An old and well-known objection to non-classical logics is that they are too weak; in particular, they cannot prove a number of important mathematical results. A promising strategy to deal with this objection consists in proving so-called recapture results. Roughly, these results show that classical logic can be used in mathematics and other unproblematic contexts. However, the strategy faces some potential problems. First, typical recapture results are formulated in a purely logical language, and do not generalize nicely to languages containing (...) the kind of vocabulary that usually motivates non-classical theories—for example, a language containing a naïve truth predicate. Second, proofs of recapture results typically employ classical principles that are not valid in the targeted non-classical system; hence, non-classical theorists do not seem entitled to those results. In this paper, we analyze these problems and provide solutions on behalf of non-classical theorists. To address the first problem, we provide a novel kind of recapture result, which generalizes nicely to a truth-theoretic language. As for the second problem, we argue that it relies on an ambiguity and that, once the ambiguity is removed, there are no reasons to think that non-classical logicians are not entitled to their recapture results. (shrink)

Connexive logics are based on two ideas: that no statement entails or is entailed by its own negation (this is Aristotle’s thesis) and that no statement entails both something and the negation of this very thing (this is Boethius' thesis). Usually, connexive logics are contra-classical. In this note, I introduce a reading of the connexive theses that makes them compatible with classical logic. According to this reading, the theses in question do not talk about validity alone; rather, they talk in (...) part about (a property related to) the soundness of arguments. (shrink)

We introduce a suitable notion of eight-shaped curve in the product S × ℝ of a Suslin line S for the real line ℝ, and we prove that if S is dense in itself, then every collection of pairwise disjoint eight-shaped curves in S × ℝ is countable. This parallels a folklore result which holds for the real plane.

Narrative medicine explores the stories that patients tell; this paper, conversely, looks at some of the stories that patients are told. The paper starts by examining the ‘story’ told by the Shambaa people of Tanzania to explain the bubonic plague and contrasts this with the stories told by Ghanaian communities to explain lymphatic filariasis. By harnessing insights from memory studies, these stories’ memorability is claimed to be due to their use mnemonic devices woven into stories. The paper suggests that stories (...) can be unpatronising, informative, and appropriate vehicles for communicating medical information to all age groups across all cultures. (shrink)

When logicians work with multiple-conclusion systems, they use a metalinguistic comma ‘,’ to aggregate premises and/or conclusions. In this note, I present an analogy between this comma and Prior’s infamous connective tonk. The analogy reveals that these expressions have much in common. I argue that, indeed, the comma can be seen as a structural incarnation of tonk. The upshot is that, whatever story one has to tell about tonk, there are good reasons to tell a similar story about the comma (...) in typical multiple-conclusion systems, and vice versa. (shrink)

In this essay I will discuss the therapeutic application of philosophy in treating what I term “the moral casualties of war.” In doing so, I will develop an etiology of moral injury and focus upon the philosophical reasoning and insights that may be applied in an individual or group setting to foster an understanding of the warexperience as the first treatment step in a long and complex journey to healing.

In this essay I will discuss the therapeutic application of philosophy in treating what I term “the moral casualties of war.” In doing so, I will develop an etiology of moral injury and focus upon the philosophical reasoning and insights that may be applied in an individual or group setting to foster an understanding of the warexperience as the first treatment step in a long and complex journey to healing.

Este artigo tem como objetivo rever a crítica que Peirce faz a uma definição de abdução como uma relação de probabilidade a partir das características. Parece consensual entre seus comentadores que, de fato, essa definição não se adequa ao conceito peirciano. Contudo, este artigo defende que não há uma desarmonia entre abdução e uma relação de probabilidade. Ao contrário, será defendido que, sendo a abdução composta de formação e seleção de hipóteses, essa relação de probabilidade poderia ter uma função na (...) parte de seleção de hipóteses. Para isso, será apresentada uma definição básica de abdução, seguida da proposta de relação de probabilidade entre características. As críticas a essa proposta serão apresentadas e será evidenciado que não se sustentam, abrindo, assim, a possibilidade da permanência dessa característica no conceito de abdução peirciana. (shrink)

v. 1. Presentazione de Biagia Catanzaro Gligora -- v. 2. Logica, totalità-reale e realtà -- v. 3. Anima e coscienza.

A metainference is usually understood as a pair consisting of a collection of inferences, called premises, and a single inference, called conclusion. In the last few years, much attention has been paid to the study of metainferences—and, in particular, to the question of what are the valid metainferences of a given logic. So far, however, this study has been done in quite a poor language. Our usual sequent calculi have no way to represent, e.g. negations, disjunctions or conjunctions of inferences. (...) In this paper we tackle this expressive issue. We assume some background sentential language as given and define what we call an inferential language, that is, a language whose atomic formulas are inferences. We provide a model-theoretic characterization of validity for this language—relative to some given characterization of validity for the background sentential language—and provide a proof-theoretic analysis of validity. We argue that our novel language has fruitful philosophical applications. Lastly, we generalize some of our definitions and results to arbitrary metainferential levels. (shrink)

Aristóteles comparte con Platón la concepción de la forma como causa del ser y del conocimiento de las cosas. Sin embargo, un análisis de sus críticas a las Ideas muestra que encuentra en la separación de las Ideas y las cosas sensibles la aporía fundamental de la teoría platónica. Con el propósito de circunscribir el significado de “separación” aplicable a las Ideas, concentraremos nuestro estudio en dos objeciones: 1) el argumento que conduce al tercer hombre y 2) la inutilidad de (...) las Ideas como causas. En el primer caso, creemos que la separación entraña homonimia, por lo que la solución aristotélica implicará la comunidad de naturaleza entre el individuo y su esencia. En el segundo, la separación implica trascendencia o falta de contacto entre generante y generado, por lo que la solución aristotélica apuntará a concebir la forma de las entidades naturales como un principio inmanente, inseparable de la materia y del movimiento, pero a la vez eterno a través de su reproducción en otros individuos de la misma especie. Creemos que en ambas soluciones opera un principio de sinonimia, que constituye su propia contribución al problema de la separación. (shrink)

The infinitary function of the truth predicate consists in its ability to express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. A transparency principle for truth states the equivalence between a sentence and its truth predication; it requires an introduction principle—which allows the inference from “snow is white” to “the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true”—and an elimination principle—which allows the inference from “the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true” to “snow is white”. It is commonly assumed that a theory of truth needs to (...) satisfy a transparency principle to fulfil the infinitary function. Picollo and Schindler (Erkenntnis 83:899–928, 2017) argue against this idea. They prove that, given certain assumptions, an elimination principle is sufficient for the purpose. Then, they pose a challenge: to show why we should incorporate introduction principles to our theory of truth. In this essay I take on the challenge. I show that, given the authors’ assumptions, an introduction principle is also sufficient to perform the infinitary function. (shrink)

Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail (...) that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable. (shrink)

In [8] it is proved that all the intermediate logics axiomatizable by formulas in one variable, except four of them, are not strongly complete. We considerably improve this result by showing that all the intermediate logics axiomatizable by formulas in one variable, except eight of them, are not strongly ω-complete. Thus, a definitive classification of such logics with respect to the notions of canonicity, strong completeness, ω-canonicity and strong ω-completeness is given.

This collection of essays explores the history of the book in pre-modern South Asia looking at the production, circulation, fruition and preservation of manuscripts in different areas and across time. Edited by the team of the Cambridge-based Sanskrit Manuscripts Project and including contributions of the researchers who collaborated with it, it covers a wide range of topics related to South Asian manuscript culture: from the material dimension and the complicated interactions of manuscripts with printing in late medieval Tibet and in (...) modern Tamil Nadu, to reading, writing, editing and educational practices, from manuscripts as sources for the study of religious, literary and intellectual traditions, to the creation of collections in medieval India and Cambodia, and the formation of the Cambridge collections in the colonial period. The contributions reflect the variety of idioms, literary genres, religious movements, and social actors of ancient South Asia, as well as the variety of approaches, interests and specialisms of the authors, and their impassionate engagement with manuscripts. (shrink)

The article presents a preliminary survey of textual reuse in Nepalese collections of j?takas and avad?nas, focusing in particular on three works: the Avad?na?ataka, the Divy?vad?na, and the Dv?vi??atyavad?nakath?. The reassessment of the manuscript tradition of these three Sanskrit collections, based on Nepalese manuscripts and Tibetan translations, sheds more light on the role of scribes in the creation of these collections and of the Nepalese avad?nam?l? literature. In particular, the great role played in the 17th century by the Nepalese scribe (...) and scholar Jayamuni in shaping the text of the Avad?na?ataka, the Divy?vad?na, and many other Buddhist narrative works is brought to light. The result of this preliminary survey shows that a study of this type of collections based on the available critical editions should be rethought in the light of the specific character of their manuscript and textual transmission in medieval and early modern Nepal. (shrink)

Lo Stato, Il sovrano, Repubblica o monarchia, di A.C. de Meis.--Lettere di F. Fiorentino a Silvio Spaventa sullo Stato moderno.

The use of critical exposition of previous doctrines is a methodological procedure usual in Aristotle. But the distinctive characteristic of Book I of the Metaphysics is that, rather than to establish a new doctrine, a review of predecessors serves to confirm the own concepts to be used in the evaluation of the doctrines examined. This imposition of own terms has cost him the charge of distorting historical understanding. With the detailed analysis of the criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas in (...) Metaphysics I, 9, we intend to show a) that the criticism of manipulation and distortion of his predecessors' views overshadow the degree to which Aristotle's own positions emerge from a critical review of previous thought and b) that the imposition of own terms does not suppose a distortion but a proposal of solution to the problems that previous theories have left unresolved. (shrink)

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Dobb’s case has given rise to confusion in the medical community, mostly concerning the specific definition of an abortion and what procedures are acceptable. Catholic bioethics has a long history of examining the ethical issues surrounding procedures used in vital conflict situations and other instances where direct or indirect abortion may be the preferred treatment. This article lays out the important points and ethical dimensions surrounding some of the most common pregnancy related interventions and (...) provides guidance to physicians seeking to treat both patients in a manner that acknowledges their value as human beings. (shrink)

If neuroscience is to contribute to economics, it will do so by the way of psychology. Neural data can and do lead to better psychological theories, and psychological insights can and do lead to better economic models. Hence, neuroscience can in principle contribute to economics. Whether it actually will do so is an empirical question and the jury is still out. Economics currently faces theoretical and empirical challenges analogous to those faced by physics at the turn of the twentieth century (...) and ultimately addressed by quantum theory. If will emerge in the coming decades, it may well be founded on such concepts as cognitive processes and brain activity. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of (...) a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic – and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising – albeit not unproblematic – route to logical pluralism. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, Camillo “Mac” Bica, Ph.D., a former Marine Corps Officer, Vietnam Veteran, and philosopher, provides a cogent analysis of why a veteran may not want to be thanked for his “service” in war. Mac’s experiential and theoretical perspective is both gut wrenching and concise. “The Philosopher speaks from the mind,” Mac writes, “the warrior from where it hurts.” With simplicity, poignancy, and power, this book, together with future installments of the War Legacy Series, works to (...) dispel the mythology of nobility and heroism by providing a window into the reality of war and its devastating effects upon all who experience its horrors. (shrink)

We extend to the predicate frame a previous characterization of the maximal intermediate propositional constructive logics. This provides a technique to get maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics starting from suitable sets of classically valid predicate formulae we call maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logics. As an example of this technique, we exhibit two maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics, yet leaving open the problem of stating whether the two logics are distinct. Further properties of these logics will be also investigated.

Neste artigo apresentamos de forma breve uma teoria searliana de interpretação dos atos de fala. Mostramos através do exemplo das metáforas que, conforme proposta por Searle, a interpretação de atos de fala consistiria em reconhecer a intenção do falante. Esse processo se daria por meio do uso de regras convencionais da linguagem tanto pelo falante quanto pelo ouvinte. Contudo, as metáforas são um exemplo de que essa proposta de interpretação não é suficiente para descrever o processo pelo qual os agentes (...) interpretam atos de fala. Argumentamos que se deve acrescentar a esse processo a noção de regras estratégicas. Seguindo Peirce, duas regras estratégicas são oferecidas: o princípio da coerência e o princípio da economia. Parece também satisfatório acrescentar o princípio da não-contradição. Embora estudos empíricos não sejam definitivos sobre o tema da interpretação, em especial sobre metáforas, os resultados apontam para a aplicação de regras estratégicas na interpretação. Finalmente, é sugerido que se Searle está certo ao dizer que interpretação é o reconhecimento da intenção do falante, então a interpretação depende do uso de regras convencionais e do uso de regras estratégicas. (shrink)

En este capítulo ofrecemos una introducción sistemática e histórica a la lógica, disciplina que contribuyó en gran medida a la producción del conocimiento en general y a la formación del pensamiento científico en particular. La primera sección contiene la introducción sistemática: primero, presentamos las distintas disciplinas que forman parte de la lógica en el sentido amplio del término; luego, identificamos a la lógica en sentido canónico o estricto como el estudio la validez; por último, explicamos en qué sentido la validez (...) es una propiedad formal. La segunda sección contiene la introducción histórica; nos detenemos, en particular, a estudiar dos hitos: el nacimiento de la lógica como disciplina con Aristóteles, y la intervención de Gottlob Frege, a quien se debe, en gran parte, el surgimiento de la lógica tal como la conocemos. Finalmente, damos un breve comentario del estado actual de la disciplina. (shrink)