14 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Caleb Liang [14]Caleb Y. Liang [1]Caleb Yi-yu Liang [1]
  1. Self-Consciousness and Immunity.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  2. Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):496-501.
    Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  3. Higher-Order Thought and Pathological Self: The Case of Somatoparaphrenia.Caleb Liang & Timothy Lane - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):661-668.
    According to Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, first-order mental states become conscious only when they are targeted by HOTs that necessarily represent the states as belonging to self. On this view a state represented as belonging to someone distinct from self could not be a conscious state. Rosenthal develops this view in terms of what he calls the ‘thin immunity principle’ (TIP). According to TIP, when I experience a conscious state, I cannot be wrong about whether it is (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4. Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.
    Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5.  38
    Body Ownership and Experiential Ownership in the Self-Touching Illusion.Caleb Liang, Si-Yan Chang, Wen-Yeo Chen, Hsu-Chia Huang & Yen-Tung Lee - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5 (1591):1-13.
    We investigate two issues about the subjective experience of one's body: first, is the experience of owning a full-body fundamentally different from the experience of owning a body-part?Second, when I experience a bodily sensation, does it guarantee that I cannot be wrong about whether it is me who feels it? To address these issues, we conducted a series of experiments that combined the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and the “body swap illusion.” The subject wore a head mounted display (HMD) connected (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6.  11
    The Sense of 1PP-Location Contributes to Shaping the Perceived Self-Location Together with the Sense of Body-Location.Hsu-Chia Huang, Yen-Tung Lee, Wen-Yeo Chen & Caleb Liang - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8 (370):1-12.
    Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor for one's interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, we investigate self-location by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  1
    Body Ownership and the Four-Hand Illusion.Wen-Yeo Chen, Hsu-Chia Huang, Yen-Tung Lee & Caleb Liang - 2018 - Scientific Reports 8 (2153):1-17.
    Recent studies of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have shown that the sense of body ownership is constrained by several factors and yet is still very flexible. However, exactly how flexible is our sense of body ownership? In this study, we address this issue by investigating the following question: is it possible that one may have the illusory experience of owning four hands? Under visual manipulation, the participant adopted the experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own. Sitting (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  15
    Body-as-Subject in the Four-Hand Illusion.Caleb Liang, Yen-Tung Lee, Wen-Yeo Chen & Hsu-Chia Huang - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9 (1710):1-9.
    In a recent study (Chen et al., 2018), we conducted a series of experiments that induced the “four-hand illusion”: using a head-mounted display (HMD), the participant adopted the experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP. The participant saw four hands via the HMD: the experimenter’s two hands from the adopted 1PP and the subject’s own two hands from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP). In the active four-hand condition, the participant tapped his/her index fingers, imitated by the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  3
    Experiential Ownership and Body Ownership Are Different Phenomena.Caleb Liang, Wen-Hsiang Lin, Tai-Yuan Chang, Chi-Hong Chen, Chen-Wei Wu, Wen-Yeo Chen, Hsu-Chia Huang & Yen-Tung Lee - 2021 - Scientific Reports 10602 (11):1-11.
    Body ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  2
    Is Perception the Origin of Objectivity?Caleb Liang - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:69-76.
    In this paper, I challenge a specific claim by Tyler Burge that perception delineates the lower border of representational mind and exhibits the most basic form of objectivity. According to this claim, perception is the most primitive type of representation that, when veridical, accurately attributes properties to non-perspective, mind-independent subject-matters. I argue that perception of the external world, especially vision, is not the most primitive type of objective representation. My approach will be interdisciplinary. After presenting Burge’s theory of perception, I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  27
    Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Vision Science.Caleb Liang - forthcoming - NTU Philosophical Review:87-120.
    I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given.Caleb Liang - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:21-36.
    In “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Alston argues against Sellars’s position in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience. I contend that the Sellarsian can agree that the phenomenal aspect of looks should be accommodated, but he is not thereby forced to concede a form of the nonconceptual Given. I examine some of Alston’s arguments, especially the Fineness of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  10
    Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given.Caleb Liang - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:21-36.
    In “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Alston argues against Sellars’s position in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience. I contend that the Sellarsian can agree that the phenomenal aspect of looks should be accommodated, but he is not thereby forced to concede a form of the nonconceptual Given. I examine some of Alston’s arguments, especially the Fineness of Grain (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  34
    Perceptual Phenomenology and Direct Realism.Caleb Liang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:103-148.
    I discuss the so-called “problem of perception” in relation to the Argument from Illusion: Can we directly perceive the external world? According to Direct Realism, at least sometimes perception provides direct and immediate awareness of reality. But the Argument from Illusion threatens to undermine the possibility of genuine perception. In The Problem of Perception (2002), A. D. Smith proposes a novel defense of Direct Realism based on a careful study of perceptual phenomenology. According to his theory, the intentionality of perception (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark