See also
Catherine Sutton
Virginia Commonwealth University
  1. The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem.C. S. Sutton - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):619-639.
    Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is (...)
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  2. Colocated Objects, Tally-Ho: A Solution to the Grounding Problem.C. S. Sutton - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):703-730.
    Are a statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it one object or two? Many philosophers have answered ‘two’ because the lump seems to have properties, such as the property of being able to survive flattening, that the statue lacks. This answer faces a serious problem : it seems that nothing grounds the difference in properties between colocated objects. The statue and lump are in the same environment and inherit properties from the same composing parts. But it seems that (...)
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    Against the Maximality Principle.C. S. Sutton - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):381-390.
    To hold that only one conscious thing is sitting in your chair, philosophers have appealed to maximality: If a property M is maximal, then anything that has property M does not have large proper parts that have property M. Philosophers have said that ordinary objects are maximal, including houses, cats, rocks, and have argued by analogy that consciousness is maximal. I argue that the maximality principle mistakenly excludes some members of a kind. Thus, it is not the correct principle to (...)
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  4. Almost One, Overlap and Function.C. S. Sutton - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):45-52.
    In David Lewis’s famous ‘Many, but Almost One’, he argues that when objects of the same kind share most of their parts, they can be counted as one. I argue that mereological overlap does not do the trick. A better candidate is overlap in function. Although mereological overlap often goes hand-in-hand with functional overlap, a functional approach is more accurate in cases in which mereology and function are teased apart. A functional approach also solves a version of the problem of (...)
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  5. Review of Persons, Animals, Ourselves by Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW]C. S. Sutton - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):429-432.
  6. Persons, Animals, Ourselves by Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW]C. S. Sutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv057.