This study elucidates and appraises a conception of praxis developed by the Yugoslav Marxist MihailoMarkovi . This notion is first distinguished from everyday and alternative theoretical uses of 'practice', 'practical', and 'praxis' . Markovic's view is then characterized as a normative, pluralistic theory of both human being and doing. Praxis , for Markovi , is activity which realizes one's best potentialities: (i) the humanly generic dispositions of intentionality, self-determination, creativity, sociality, and rationality, and (ii) one's relatively (...) distinctive abilities and bents compatible with (i). Following a critical analysis of Markovic's attempts to justify praxis as norm, two substantive criticisms are advanced. The theory needs (i) priority rules for the relative weighting of praxis components when they cannot all be (fully) realized in an action, and (ii) a specification of the genus praxis so as to recognize important differences among optimal activities which shape things, construct theories, rear children, and share with mature persons. (shrink)
Marxism is often claimed to be incompatible with any kind of ethical theory, because of its assumptions of economic determinism, of the class character of morals, and of the subordination of morality to politics. But the author proposes that these assumptions can be interpreted in such a flexible way as not to rule out the freedom of choice and responsibility, die relative independence of morals from economic conditions and political ends, and concepts of universal human value and a specifically moral (...) ideal. A humanist philosophy, centered in Marx's analysis of alienation, provides a sufficiently rich theoretical basis for the solution of both ethical and meta-ethical' problems. (shrink)
Doppelt argues that the democratic socialist conception of human freedom expressed in some recent works of mine lacks philosophical justification and fails to get to the roots of the socialist ideals of dignity, human worth, and self-respect. Doppelt claims to provide a new approach to the grounding of human freedom which allows him to avoid what he regards as the narrowness of my own conception. Not only does Doppelt fail to show that my own conception of freedom is confined to (...) self-management and cannot embrace the dimensions of social life his own paradigm is claimed to take care of, his article fails to raise or resolve the question of the conflict between the democratic socialist and the Rawlsian components that make up his 'new' paradigm. In this reply I discuss the issues Doppelt himself raises in connection with my own work: (1) how to ground human freedom; (2) whether my conception of freedom in democratic socialism is rationally preferable to the conception embodied in contemporary capitalist society; and (3) whether my idea of freedom does indeed exclude those dimensions of life to which Doppelt refers. (shrink)
Although the concept of "reason" acquired a precise meaning and clearly defined field of validity only in Kant's critical philosophy, the term has a long genesis in European intellectual history. The roots of the concept lie in the Greek concept of the logos and may be reduced to six basic meanings. The earliest Greek thinkers used the word logos to denote the logical structure of the human thought and the rational structure of the world. Anaxagoras considered the all-embracing spiritual principle (...) of the nous the source of overall rationality. In the philosophy of the Stoa the term - logos spermaticos is the active principle acting on passive matter in order to create the world. For the Stoics, the concept of logos is the fundamental principle of entire morality. In Christian theology, the God is logos, Holy Spirit - pneuma the soul. In modern philosophy the basic meanings of the Greek logos were taken over by Latin terms "intellectus" and "ratio". These concepts chart quite clearly two basic lines of European thought, one characterized by immediate and the other by mediated discursive understanding of the truth. Kant was the first in the history of philosophy to introduce the essential distinction between understanding and reason. According to this distinction, understanding is analytical and abstract, while reason is the source of apriori principles connecting and grounding the whole of our knowledge and volition. Therefore Kant distinguishes theoretical from practical reason. Though practical reason applies the concepts and principles of theoretical reason, it has priority over the latter because it bestows practical reality also on what is theoretically unknowable. The primacy of practical reason was especially emphasized by Fichte in his Doctrine of Science. Reason is for him a purely purposeful activity. The idea of reason attains full articulation in Hegel's philosophy of the absolute spirit. For Hegel, reason is first of all a world principle rather than a human capacity. Unlike Kant, whose reason is basically static, a substantial novelty of Hegel's conception of the objective reason is its dynamism, enabling it to reach an increasing awareness "of itself" in its dialectical development. By including the idea of progress in his conception of reason, Hegel introduced an evaluative element in the concept of rationality and thus enabled a connection between reason and ethos in the era of modernity. The deepest cleavage between reason and ethos was opened by the modern science. On one hand, it improved human life by its discoveries and new knowledge, liberating man from religious superstition and other forms of subordination, but on the other it displayed a restrictive attitude not only toward all sorts of value judgments but also toward many dimensions of reason. The positive knowledge of modern science with no ethos lacks any critical self-awareness of the purpose of knowledge, of how it can be used to the benefit of mankind or abused. Thus for establishing a humanistic scientific culture the connection between reason and ethos must be reaffirmed in modern science. Iako je tek u Kantovoj kritickoj filozofiji pojam "uma" dobio precizno znacenje i jasno omedjeno podrucje svog vazenja, ovaj termin ima dugu genezu u evropskoj duhovnoj istoriji. Koreni pojma uma nalaze se u grckom pojmu logosa i mogu se svesti na sest osnovnih znacenja kojima se oznacava logicka struktura ljudskog misljenja i racionalna struktura sveta. Anaksagora je sveopsti duhovni princip nus smatrao izvorom svekolike racionalnosti. Kod filozofa Stoe izraz logos spermaticos predstavlja aktivni princip koji deluje na pasivnu materiju da bi se stvorio svet. Za Stoike pojam logosa cini temeljni princip celokupnog morala. U hriscanskoj teologiji bog je logos, sveti duh - pneuma, dusa. U novovekovnoj filozofiji osnovna znacenja grckog logosa preuzeli su latinski termini "intellectus" i "ratio". Ovi pojmovi sasvim jasno ocrtavaju dve glavne linije evropskog misljenja koje karakterise neposredno i posredovano diskurzivno shvatanje istine. Kant je prvi u istoriji filozofije uveo bitnu razliku izmedju razuma i uma. Razum je analitican i apstraktan, a um je izvor apriornih principa kojima se povezuje i utemeljuje celokupno nase saznanje i volja. Stoga Kant razlikuje teorijski i prakticki um. Za razliku od teorijskog uma, cije pojmove i nacela primenjuje, prakticki um ima primat jer za njega ima prakticki realitet i ono sto je teorijski nesaznatljivo. Primat praktickog uma u svom Ucenju o nauci posebno je naglasio Fihte. Um je za njega cista svrsishodna delatnost. Potpunu artikulaciju ideja uma dobija u Hegelovoj filozofiji apsolutnog duha. Kod Hegela um je pre svega svetski princip a ne samo ljudska sposobnost. Za razliku od Kanta ciji um je u osnovi statican, bitna novina Hegelovog shvatanja objektivnog uma jeste njegov dinamizam koji mu omogucava da u svom dijalektickom razvitku sve vise dolazi do svesti o "samom sebi". Ukljucujuci ideju progresa u svoje shvatanje uma Hegel je uneo jedan vrednosni elemenat u pojam umnosti i time omogucio povezivanje uma i etosa u epohi moderne. Najdublji razdor izmedju uma i etosa izazvala je moderna nauka, koja je s jedne strane svojim otkricima i novim saznanjima unapredila ljudski zivot, oslobadjajuci coveka od religijskog sujeverja i drugih oblika potcinjenosti, ali je s druge strane pokazala restriktivan odnos, ne samo prema svim vrstama vrednosnih sudova, vec i prema mnogim dimenzijama uma. Pozitivno znanje novovekovne nauke bez ikakvog etosa liseno je bilo kakve kriticke samosvesti o svrsi znanja, o tome kako se ono moze upotrebiti na dobro coveka i kako moze biti zloupotrebljeno. Za uspostavljanje humanisticke naucne kulture neophodna je reafirmacija veze uma i etosa u modernoj nauci. (shrink)
The elementary, liberal form of democracy has been criticized for being purely political, predominantly representative, centralistic, involving struggle for power among oligarchic political parties, maintaining professional politics and domination of wealthy classes. A more rational and radical form, the council democracy, is projected as a historically possible and better alternative. It extends democratic principles to economy and culture, combines direct participation with representation, replaces centralism with federalism, develops political pluralism without ruling parties, deprofessionalizes politics, and dismantles any monopoly of power. (...) In the light of existing historical experiences the structure of council-democracy is analyzed, possible solutions of crucial practical problems indicated, and different strategies of its realization are examined. (shrink)
The elementary, liberal form of democracy has been criticized for being purely political, predominantly representative, centralistic, involving struggle for power among oligarchic political parties, maintaining professional politics and domination of wealthy classes. A more rational and radical form, the council democracy, is projected as a historically possible and better alternative. It extends democratic principles to economy and culture, combines direct participation with representation, replaces centralism with federalism, develops political pluralism without ruling parties, deprofessionalizes politics, and dismantles any monopoly of power. (...) In the light of existing historical experiences the structure of council-democracy is analyzed, possible solutions of crucial practical problems indicated, and different strategies of its realization are examined. (shrink)
There are two different senses of rationality of methodological rules: one is instrumental rationality, another is rationality of goals. In the first sense methodological rules are mere means of an apparently neutral true description of a given reality. Such a description, no matter how adequate, involves hidden value-assumptions and may be used for irrational purposes. A different notion of ends-means rationality characterizes methodological rules of critical science which analyses limitations of the given reality from an explicitly stated value-standpoint. The ultimate (...) purpose of such critical research is to produce changes in human behaviour and in objective reality. As in the case of medical activity: diagnosis is followed by therapy. Methodological rules of critical inquiry are only a special case of a general methodology of human practice, the rationality of which presupposes a universal emancipatory goal. (shrink)
There are two different senses of rationality of methodological rules: one is instrumental rationality, another is rationality of goals. In the first sense methodological rules are mere means of an apparently neutral true description of a given reality. Such a description, no matter how adequate, involves hidden value-assumptions and may be used for irrational purposes. A different notion of ends-means rationality characterizes methodological rules of critical science which analyses limitations of the given reality from an explicitly stated value-standpoint. The ultimate (...) purpose of such critical research is to produce changes in human behaviour and in objective reality. As in the case of medical activity: diagnosis is followed by therapy. Methodological rules of critical inquiry are only a special case of a general methodology of human practice, the rationality of which presupposes a universal emancipatory goal. (shrink)
Christology seems to fall fairly clearly into two divisions. The first is concerned with the truth of the two propositions: ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’. The second is concerned with the mutual compatibility of these propositions. The first part of Christology tends to confine itself to what is sometimes called ‘positive theology’: that is to say, it is largely given over to examining the Jons revelationis —let us not prejudge currently burning issues by asking what this is—to (...) see what evidence can be found for the truth of these propositions. Clearly, the methods used will be above all those of New Testament exegesis. The second part of Christology will necessarily consist entirely of that speculative theology which is contrasted with positive theology. Even if the earliest speculation on this topic is to be found in the New Testament itself and thus becomes fair game for the exegetes, any attempt to relate the primary truths, ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’, to eachother is a work of reflection, and in the terminology I am using speculative. (shrink)
One dark and rainy night, Yuso sexually assaults and tortures Zelan. In escaping from the scene of his crime, he falls heavily and becomes an impotent paraplegic. Instead of treating his fate as divine retribution for his wicked acts, Yuso sees it as sheer bad luck. He shows no remorse for what he has done, and vainly hopes that he will recover his powers, which he now treats as involuntarily hoarded resources to be used on less rainy days. In the (...) presence of others, he pretends that he has turned over a new leaf. He asks for religious and educational books, hoping to make up for his poor education and deprived social background. But he immediately discards them when he is alone in favor of the pornographic magazines which he has bribed a nurse to smuggle in for him. His deception and various obscene acts committed in the hospital are exposed; by the time he comes up for trial, everyone knows that he is still a lustful, sadistic, and unrepentant man. Most retributivists have a sufficient justification for punishing Yuso independently of the social consequences of his punishment. Two features of the case might cause some difficulties. First, Yuso has already experienced considerable suffering and deprivation both before and after his crime, and retributivists might disagree about the relevance of the suffering to his punishment. Secondly, Yuso is unrepentant, and it is unlikely that punishment will change him. This might, as we shall see, create a problem for those who think that the justifying aim of punishment is the moral reform of the offender. (shrink)
