The questions inherent to the relationship between time and freedom reach their maturity in the works of Hegel and Schelling. In this article, we will attend particularly to the latter since the way opened by his "Investigations on the essence of human freedom" derives quite clearly into the successive attempts of exposition of a system of time in the "Ages of the World" and in the Lessons of München . Following Schelling's development, then, we will try to understand why in (...) the post-Kantian idealism the search for a philosophy of the spirit as a system of freedom leads to treat "time" not only as an a priori intuition of sensibility but as an inherent determination of the absolute, and in that sense, why in Schelling's thought system of freedom and system of time are equivalent to the exposition of the absolute.Las cuestiones inherentes a la relación entre tiempo y libertad alcanzan su madurez en las obras de Hegel y Schelling. En el presente artículo atenderemos de manera particular a este último, ya que el camino abierto por sus Investigaciones sobre la esencia de la libertad humana deriva con cierta claridad en los sucesivos intentos de exposición de un sistema del tiempo en las Edades del mundo y en las Lecciones de München . Siguiendo el desarrollo de Schelling, pues, intentaremos comprender por qué en el idealismo postkantiano la búsqueda de una filosofía del espíritu como sistema de la libertad conduce a tratar el "tiempo" ya no sólo como una intuición a priori de la sensibilidad sino como una determinación inherente al absoluto, y, en tal sentido, por qué en el pensamiento de Schelling sistema de la libertad y sistema del tiempo equivalen a la exposición del absoluto. (shrink)
Este ensayo recorre la historia de la mentira. Un curioso e interesante itinerario por distintas épocas en las que el engaño, el disimulo y la verdad manipulada describen el devenir y la cotidianeidad de las sociedades humanas. Desde el principio, la mentira se convierte en un acto social, por tanto en una práctica que se transforma con las modas y circunstancias históricas. El ser humano necesita de la verdad y de la ficción para vivir. Lo difícil es saber distinguir una (...) de otra sin perderse por el camino.This essay crosses the history of the lie. A curious and interesting itinerary in different epochs in which the deception, the dissimulation and the manipulated truth describe to develop and the ordinariness of the human societies. From the beginning, the lie turns into a social act, therefore into a practice that transforms with the modes and historical circumstances. The human being needs from the truth and from the fiction to live. The difficult thing is to be able to distinguish one of other one without getting lost for the way. (shrink)
How do we know our current states of mind--what we want, and believe in? Jordi Fernández proposes a new theory of self-knowledge, challenging the traditional view that it is a matter of introspection. He argues that we know what we believe and desire by 'looking outward', towards the states of affairs which those beliefs and desires are about.
En esta investigación se analiza la titulación de los periódicos venezolanos El Nacional y Panorama sobre la guerra en Irak, para conocer la recontextualización de ese conflicto en la prensa de ese país. Se sigue el modelo teórico-metodológico de Fernández que integra el análisis lingüístico con la acción comunicativa y las funciones estratégicas del discurso periodístico. Los resultados permiten caracterizar la conceptualización, el léxico, las construcciones sintácticas y las metáforas. Se concluye que en los titulares el periodista deja marcas (...) lingüísticas de su subjetividad, que se privilegian los actantes principales de los hechos y no se exploran las causas y las posibles consecuencias de los acontecimientos, lo cual no contribuye con el entendimiento de procesos complejos como los que involucra la guerra. (shrink)
The inner semiotic core of biology Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9547-z Authors Eliseo Fernández, Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology, Kansas City, MO 64110, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
Ce texte a déjà paru dans la Revue du MAUSS, 2011/2, n° 38, p. 339-348. Nous remercions Benjamin Fernandez et Alain Caillé de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. « Ce que nous vendons à Coca-cola, c'est du temps de cerveau disponible. » Patrick LELAY, ancien président de la chaîne privée française TF1 (2004). La pensée moderne, héritière des Lumières, avait accouché de la figure du sujet libre : une conscience de soi, substance stable et indivisible (Descartes), actrice du (...) langage et d'un (...) - 1. Comment penser le pouvoir dans le monde contemporain ? – Nouvel article. (shrink)
This introduction to the Journal of Business Research special issue on anti-consumption briefly defines and highlights the importance of anticonsumption research, provides an overview of the latest studies in the area, and suggests an agenda for future research on anti-consumption.
The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious (...) faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism. (shrink)
I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will (...) point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. (shrink)
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...) and I shall aim at a specification of the content of memories that is in accordance with those aspects of them. (shrink)
In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account (...) to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge. (shrink)
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in (...) question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis. (shrink)
In this paper, I will reflect on the place of language within Michel Henry’s phenomenology. I will claim that Michel Henry’s position provokes an architectonic problem in his conception of phenomenology and I will discuss how he tried to solve it. At the end of the essay, I will try to clarify what I believe to be the ultimate root of that problem involving language.
OBJECTIVES: To compare 2005 and 1995 ethics guidelines from journal editors to authors regarding requirements for institutional review board (IRB) approval and conflict-of-interest (COI) disclosure. DESIGN: A descriptive study of the ethics guidelines published in 103 English-language biomedical journals listed in the Abridged Index Medicus in 1995 and 2005. Each journal was reviewed by the principal author and one of four independent reviewers. RESULTS: During the period, the proportion of journals requiring IRB approval increased from 42% (95% CI 32.2% to (...) 51.2%, p<0.001) to 76% (95% CI 66.4% to 83.1%, p<0.001). In 2005, an additional 9% referred to the Declaration of Helsinki or the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors' Uniform requirements for ethical guidelines; 15% (95% CI 8.5% to 22.5%, p<0.01) provided ambiguous or no requirements. The proportion of journals requiring COI disclosure increased from 75% (95% CI 66.6% to 83.3%, p<0.05) to 94% (95% CI 89.4% to 98.6%, p<0.05); 41% had comprehensive requirements, while some addressed only funding source (6%), were vague (10%) or both (14%). Criteria for authorship rose from 40% (95% CI 30.5% to 49.5%, p<0.05) to 72% (95% CI 63.3% to 80.7%, p<0.05). Journals with higher impact factors were more likely to require IRB approval (p<0.01). Journals in anaesthesia and radiology all required IRB approval; requirements in other disciplines varied. CONCLUSIONS: Instructions to authors regarding ethical standards have improved. Some remain incomplete, especially regarding the scope of disclosure of COI. The ethical guidelines presented to authors need further clarification and standardisation. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the (...) subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of selfknowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception. (shrink)
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a (...) positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having. (shrink)
Background: The Declaration of Helsinki prohibits the publication of articles that do not meet defined ethical standards for reporting of research ethics board approval and informed consent. Despite this prohibition and a call to highlight the deficiency for the reader, articles with potential ethical shortcomings continue to be published.Objective: To determine what proportion of articles in major medical journals lack statements confirming REB approval and informed consent, and whether accompanying commentary alerts readers to this deficiency.Design: Retrospective, observational study.Setting: Online review (...) of five major medical journals.Population: All clinical research articles published online between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2006 in the BMJ, Lancet, Annals of Internal Medicine, JAMA and the New England Journal of Medicine.Measurements: Statement of REB approval and informed consent.Results: Of 1780 articles reviewed, 1133 met inclusion criteria , 36 articles lacked a statement of REB approval, 62 lacked disclosure of informed consent and 15 articles lacked both. Articles that did not state REB approval were associated with not stating informed consent . There were no editorial comments to alert readers to the lack of either REB approval or informed consent statements associated with any of the deficient articles.Conclusions: Articles that lack explicit statements of REB approval and informed consent are infrequent but continue to be published in major medical journals without editorial statements to alert the reader to this deficiency. (shrink)
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took (...) place). Next, I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. (shrink)
Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.
PURPOSE: The offer to return research results to participants is increasingly recognized as an ethical obligation, although few researchers routinely return results. We examined the needs and attitudes of parents of children with cancer and of adolescents with cancer to the return of research results. METHODS: Seven experts in research ethics scored content validity on parent and adolescent questionnaires previously developed through focus group and phone interviews. The questionnaires were revised and provided to 30 parents and 10 adolescents in a (...) tertiary care oncology setting. RESULTS: The content validity index for individual questions and the overall questionnaires scored as 0.86 for both questionnaires. All 30 parents and 10 adolescents who agreed to participate returned questionnaires. The majority (>95%) indicated that they had a strong or very strong right to receive results. Letter or e-mail was a satisfactory means to return results described as good or neutral (66% parents, 100% adolescents) but more participants wished face-to-face disclosure of results with negative implications (50% parents, 60% adolescents). Very few wanted results disseminated through a Web site. The majority acknowledged the need for peer-review before disclosure (60% of adolescents and parents) but did not want "to be the last to know." CONCLUSIONS: Our data suggest that pediatric oncology patients and parents of children with cancer strongly feel that they have a right to research results, and that they wish to receive these in a timely manner. (shrink)
If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentaccounts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second (...) one. I propose a notion of mnemonic Content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs. (shrink)
The attentional blink (AB) is an impairment of attention, which occurs when subjects have to report a target stimulus (T2) following a previous target (T1) with a short delay (up to 600 ms). Theories explaining the AB assume that processing of T2 is more vulnerable to decay or substitution, as long as attention is allocated to T1. Existing models of the AB, however, do not account for the fact that T2 detection accuracy reaches the minimum when T2 is presented after (...) about 300 ms and not immediately following T1. Therefore, a new model is suggested, which is based on chronometrical considerations together with recent neurophysiological findings concerning the relation between the P3 event-related potential and the AB, the interaction between P3 and gamma oscillations, and the significance of the early evoked gamma band response. We hypothesize that suppression of the early gamma response to T2, accompanying the P3 related to T1, causes the AB. (shrink)
Las polémicas entre mentira (importante vitium linguae según los moralistas) y verdad (identificada con una idea superior, incluso con la divinidad) han sido muy características de la Europa cristiana medieval. Sobre bases bíblicas, patrísticas, escolásticas y prerrenacentistas, las disputas han afectado tanto a los medios académicos (vg. la teoría de la Duplex veritas atribuida a los averroístas) como al común de los cristianos (vg. El recurso a la ordalía).
When it comes to communication of pain, Anna Wierzbicka (2012) takes issue with the scientific definition of pain and turns to natural semantic metalanguage (NSM). However, “pain” is not one of the 64 semantic primes in NSM, and therefore Wierzbicka suggests words such as “body,” “bad,” and “don’t want.” This blurs the boundaries between pain and other aversive sensations and it also challenges certain clinical features of the pain experience.
Frédéric Chopin is the epitome of the romantic artist; he had a chronic pulmonary disease that ultimately caused his death at the age of 39. An overlooked neurological condition is discussed in this paper. We consider the possibility of a temporal lobe epilepsy, as throughout his life Chopin had hallucinatory episodes, which can accompany seizure disorders.
Part One defends the thesis, first advanced by Aristotle, that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and argues for its philosophical significance. Opposition to the thesis rests on a contestable way of distinguishing between acts and contents of reasoning and on a picture of normative principles as external to the actions that fall under them. The resulting view forces us to choose between the efficacious, world-changing character of practical thought and its subjection to objective rational standards. This is (...) a false choice. Aristotle's own understanding of the thesis points the way to an alternative conception of practical reason on which it is at once a power to effect changes in the world and to get things right. Practical reasoning endows the action performed on its basis with a principle that is not imposed on it from outside: instead, it makes the action what it is. Properly understood in terms of the relevant acts of a rational subject, the thesis is defensible and philosophically attractive. Furthermore, it helps us understand the continuity and discontinuity that exists between the motions of human beings and those of other animals, as Aristotle showed. (shrink)
El legado científico filosófico de Max Born, al estar vinculado a la conocida como interpretación ortodoxa de la mecánica cuántica o interpretación de Copenhague, ha sido entendido desde el marco de una filosofía de la ciencia de corte instrumentalista, considerando su interpretación probabilística de la función de onda como la más clara defensa de una postura indeterminista acausal. Frente a este orden de cosas, este artículo pretende lograr dos objetivos. El primero consiste en mostrar cómo la interpretación de Born, a (...) pesar de instaurar de forma definitiva el indeterminismo en el ámbito de la física elemental, no implica el abandono de una explicación causal de los fenómenos físicos. El segundo trata de defender la posibilidad de reivindicar una interpretación "realista" de la labor científica a partir de la noción de "invariantes observaciones" que Born propone, conciliando el aspecto dual de la realidad elemental en favor de su carácter corpuscular y analizando la aporética noción de "probabilidad objetiva" que su interpretación instaura. (shrink)
Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reductive.