rules are just as good as the straight rule if our only constraint on what counts as ‘success’ for an inductive rule is that it is ‘asymptotic’, i.e. that it converges in the (...)
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  8.  41
    Topology as Epistemology.Cory Juhl - 1996 - The Monist 79 (1):141-147.
  9.  34
    Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science.Kevin T. Kelly, Oliver Schulte & Cory Juhl - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):245-267.
    This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on inductive uncertainty and uncomputability.
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  10.  13
    Realism, Convergence, and Additivity.Cory Juhl & Kevin T. Kelly - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:181 - 189.
    In this paper, we argue for the centrality of countable additivity to realist claims about the convergence of science to the truth. In particular, we show how classical sceptical arguments can be revived when countable additivity is dropped.
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  11.  44
    Objectively Reliable Subjective Probabilities.Cory F. Juhl - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):293 - 309.
    Subjective Bayesians typically find the following objection difficult to answer: some joint probability measures lead to intuitively irrational inductive behavior, even in the long run. Yet well-motivated ways to restrict the set of reasonable prior joint measures have not been forthcoming. In this paper I propose a way to restrict the set of prior joint probability measures in particular inductive settings. My proposal is the following: where there exists some successful inductive method for getting to the truth in some situation, (...)
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  12.  14
    Reliability, Realism, and Relativism.Kevin T. Kelly, Cory Juhl & Clark Glymour - unknown
    Kevin T. Kelly, Cory Juhl and Clark Glymour. Reliability, Realism, and Relativism.
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  13.  48
    Teleosemantics, Kripkenstein and Paradox.Cory F. Juhl - 2000 - In N. Shanks & R. Gardner (eds.), Logic, Probability and Science. Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 168-181.
  14.  16
    Statistical Data and Mathematical Propositions.Cory Juhl - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):100-115.
    Statistical tests of the primality of some numbers look similar to statistical tests of many nonmathematical, clearly empirical propositions. Yet interpretations of probability prima facie appear to preclude the possibility of statistical tests of mathematical propositions. For example, it is hard to understand how the statement that n is prime could have a frequentist probability other than 0 or 1. On the other hand, subjectivist approaches appear to be saddled with ‘coherence’ constraints on rational probabilities that require rational agents to (...)
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  15.  46
    Conscious Experience and the Nontrivality Principle.Cory F. Juhl - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (1):91-101.
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  16.  13
    Blind Realism.Cory Juhl - 1994 - Review of Metaphysics 47 (4):797-798.
  17.  3
    A Context-Sensitive Liar.C. F. Juhl - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):202-204.
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  18.  34
    Pure and Impure Stipulata.Cory Juhl - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):637-652.
  19.  21
    On the Indispensability of the Distinctively Mathematical.C. Juhl - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):324-338.
    Indispensability arguments purport to show that empirical data provide evidence for the existence of mathematical entities. In this paper we argue that indispensability arguments fail to show that empirical data bears on the mathematical. In order to show this we attempt to clarify what it is to be mathematical , and separate the question whether abstracta in general exist from whether distinctively mathematical abstracta exist. We introduce the notion of an ‘agnostified’ empirical theory as a heuristic device for clarifying the (...)
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  20.  24
    Gary Ebbs's Truth and Words.Cory Juhl - 2010 - Philosophical Books 51 (3):175-186.
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  21.  19
    The Comprehensibility of the Universe.Cory F. Juhl - 2000 - International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):517-518.
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  22.  20
    Is Gold-Putnam Diagonalization Complete?Cory Juhl - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (2):117 - 138.
    Diagonalization is a proof technique that formal learning theorists use to show that inductive problems are unsolvable. The technique intuitively requires the construction of the mathematical equivalent of a "Cartesian demon" that fools the scientist no matter how he proceeds. A natural question that arises is whether diagonalization is complete. That is, given an arbitrary unsolvable inductive problem, does an invincible demon exist? The answer to that question turns out to depend upon what axioms of set theory we adopt. The (...)
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  23.  20
    Review of Hans-Johann Glock,, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality[REVIEW]Cory Juhl - 2003 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11).
    Glock’s most recent book is a critical examination of the views of Quine and Davidson. One of the novel features of the book that will prove helpful to most readers is Glock’s comparative treatment of the two. Glock not only thoroughly articulates their views, he also points out significant differences between their basic assumptions and between the goals driving their various projects. For example, Glock compares Quine’s ’radical translation’ project with Davidson’s ’radical interpretation’ project, pointing out interesting differences in assumptions (...)
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  24.  1
    Pure and Impure Stipulata.Cory Juhl - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):637-652.
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  25.  76
    Analyticity.Cory Juhl & Eric Loomis - 2009 - Routledge.
    Analyticity, or the 'analytic/synthetic' distinction is one of the most important and controversial problems in contemporary philosophy. It is also essential to understanding many developments in logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. In this outstanding introduction to analyticity Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis cover the following key topics: The origins of analyticity in the philosophy of Hume and Kant Carnap's arguments concerning analyticity in the early twentieth century Quine's famous objections to analyticity in his classic 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (...)
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  26. Conscious Experience and the Non-Triviality Principle.C. Juhl - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (1):91-101.
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  27. Fine-Tuning is Not Surprising.Cory Juhl - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):269-275.
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  28. Fine-Tuning is Not Surprising.C. Juhl - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):269-275.
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  29. Gedanken und theoretische Postulate: einige Disanalogien. Ein Kommentar zu Rosenberg.C. Juhl - 2000 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48 (4):657-660.
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  30. Gedanken und theoretische Postulate: einige Disanalogien.Cory Juhl - 2000 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48 (4).
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  31. The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science. [REVIEW]Cory F. Juhl - 2000 - International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):517-518.
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  32. Transcendental Deductions and Universal Architectures for Inductive Inferences.Kevin Kelly & Cory Juhl - 1998 - ProtoSociology 12:158-175.
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  33. Tracy Lupher.Mark Sainsbury, Cory Juhl, Nicholas Asher, Hans Halvorson, Lawrence Sklar & Jim Hankinson - 2006 - In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. pp. 164-202.
     
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