ABSTRACT:Alasdair MacIntyre’sAfter Virtuehas made a significant impact within business ethics. This impact has centered upon applications of the virtues-goods-practices-institutions schema (Moore & Beadle, 2006). In this article, I develop an extension of the practices-institutions schema (Moore, 2017), drawing upon MacIntyre’s later text,Dependent Rational Animals. Two key concepts drawn from this text are “networks of giving and receiving” and “the virtues of acknowledged dependence.” Networks of giving and receiving are non-calculative relationships that enable participants to cope with vulnerability. These relationships are (...) sustained by the virtues of acknowledged dependence, including just generosity,misericordia,and beneficence, virtues that direct participants to treat the needs of others as reasons for action. Drawing upon research in social network theory, I develop an example illustrating the application of these concepts within an organizational and interorganizational context. I then suggest a number of applications and research questions related to this extension of the practices-institutions schema. (shrink)

We draw on Alasdair MacIntyre's virtues, practices, and institutions schema to argue that employee participation in governance practices can play an important role in developing virtue. Whereas MacIntyre's schema has been most widely employed to understand how productive practices can cultivate virtue, we focus instead on the way that meaningful deliberation about the common good can provide experiences requiring employees to exercise the virtues. We then apply this theoretical framework to an analysis of the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation. Our analysis emphasizes (...) the importance of participatory governance over employee ownership. Based on this analysis, we draw several implications for increasing participatory governance in a way that will prevent shareholder maximization from crowding out virtue, even in corporate contexts where productive activity itself does not provide a meaningful, virtue-instilling experience. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Experience often manifests a gap between moral principles that are both rationally defensible and widely accepted, and the actual practice of business. In this article, I adapt Pope Francis’s discussion of conscience, gradualness, and discernment, inAmoris Laetitia, for the philosophical context of business ethics in order to better conceptualize and to identify means of narrowing the gap between objective moral principles and business practice. Specifically, right conscience allows for a better understanding of the scope and boundary conditions of moral principles, (...) gradualness highlights the need to identify ways that moral principles can be properly implemented within organizations, and discernment draws attention to the importance of solidarity, in order to avoid one-sided, self-serving action descriptions. In these ways, Francis’s discussion contributes to the narrowing of the gap between objective moral principles and business practice. I conclude by discussing ways that Francis’s framework can inform business ethics courses. (shrink)

Research in business ethics has largely ignored questions of equality and dissensus, raised by theorists of radical democracy. Alasdair MacIntyre, whose work has been very influential in business ethics, has developed a novel approach to virtue ethics rooted in both Aristotelian practical philosophy and a Marxian appreciation of radical democracy. In this paper, we bring MacIntyre into conversation with Jacques Rancière and Chantal Mouffe and argue the following: first, MacIntyre’s work has significant similarities with Rancière and Mouffe, thus suggesting that (...) MacIntyrean business ethics has the potential to address the concerns of radical democrats; second, the MacIntyrean business ethics literature has not adequately incorporated the aspects of Macntyre’s work addressing concerns regarding equality and dissensus and future work should pay more attention to these concerns. (shrink)

Rights claims are ubiquitous in modernity. Often expressed when relatively weaker agents assert claims against more powerful actors, especially against states and corporations, the prominence of rights claims in organizational contexts creates a challenge for virtue-based approaches to business ethics, especially perspectives employing MacIntyre’s practices–institutions schema since MacIntyre has long been a vocal critic of the notion of human rights. In this article, I argue that employee rights can be understood at a basic level as rights conferred by the rules (...) constitutive of practices. As such, employee rights correspond to the obligations of practitioners to treat fellow practitioners according to the standards of excellence and requirements of justice. Thus, one way that managers can ensure that their core practice is well-functioning is to recognize employee rights. One implication of this argument is that managers should adopt a more positive stance toward labor unions, insofar as they are a key way for employees to ensure that their voice is heard, and their rights respected. (shrink)

Trends in corporate governance to minimize employee participation and to promote shareholder rights, in both the EU and US contexts, evidence the practical efficacy of the separation thesis and the dominance of models of corporate governance founded upon decision theory. Giving expression to a vision of human agency in terms of instrumental rationality, such models of corporate governance, presuppose clearly defined objectives. Drawing on the work of Talbot Brewer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Robert Brandom, this paper offers an alternative practice-based model (...) of corporate governance that emphasizes the role of socially and historically embodied forms of reasoning in promoting a better understanding of the aims or objectives of the corporation, particularly with respect to the social, environmental, and economic context of the firm. After reviewing recent empirical literature concerning employee participation, criteria are offered concerning effective employee participation programs, as a means of implementing a practice-based model of corporate governance. (shrink)

The market failures approach is amongst the most influential theories of business ethics. Its interest within the field is, in large part, a result of its rejection of moralism and any sort of applied ethics approach, favouring, in contrast, a focus on the institutionally embodied goal of economic activity, which it takes to be that of Pareto efficiency. From this articulation of the goal, or purpose, of markets, a set of efficiency imperatives are derived that are taken to comprise the (...) implicit morality of the market. However, the market failures approach has not adequately explained the basis of market actors’ moral motivation, that is, the reasons individuals have to self-consciously adhere to moral norms governing market transactions. This failure, I argue, stems from its misspecification of the purpose of the market. After explaining this failure to address the problem of moral motivation, I argue that a distinctive mode of freedom understood as a form of self-authorship is better seen as the purpose of the market, a goal that actually animates individual market participants. I then argue that this notion of freedom is intrinsically linked to a conception of responsibility and that this notion of responsibility can be more adequately conceptualized as involving a set of market virtues focused on promoting mutually beneficial transactions. Thus, the link between freedom and responsibility, stemming from an individual’s need to legitimize their freedom in a market context, provides the basis for a self-conscious sense of moral motivation. As such, this approach better captures the implicit morality of the market while also addressing the problem of moral motivation. (shrink)

Hegel’s practical philosophy has important insights for understanding the ethical role of the firm in modern society. From a broadly Hegelian perspective, the firm’s role in society is to facilitate freedom, that is, the concrete realization of rational agency. It does this by providing the institutional structures, norms, practices, and modes of discourse necessary for individuals to link their subjective aims with objectively valid societal aims, embodied in the firm’s purpose. Accordingly, I first present a Hegelian account of the link (...) between action and social structure, before arguing that the firm, when it functions properly, enables individuals to express their capacity for rational agency within concrete social contexts. I then draw upon Paul Adler’s Marxist analysis of the development of organizational structures and processes to support the viability of a broadly Hegelian account of the firm within a contemporary economic context. I conclude by outlining a number of practical implications of this account, before explaining its implications for two prominent theories of business ethics, the MacIntyrean perspective, and the Market Failures Approach. (shrink)

MacIntyre’s distinctive version of practice theory has already influenced strategy as practice research but his approach has further relevance to the field. The MacIntyrean approach further focuses attention on joint production as an organization-wide practice that potentially encompasses and integrates sub-organizational practices. It also highlights the way that ordinary organization members engage in modes of praxis in order to integrate productive practices in the service of morally salient, organizational goals, facilitating collaboration and long-term value creation, illustrating how participation in joint (...) production shapes members’ identities beyond that derived from sub-organizational, productive practices. As such, this approach offers new insights into the nature of the praxis, practices, and practitioners that shape processes of strategizing within organizations., This approach also furthers the integration of the practical and critical strands of strategy as practice research and provides insights into the way it can be integrated with other research in strategy. (shrink)

The combined effect of technological innovations in the workplace and the lockdowns imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly increased the prominence of remote working, with an undeniable impact on both business and society. In light of this organizational and sociological change, this article analyzes how this renewed work environment can be the place where workers can develop several relevant virtues, specifically moderation, integrity, and mercy. This new environment may also present the opportunity to develop a number of opposing vices, (...) which are also explained and analyzed. The article concludes by suggesting some implications for managers who wish to promote virtuous behaviors in the new context of remote work. (shrink)

Recognition is a fundamental good that corporations ought to give to employees, a good that is essential to their well-being, and thus, recognition should be among the central notions in our understanding of organizations and in any theory of business ethics. Drawing upon the work of Philip Pettit and Robert Brandom as well as themes from instrumental stakeholder theory, I develop a complex notion of recognition involving both status recognition and capacity recognition and argue that this account meets three fundamental (...) desiderata of any adequate account of business ethics: It makes salient key normative features of the practice of business. It articulates a genuine ethical demand that is not reducible to the economic imperatives typical of self-interested actors. And it is compatible with the strategic demands that organizations face to remain competitive. Status recognition involves treating others as persons whose rights are legally enshrined. Capacity recognition involves treating others as persons possessing specific capacities. When corporations accord these forms of recognition to employees, they promote their well-being in a fundamental way and they promote the long-term success of the firm. Thus, recognition represents an underappreciated concept that may further contribute to theory development in business ethics and organization studies and more ethical business practice. (shrink)

Feldman (Organization Science 11(6): 611–629, 2000) describes the striving mechanism as a mode of routine change driven by successful organizational routines. Striving describes a process by which organization members gain a better understanding of the ideals undergirding their actions. In turn, this insight drives changes within routines. In this paper, I argue that the rational actor model, especially as articulated in Donald Davidson’s (1963) theory of action, is unable to account for the striving mechanism of endogenous routine change identified by (...) Feldman (Organization Science 11(6): 611–629, 2000). Drawing upon Brewer’s (2011) criticisms of propositional theories of desire, the account of meta-language intentional attitudes developed by List and Pettit (2011), and MacIntyre’s (2007) theory of social practices, I introduce an expanded framework for conceptualizing agency at the individual level, and aggregation at the organization level, that better accounts for the striving mechanism as a process of endogenous routine change. (shrink)

Patrick Byrne argues that MacIntyre’s account of practical reasoning is inadequate because it is based upon a notion of flourishing that places too much emphasis on impersonal facts, likewise because it is excessively focused on means without considering the role of desire for ends, and because it is does not account for the role of feelings in explaining how knowledge of ends is attained. In this essay, I argue that MacIntyre’s account provides adequate responses to each of these concerns. But (...) more broadly, I argue that Byrne is right to suggest that a Lonerganian perspective offers important insights that can extend MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy. Specifically, Lonergan’s account of the generalized empirical method may inform MacIntyre’s theory of rival, and potentially incommensurable traditions, explaining how standards of argument are both transcultural and historically articulated. (shrink)

This article develops a liberal theory of the virtues in business. I first articulate two key liberal values embodied within market society: self-authorship and mutual benefit. Self-authorship is a mode of autonomy given expression through the effective exercise of economic liberties. Mutual benefit involves the intentional pursuit of the well-being of one’s transaction partners within economic exchange. These values are uniquely realized, I argue, within business, conceptualized as a distinct, firm-level, social practice. More specifically, individuals realize self-authorship by purposively integrating (...) cospecialized resources, forms of knowledge, and business functions to facilitate mutually beneficial transactions. Through their commitment to mutual benefit, businesspersons establish ongoing, cooperative relationships with customers, members of other firms, and various stakeholders more generally. These relationships are constitutive of a distinct liberal notion of the common good. The practice of business and the common good in a market society are sustained by a range of individual-level virtues. I recount these virtues and, before concluding, discuss several other theoretical implications of this account. (shrink)

Bounded rationality presents a challenge to the notion that virtue is a capacity for knowledge, suggesting that judgments concerning the salience of specific facts are, in some cases, an indication of one’s incapacity to appreciate the full range of normatively salient facts. This problem can be mitigated by linking an account of the virtues with a theory of organizations. From this perspective, virtue is inherently shaped by the norms structuring one’s role(s) and is linked to the complementary set of roles, (...) that is, the organization, in which one is participating through the virtues of loyalty and obedience. Within this perspective, human cognitive limitations are made to be strengths, allowing one to focus on a narrow set of reasons for action linked with one’s role to better achieve salient aims as a member of the organization than one could as an isolated individual. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Alasdair MacIntyre: An Intellectual Biography by Émile Perreau-SaussineCaleb BernacchioPERREAU-SAUSSINE, Émile. Alasdair MacIntyre: An Intellectual Biography. Translated by Nathan Pinkoski. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022. xvii + 216 pp. Cloth, $40.00This book is the much anticipated translation of the author's doctoral dissertation completed under the direction of Pierre Manent and Charles Taylor in 2000. Manent also contributes a foreword to this edition. Alasdair MacIntyre: An (...) Intellectual Biography comes in the wake of Perreau-Saussine's untimely death in 2010, during which time he was translating a portion of his dissertation (chapter 2, part 1), which is included in the present text. Accordingly, the book does not discuss works published by MacIntyre after 2000. The book provides a detailed account of MacIntyre's intellectual development. Besides the introduction and epilogue, its three chapters cover politics, philosophy, and theology, respectively. [End Page 557]In chapter 1, Perreau-Saussine recounts the impact of British political debates during the 1950s and 1960s on MacIntyre's early intellectual development. Sharing a disdain for the Labour Party's embrace of a "reformed capitalism" and welfare state politics with other members of the New Left such as Charles Taylor, MacIntyre connected this political stance with a theoretical critique of utilitarianism, foreshadowing his later criticisms of bureaucracy in After Virtue. However, unlike Taylor, who "places himself on the field 'culture,'" focusing on the articulation of a richer account of modern values, "in MacIntyre's eyes, virtue and wisdom are more fragile than Taylor thinks." Perreau-Saussine not only insightfully explains the contrasting views of MacIntyre and Taylor in terms of their estimation of the prospects inherent within postwar liberal politics but also explains how MacIntyre's pessimistic take on postwar politics led him to embrace elements of conservatism, especially the theme of the individual as "embedded" within a community and tradition, which thus provide an essential context for understanding individual freedom. As such, the author argues, for MacIntyre, Burke and Marx come together in their critique of the abstractions of liberalism. However, "[u]nlike Burke's conservatism," the author argues, "MacIntyre's is not a liberal conservatism but one that tends toward an antiliberal conservatism." We might also note that this skepticism of the market places MacIntyre in opposition to many contemporary conservatives. Perreau-Saussine shows how MacIntyre's early affinity with conservative ideas, originally as a source of criticism of the Labour Party's embrace of the welfare state, links with MacIntyre's later work, especially his notion of a practice, which connects with Ruskin's discussions of the craftsman, and his account of the natural law, which, like Burke, he takes to be embedded within communities and traditions.Chapter 2 shows how MacIntyre's participation in postwar politics overlaps with various philosophical debates of the time, including those concerning the role of morality within Marxism, the adequacy of analytic moral philosophy, and the impact of the late Wittgenstein's work. For MacIntyre and other Marxists, Stalin's brutality highlighted Marxism's need for an adequate account of ethics. Whereas some appealed to Kantian themes to address this problem, MacIntyre rejected this path. Accordingly, Perreau-Saussine notes "MacIntyre's unceasing interest with Hegelian philosophy of action," especially Hegel's critique of Kant's appeal to an abstract notion of "humanity," a theme that returns in After Virtue. This recognition of the lack of an adequate moral perspective within Marxism, made apparent by Stalin's consequentialism, along with MacIntyre's refusal to embrace Kant's "abstract universalism" was another avenue leading him from Marx to Aquinas, as the author adeptly illustrates. Perreau-Saussine's comparison of MacIntyre and Lyotard is also insightful. For both, Stalinism and the theoretical failures of Marxism lead to a rejection of this political tradition; but where Lyotard, rejecting universalism altogether, turns to Nietzsche, MacIntyre turns to Aristotle and then Aquinas, seeking a more adequate conception of reason rather [End Page 558] than rejecting it. Like Hegel, the late Wittgenstein's emphasis on the role of communal standards for individual thought and action also made an important impact on MacIntyre's thought, further informing his focus on local communities and traditions. As the... (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory presents a complex argument that spans numerous academic disciplines and combines empirical and theoretical analyses. Its radical conclusion has inspired activists and social critics from all sides of the ideological spectrum. Critics and commentators have questioned MacIntyre’s critique of modern moral philosophy and the plausibility of the concluding prescription, concerning the need to create new forms of community. But it has less often been asked in what sense the book presents a (...) unified perspective. In other words, how do the premises of MacIntyre’s argument, presented and defended throughout the text, warrant the conclusion? In this article, I partially formalize the main argument of After Virtue, discussing the grounds for each premise, and explaining how they ground the book’s radical conclusion. In doing this, I argue that economic sociology, specifically Karl Polanyi’s theory of the modern market economy, plays a large role in supporting MacIntyre’s claims. After presenting the main argument of the text, I draw upon the social theory elaborated in Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, specifically its theory of the relationship between vulnerability, dependence, and virtuous networks of giving and receiving, while briefly noting recent sociological criticisms of Polanyi, to argue that we have reason to be skeptical of MacIntyre’s empirical claims concerning the vicious character of modern social structures in After Virtue. (shrink)

This is a review of Martin Kornberger’s Strategies for Distributed and Collective Action: Connecting the Dots. This book offers a comprehensive account of novel modes of organizing that are both distributed and collective. I briefly summarize each chapter and offers some critical comments.