In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti-idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti–idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

This collection provides a thorough grounding in the philosophy of American pragmatism by examining the views of four principal thinkers - Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead - on issues of central and enduring importance to life in human society. Pragmatism emerged as a characteristically American response to an inheritance of British empiricism. Presenting a radical reconception of the nature of experience, pragmatism represents a belief that ideas are not merely to be contemplated but must (...) be put into action, tested and refined through experience. At the same time, the American pragmatists argued for an emphasis on human community that would offset the deep-seated American bias in favor of individualism. Far from being a relic of the past, pragmatism offers a dynamic and substantive approach to questions of human conduct, social values, scientific inquiry, religious belief, and aesthetic experience that lie at the center of contemporary life. This volume is an invaluable introduction to a school of thought that remains vital, instructive, and provocative. (shrink)

Charles Peirce’s semeiotic is inseparable from his account of the three categories of experience and his metaphysics. The discussion summarizes his account of the categories and considers the way they have ontological implications. These implications are then focused on Peirce’s Apapism, which is his way of referring to a theory of evolution. Finally, some suggestions are offered for a way the semeiotic with the metaphysical implications, especially their relevance for a theory of evolution, propose how Peirce might apply them for (...) questions of jurisprudence. (shrink)

: When language is expressed metaphorically, metaphors seem to "say" something that has never seen said before. Some of them seem to express insights. What then are the constraints on their interpretations? Charles Peirce's semeiotic suggests a way to answer the question. Crucial to the answer is Peirce's account of semeiotic objects as two-fold, one side, the dynamic or "real" object to be interpreted, the other side, the immediate object, which is the dynamic object that has been interpreted. The interaction (...) account of metaphor is reviewed and related to Peirce's conception of semeiotic objects. The result is my suggestion that the dynamic objects to which metaphorical objects are directed are transformed into interpreted, immediate objects through the mediation of incipient immediate objects. Incipient immediate objects initially appear as dyadic objects recognized through identity expressions—e.g., "Juliet is the sun," which is not a classification but an identification of the referents of the subject and the predicate. The incipient mediating immediate object parallels the percipium referred to in Peirce's account of the formation of perceptual judgments, which are interpretations of percepts. (shrink)

Martland’s purpose in this book is to show how religion and art share a common function rather than to show how they are distinct. They both reveal and create the significance of our lives and our world. In order to explain how they do this, Martland devotes a relatively substantial amount of space to a discussion of his approach. He makes it clear that he is not concerned with attempting an objective description of the achievements of art and religion and (...) a comparison of their features. Nor is he concerned with analyzing the activities of art and religion in order to compare alleged essences. As his title indicates, he focuses on how art and religion are the same in function. His account of how they function is prescriptive. Selection and characterization of the data, then, are governed by a thesis. If it is objected that such a study is consequently circular, we are reminded that we cannot make observations without employing some interpretive frame of reference. (shrink)

479 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 Sandra B. Rosenthal. Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Pp. xi + 177. Board, $16.95. Sandra Rosenthal's Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism represents a sustained discus- sion of those aspects of Peirce's philosophy that suggest that he was a philosophical pluralist. The book contains a complex, intricate, and extremely well documented exhibition of how the uniqueness of Peirce's thought places him beyond traditional views labeled as (...) phenomenalist, idealist, and realist. The kind of pluralism -- not nominalistic, but "pragmatic pluralism"--underlying Peirce's thought, however, is not a relativistic anti-foundationalism; it affirms nonarhitrary epistemological and metaphysical commitments. The first chapter examines Peirce's conceptions of world, truth, and science. The actual world is a system of facts that must be understood in terms of perceptual and.. (shrink)

When language is expressed metaphorically, metaphors seem to "say" something that has never seen said before. Some of them seem to express insights. What then are the constraints on their interpretations? Charles Peirce's semeiotic suggests a way to answer the question. Crucial to the answer is Peirce's account of semeiotic objects as two-fold, one side, the dynamic or "real" object to be interpreted, the other side, the immediate object, which is the dynamic object that has been interpreted. The interaction account (...) of metaphor is reviewed and related to Peirce's conception of semeiotic objects. The result is my suggestion that the dynamic objects to which metaphorical objects are directed are transformed into interpreted, immediate objects through the mediation of incipient immediate objects. Incipient immediate objects initially appear as dyadic objects recognized through identity expressions—e.g., "Juliet is the sun," which is not a classification but an identification of the referents of the subject and the predicate. The incipient mediating immediate object parallels the percipium referred to in Peirce's account of the formation of perceptual judgments, which are interpretations of percepts. (shrink)

Martland’s purpose in this book is to show how religion and art share a common function rather than to show how they are distinct. They both reveal and create the significance of our lives and our world. In order to explain how they do this, Martland devotes a relatively substantial amount of space to a discussion of his approach. He makes it clear that he is not concerned with attempting an objective description of the achievements of art and religion and (...) a comparison of their features. Nor is he concerned with analyzing the activities of art and religion in order to compare alleged essences. As his title indicates, he focuses on how art and religion are the same in function. His account of how they function is prescriptive. Selection and characterization of the data, then, are governed by a thesis. If it is objected that such a study is consequently circular, we are reminded that we cannot make observations without employing some interpretive frame of reference. (shrink)

The first issue concerns what can be meant by the "newness" or "originality" which Koestler attributes to the products of creative acts. One of the purposes of this paper will be to discriminate several distinct but incompatible meanings which Koestler associates with the newness in created objects. The second issue concerns whether Koestler's thesis commits him to a form of determinism or indeterminism with respect to human creative activity. The third issue raises the question whether his thesis is intended as (...) an explanatory hypothesis or as an elaborate description of common features in creative activities. This question, of course, relates directly to the initial query about the standards of understanding which are appropriate to creative acts. And it points to the last issue which concerns the metaphysical implications of the thesis. It will be my aim to argue that a development of the metaphysics implicit in the thesis would provide a more comprehensive theory that could meet at least some of the difficulties the theory raises. (shrink)

Today we discuss in our own special vocabulary the assumption underlying the quarrel between poetry and philosophy. We speak of propositions, implications, signs, icons, symbols, etc., in connection with fine art. But in so far as we dispute over the assumption at all, the central question remains: Does poetry or art reveal something which is also revealed by philosophy?