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Carl Ginet [88]Carl Allen Ginet [1]
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Profile: Carl Ginet (Cornell University)
  1. On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
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  2. In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing.Carl Ginet - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
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  3. Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.
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  4.  83
    Book Review. Living Without Free Will. Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2002 - Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
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  5. On Action.Carl Ginet, Kathleen Lennon & Carlos J. Moya - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.
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  6. Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency.Carl Ginet - 1997 - Journal of Ethics 1 (1):85-98.
    This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal (...)
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  7.  86
    Working with Fischer and Ravizza's Account of Moral Responsibility.Carl Ginet - 2005 - Journal of Ethics 10 (3):229-253.
    This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it.
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  8. In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237.
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
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  9. Libertarianism.Carl Ginet - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 587-612.
     
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  10. Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress Problem.Carl Ginet - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  11.  87
    An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent.Carl Ginet - 2007 - In Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate. pp. 243--255.
  12.  47
    Contra Reliabilism.Carl Ginet - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):175-187.
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  13. Review of Pereboom's Living Without Free Will. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2002 - Journal of Ethics 6:305-309.
  14.  42
    Trying to Act.Carl Ginet - 2004 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press.
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  15.  80
    The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility.Carl Ginet - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):267 - 277.
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  16. Might We Have No Choice?Carl Ginet - 1966 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinisim. Random House. pp. 87--104.
  17. Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston.William P. Alston, Laurence Bonjour, Carl Ginet, Alvin I. Goldman, John Greco, George I. Mavrodes, Philip L. Quinn, Alessandra Tanesini, Nicholas Wolterstorff & Linda Zagzebski - 2005 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
     
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  18.  92
    Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account.Carl Ginet - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:17-46.
  19.  91
    Can the Will Be Caused?Carl Ginet - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (January):49-55.
  20.  57
    Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing.Carl Ginet - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):95-110.
  21. Self-Evidence.Carl Ginet - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 54 (2):325-352.
    ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self- evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true (...)
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  22. On Mele and Robb's Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case.Carl Ginet & David Palmer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.
    Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decision at the precise time (...)
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  23. The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection.Carl Ginet - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
    The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values (...)
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  24.  96
    The Fourth Condition.Carl Ginet - 1988 - In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 105--117.
  25.  78
    In Defense of Incompatibilism.Carl Ginet - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.
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  26.  13
    Living Without Free Will by Derk Pereboom.Carl Ginet - 2002 - Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
  27.  49
    The Conditional Analysis of Freedom.Carl Ginet - 1980 - In P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel. pp. 171-186.
  28.  35
    Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – Discussion.Carl Ginet - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):261-272.
  29. Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist Versus Noncausalist Accounts.Carl Ginet - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405.
  30. The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification Carl Ginet.Carl Ginet - 1998 - In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 79.
     
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  31.  66
    Performativity.Carl Ginet - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (2):245 - 265.
  32.  20
    Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-Causal Account.Carl Ginet - 2016 - Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):219-228.
    If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while (...)
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  33.  1
    Actions.Carl Ginet & Jennifer Hornsby - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):120.
  34.  26
    Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem.Carl Ginet - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 140--149.
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  35.  34
    Knowing Less by Knowing More.Carl Ginet - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):151-162.
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  36.  64
    What Must Be Added to Knowing to Obtain Knowing That One Knows?Carl Ginet - 1970 - Synthese 21 (2):163 - 186.
  37.  16
    The Significance of Free Will.Carl Ginet & Robert Kane - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):312.
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  38.  30
    Review: Comments on Plantinga's Two-Volume Work on Warrant. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):403 - 408.
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  39.  35
    Excerpts From John Martin Fischer's Discussion with Members of the Audience.Scott MacDonald, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Joseph Margolis, Mark Case, Elie Noujain, Robert Kane & Derk Pereboom - 2000 - Journal of Ethics 4 (4):408 - 417.
  40.  42
    Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional Account.Carl Ginet - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):223-45.
  41.  6
    Plantinga and the Philosophy of Mind.Carl Ginet - 1985 - In James Tomberlin & Peter van Ingwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga. pp. 199-224.
  42.  48
    Qualia and Private Language.Carl Ginet - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):121-38.
  43.  18
    Four Difficulties with Dretske's Theory of Knowledge.Carl Ginet - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):69-70.
    Four difficulties with Dretske's theory of knowledge .
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  44.  56
    Knowledge and Mind: Essays Presented to Norman Malcolm.Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.) - 1983 - Oxford Univresity Press.
  45. Knowledge and Mind.Syndey Shoemaker & Carl Ginet (eds.) - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
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  46.  1
    On Action.Carl Ginet - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):488-491.
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  47.  38
    Justification.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:93-107.
    This paper argues that a fact which constitutes part of a subject’s being justified in adopting an action or a belief at a particular time need not be part of what induced the subject to adopt that action or belief but it must be something to which the subject had immediate access. It argues that similar points hold for justification of the involuntary acquisition of a belief and for the justification of continuing a belief (actively or dispositionally.).
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  48.  34
    The Works of Agency.Carl Ginet - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):632-635.
  49.  19
    Réplica a Comesaña.Carl Ginet - 2010 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 55 (2):24-32.
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  50.  6
    On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction.Jennifer Hornsby, Carl Ginet, Kathleen Lennon & Carlos J. Moya - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498.
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1 — 50 / 88