86 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Carl Ginet [86]Carl Allen Ginet [1]
See also
Carl Ginet
Cornell University
  1. On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   230 citations  
  2. On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   215 citations  
  3. In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing.Carl Ginet - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
  4. Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.
  5.  19
    Living Without Free Will.Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  6. Might We Have No Choice.Carl Ginet - 1966 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinisim. Random House. pp. 87--104.
  7. Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency.Carl Ginet - 1997 - The Journal of Ethics 1 (1):85-98.
    This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  8. An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent.Carl Ginet - 2007 - In Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate. pp. 243--255.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  9. The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility.Carl Ginet - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):267 - 277.
  10.  44
    The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom.Carl Ginet & Hugh J. McCann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):632.
    This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  11.  61
    Contra Reliabilism.Carl Ginet - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):175-187.
    The reliability of a belief-producing process is a matter of how likely it is that the process will produce beliefs that are true. The term reliabilism may be used to refer to any position that makes this idea of reliability central to the explication of some important epistemic concept. I know of three such positions that appeal to some epistemologists: a reliabilist account of what makes a belief justified, a reliabilist account of what makes a true belief knowledge, and a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  12. Can the Will Be Caused?Carl Ginet - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (January):49-55.
  13. In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  14. The Conditional Analysis of Freedom.Carl Ginet - 1980 - In P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel. pp. 171-186.
  15. Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account.Carl Ginet - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:17-46.
  16.  49
    Knowing Less by Knowing More.Carl Ginet - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):151-162.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  17.  38
    The Significance of Free Will.Carl Ginet - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):312.
    If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  18.  51
    Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem.Carl Ginet - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 140--149.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  19.  92
    Performativity.Carl Ginet - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (2):245 - 265.
  20.  29
    Actions.Carl Ginet - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):120.
  21. Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist Versus Noncausalist Accounts.Carl Ginet - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405.
  22.  73
    Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-Causal Account.Carl Ginet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):219-228.
    If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Libertarianism.Carl Ginet - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 587-612.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  24. Working with Fischer and Ravizza’s Account of Moral Responsibility.Carl Ginet - 2006 - The Journal of Ethics 10 (3):229-253.
    This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  25.  97
    In Defense of Incompatibilism.Carl Ginet - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  26. Book Review. Living Without Free Will. Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
  27. Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress Problem.Carl Ginet - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  28.  88
    What Must Be Added to Knowing to Obtain Knowing That One Knows?Carl Ginet - 1970 - Synthese 21 (2):163 - 186.
  29.  30
    On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction.Jennifer Hornsby, Carl Ginet, Kathleen Lennon & Carlos J. Moya - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498.
  30.  52
    Trying to Act.Carl Ginet - 2004 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  31. Review of Pereboom's Living Without Free Will. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6:305-309.
  32.  20
    Living Without Free Will by Derk Pereboom.Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
  33.  68
    Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing.Carl Ginet - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):95-110.
  34.  47
    An Essay on Human Action.Carl Ginet & Michael J. Zimmerman - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (1):114.
  35. The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection.Carl Ginet - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
    The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36. The Fourth Condition.Carl Ginet - 1988 - In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 105--117.
  37.  79
    Comments on Plantinga’s Two-Volume Work on Warrant.Carl Ginet - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):403-408.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. Knowledge and Mind.Syndey Shoemaker & Carl Ginet (eds.) - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39.  3
    Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston.William P. Alston, Carl Ginet, Alvin I. Goldman, John Greco, George I. Mavrodes, Philip L. Quinn, Alessandra Tanesini, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Linda Zagzebski & Laurence BonJour - 2005 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case.Carl Ginet & David Palmer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.
    Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decision at the precise time (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41.  51
    Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional Account.Carl Ginet - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):223-45.
  42.  22
    Four Difficulties with Dretske's Theory of Knowledge.Carl Ginet - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):69-70.
    Four difficulties with Dretske's theory of knowledge .
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43.  14
    Plantinga and the Philosophy of Mind.Carl Ginet - 1985 - In James Tomberlin & Peter van Ingwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga. pp. 199-224.
  44.  84
    Excerpts From John Martin Fischer's Discussion with Members of the Audience.Scott MacDonald, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Joseph Margolis, Mark Case, Elie Noujain, Robert Kane & Derk Pereboom - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (4):408 - 417.
  45.  81
    Knowledge and Mind: Essays Presented to Norman Malcolm.Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.) - 1983 - Oxford Univresity Press.
  46. Self-Evidence.Carl Ginet - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):325-352.
    ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self- evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  18
    Freedom and the Will.Carl Ginet - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (1):124.
  48. The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification Carl Ginet.Carl Ginet - 1998 - In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 79.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  26
    An Incoherence in the Tractatus.Carl Ginet - 1973 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):143-151.
    In rejecting, In 1929-30, The complete independence of the elementary propositions--According to which any combination of truth-Values for any set of elementary propositions is logically possible--Wittgenstein did not reject an essential element of the "tractatus" system but rather one that fails to cohere with the central picture-Theory of propositions, According to which a method of truth-Valued representation must be capable of presenting 'competing alternative' representations, The false one of these alternatives being false because they fail to 'agree' or 'coincide' with (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50.  49
    Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – Discussion.Carl Ginet - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):261-272.
1 — 50 / 86