My aim is to depict Schutzian phenomenology as a whole. In order to do so, I will start by presenting Schutz’s ideas on the phenomenological, egological,and eidetic reductions as mere technical devices. Then I will show how they are interconnected with phenomenological psychology. After that, I will argue thatphenomenological psychology leads to worldly phenomenology and I will explore its consequences for transcendental philosophy and the empirical sciences. I will conclude with some reflections on naturalized phenomenology and how it finds absolute (...) certainty in the life-world, not in the transcendental realm. (shrink)

My aim is to collect and consider as a whole Schutz’s fragments on the sociology of roles. With this goal, I will classify the fragments into two sets according to their theoretical intention. First, I will consider Schutz’s discussion of Parsons’ theory of social action of the 1940s. I will show that Schutz focuses on criticizing Parsons’ objectivism and on retrieving the concrete ego as the performer of social roles. Second, I will account for Schutz’s intent to elaborate on a (...) terminology of his own concerning these issues in the 1950s. I will argue that Schutz bases his theory of social roles in his phenomenology of the life-world. This not only requires a subjective approach—which he had already provided in the 1940s—but also requires taking into account objective meaning. Other elements of Schutzian phenomenology must be called in as well, such as the relative natural conception of the world of groups, socioculturally derived knowledge, and imposed relevances. I will end by discussing the main contributions of Schutz’s conception of social roles and to what extent he succeeded in overcoming the objectivism of structural-functional theory. (shrink)

En este texto paso revista a las tesis de Alfred Schutz sobre el sentido común, reconstruyendo su posición en un doble sentido, genético y sistemático. En este marco, argumento que su posición va pasando de una consideración negativa del sentido común entendido como un modo de conocimiento distinto del conocimiento científico, de cuyas cualidades está desprovisto, a una consideración positiva, que hace de él no sólo el suelo de todo otro modo de conocimiento (incluido el científico) sino también nuestro arraigo (...) en el mundo de la actitud natural. Esta transformación es correlativa de un pasaje desde una perspectiva más epistemológica hacia una perspectiva más ontológica, donde el sentido común pasa de ser considerado como un modo específico de conocimiento a ser visto como el ámbito de nuestro arraigo en el mundo y el suelo de toda consideración ontológica y científica. (shrink)

In the first place, I discuss the main papers and books on Durkheim published in recent years, where no attention is given to the phenomenological interpretations of his work. Then I expose different phenomenological readings of Durkheim, some of them positive, some negative, some ambivalent. Later I find that there is in Durkheim an implicit practice of phenomenology, inspired by Descartes’ Meditations on first philosophy. Consequently, I support Tyriakian’s thesis that there is in Durkheim an implicit phenomenological approach, despite his (...) positivism. Then I wonder whether this tacit approach produces a phenomenological ontology of the social world. I find that it actually does, especially in what regards to social facts considered as things. I argue that Durkheim’s conception of social things is consistent with Husserl’s notion of ideal objectivities. I conclude that Durkheim’s rule of considering social facts as things is part of his phenomenological legacy and that it does not contradict the idea that they also are “states lived”. (shrink)

Very often, phenomenology has been presented as opposed to structuralism. We aim to contest that opposition. We will argue that Husserl has influenced on structuralism in the early 20th century, and that phenomenolgy shows itself as a neither a global (trivial) nor a methodic struc-turalism. Indeed,..

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the idea that members are fully competent at what they do. With that aim, I start with a Schutzian and Ethno­methodological account of what it is like to be a member of the tango scene in the dance halls of Buenos Aires. I specify different degrees and kinds of competences. On the one hand, there are fully competent members and incompetent members. The incompetent members are the vast majority in comparison to the (...) few fully competent ones. On the other hand, there are technically competent members and socially competent ones. Technical competence is very hard to acquire, thus it is very rare. Social competences, instead, are accessible to all members. These different ways of being a member are heterogeneous and indicate a significant diversity of competences and skills. I conclude that not all members are alike and that each one is challenged in a particular way. (shrink)

En este trabajo, paso revista a las consideraciones respecto de la filosofía que Merleau-Ponty ha ido vertiendo a lo largo de su obra. Comenzaré presentando su interpretación fenomenológicoexistencial de la filosofía pues ella inaugura una serie de consideraciones concernientes al tratamiento de la ..