47 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Carl Gillett [47]Carl John Gillett [1]
See also
Carl Gillett
Northern Illinois University
  1. The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.
  2. The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
    Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account ( Shapiro, 2000 and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  3. The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):316-323.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  4. Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):193-216.
  5. Physicalism and its Discontents.Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.) - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published in 2001, offers a series of perspectives on this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  6. The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis.Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
    An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged ? Philosophers have worried whether so-called ‘determinable’ predicates, such as ‘is charged’, actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as ‘has a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs’, refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, dating only to its (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  7. Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron to Construct a Starting Framework. [REVIEW]Carl Gillett - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):309-337.
    Inter-level mechanistic explanations in the sciences have long been a focus of philosophical interest, but attention has recently turned to the compositional character of these explanations which work by explaining higher level entities, whether processes, individuals or properties, using the lower level entities they take to compose them. However, we still have no theoretical account of the constitution or parthood relations between individuals deployed in such explanations, nor any accounts of multiple constitution. My primary focus in this paper is to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  8. The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience.Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 202--223.
    Sometimes neuroscientists discover distinct realizations for a single psychological property. In considering such cases, some philosophers have maintained that scientists will abandon the single multiply realized psychological property in favor of one or more uniquely realized psychological properties. In this paper, we build on the Dimensioned theory of realization and a companion theory of multiple realization to argue that this is not the case. Whether scientists postulate unique realizations or multiple realizations is not determined by the neuroscience alone, but by (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  9.  57
    Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization: The Problem of Qualitative Distinctness in the Metaphysics of Science.Carl Gillett - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.
    Understanding the 'making-up' relations, to put things neutrally, posited in mechanistic explanations the sciences is finally an explicit topic of debate amongst philosophers of science. In particular, there is now lively debate over the nature of the so-called 'realization' relations between properties posited in such explanations. Despite criticism (Gillett, Analysis 62: 316-323, 2002a), the most common approach continues to be that of applying machinery developed in the philosophy of mind to scientific concepts in what is known as the 'Flat' or (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  10. What You Are and the Evolution of Organs, Souls and Superorganisms: A Reply to Blatti.Carl Gillett - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):271-279.
    Stephan Blatti claims to have a new line of reasoning using evolutionary theory that resolves arguments over our deeper natures in favor of the Animalist position that we are identical to Homo sapiens organisms. Blatti thus raises an important question about which views of what we are can take us to be evolved. However, in this response I show that Blatti’s argument using evolution is based upon a false assumption about contemporary biology. I highlight how a better understanding of evolutionary (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  11. Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 539--582.
  12. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy.Carl Gillett - 2016 - Cambridge University Press.
    Grand debates over reduction and emergence are playing out across the sciences, but these debates have reached a stalemate, with both sides declaring victory on empirical grounds. In this book, Carl Gillett provides new theoretical frameworks with which to understand these debates, illuminating both the novel positions of scientific reductionists and emergentists and the recent empirical advances that drive these new views. Gillett also highlights the flaws in existing philosophical frameworks and reorients the discussion to reflect the new scientific advances (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. A "Physical" Need: Physicalism and the Via Negativa.Carl Gillett & D. Gene Witmer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):302–309.
    A number of philosophers have argued that there is no good way to make sense of the "physical" so that the usual arguments and conclusions of physicalists can be rendered sensible. David Papineau and David Spurrett have recently suggested replacing "physical" with either "non-mental" or "quantitative" in the best known argument for physicalism, namely, the causal argument. We argue that the resulting new argument is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we argue that if there was a real difficulty in making sense of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  14. The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):95-121.
    I outline reasons for the recent popularity, and lingering suspicion, about 'emergence' by examining three distinct concepts of property emergence, their purposes and associated obligations. In Part 1, I argue 'Strong' emergence is the grail for many emergentists (and physicalists), since it frames what is needed to block the 'Argument from Realization' (AR) which moves from the truth of physicalism to the inefficacy of special science properties. I then distinguish 'Weak' and 'Ontological' emergence, in Part 2, arguing each is a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  15. Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists.Carl Gillett - 2006 - Synthese 153 (2):261-296.
    Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  16. The Methodological Role of Physicalism: A Minimal Skepticism.Carl Gillett - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
  17.  74
    Does the Argument From Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim.Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):79-98.
    By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  18.  57
    Hyper-Extending the Mind?Carl Gillett - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):161-188.
  19. Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):87-120.
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and nom-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positions are committed to an untenable combination of both ‘upward’ and ‘dounward’ determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis the ‘Completeness of Physics' I show that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
    Foundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect--all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Infinitism"--the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  21.  46
    Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist Metaphysics for 'Downward' Determination.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Principia 6 (1):89-120.
    Iaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challen,ge to both emergentism cmd ncm-reductIve physicalism lyy providing arguments that these positums are cornmitted to an untenabie combmation of both `upwarcit and 'clouniwardi determmation. In secuon 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realiza:0n relatzon underlies such sicepucal arguments However, tn secuon 2, I suggest that such conclusicrns involve a confusion between the implications of physicahsm and those of a related thesis the Vompleteness of Physics' (Co?) I show tht (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  22.  25
    Understanding the Sciences Through the Fog of “Functionalism (S)”.Carl Gillett - 2013 - In Philippe Huneman (ed.), Functions: Selection and Mechanisms. Springer. pp. 159--181.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23.  19
    Defending Pluralism About Compositional Explanations.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 78:101202.
  24.  17
    Understanding The New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science And Compositional Reduction.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):193-216.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  25. Multiple Realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  26.  48
    Brains, Neuroscience, and Animalism: On the Implications of Thinking Brains.Carl Gillett - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):41-52.
    The neuroscience revolution has led many scientists to posit “expansive” or “thinking” brains that instantiate rich psychological properties. As a result, some scientists now even claim you are identical to such a brain. However, Eric Olson has offered new arguments that thinking brains cannot exist due to their intuitively “abominable” implications. After situating the commitment to thinking brains in the wider scientific discussions in which they are posited, I then critically assess Olson's arguments against such entities. Although highlighting an important (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27.  28
    Nonreductive Realization and Nonreductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.Carl Gillett - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 31.
  28.  92
    A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind: A Third Way for Functionalists.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:21-42.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29.  67
    The Hidden Battles Over Emergence.Carl Gillett - 2006 - In Philip Clayton (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 801--819.
    By Carl Gillett, Illinois Wesleyan University. Ontological reductionism has long dominated the sciences and intellectual life more broadly. It holds that a ‘final theory’ in physics would, in principle, suffice to explain all natural phenomena and that, ultimately, the entities of such a theory, like quarks with their properties of spin, charm and charge, are all that actually exists. Recently, however, a mounting challenge to this hegemonic reductionism has been focused around ‘emergent’ entities. On one hand, philosophers and a range (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30.  9
    Hyper-Extending the Mind?: Setting Boundaries in the Special Sciences.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):161-187.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31.  82
    Multiply Realizing Scientific Properties and Their Instances.Carl Gillett - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):727-738.
    Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro (or P&S) have recently (2008) criticized ?causal-mechanist? views of realization that dominate research in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics of science. P&S offer the internal criticism that any account of realization focusing upon property instances, as views of causal-mechanist realization routinely do, must lead to incoherence about multiple realization. P&S's argument highlights important issues about property instances that have recently been neglected, as well as raising a challenge to the standard approach to understanding the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Multiple Realization and Methodology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - unknown
    ABSRACT: An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast to the claims of (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  41
    A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:21-42.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism.Carl Gillett - 2007 - In Maurice K. D. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell.
    Over the last century, as Figure 1 graphically illustrates, scientific investigations have given us a detailed account of many natural phenomena, from molecules to manic depression, through so-called.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35.  12
    Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709-717.
    Foundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect---all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls “Infinitism”---the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  36.  7
    A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind: A Third Way for Functionalists.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:21-42.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Principia: Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 6 (1):89-120.
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positions are committed to an untenable combination of both ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments. However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis the ‘Completeness of Physics’. I show that the (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38.  36
    Physicalism and Panentheism: Good News and Bad News.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):3-23.
  39. On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism.Carl Gillett - 2009 - In T. O'connor & A. Corradini (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
  40. Multiple Realization and Methodology in the Neurological and Psychological Sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - manuscript
    The reigning picture of special sciences, what we will term the ‘received’ view, grew out of the work of writers, such as Jerry Fodor, William Wimsatt, and Philip Kitcher, who overturned the Positivist’s jaundiced view of these disciplines by looking at real cases from the biological sciences, linguistics, psychology, and economics, amongst other areas.1 Central to the received view is the ontological claim that the ‘multiple realization’ of properties is widespread in the special sciences which we may frame thus.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. Peter A. Morton, Ed., A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Readings with Commentary Reviewed By.Carl Gillett - 1998 - Philosophy in Review 18 (1):50-51.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Special Sciences.Carl Gillett - 2006 - In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Reference.
  43. &Amp.Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillett - unknown
    Over fifty years ago, H.M. was treated for chronic epilepsy by a bilateral hippocampectomy. Among the lasting side effects of this treatment was that H.M. could no longer form certain types of long term memories, although he could form others. One of the many morals philosophers and psychologists have sometimes drawn from this sad case (and others) is that information about the brain can be used to guide theorizing about the mind. More specifically, it has been claimed that differences in (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  38
    Symposium on Mechanisms in Mind.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:1-2.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  7
    Symposium on Mechanisms in Mind.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:1-2.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 369 Pp. [REVIEW]Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4-6):363.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Realization and Reduction by Functionalism.Carl Gillett - forthcoming - In De Joong & Schouten (eds.), Rethinking Reduction. Blackwell.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark