My aim is to depict Psathas’s position on ethnomethodology as a way of doing phenomenological sociology. On this, he contested with others who argued that ethnomethodology is not a phenomenological sociology at all. His claim was that ethnomethodology is a part of the phenomenological movement. In this dispute, he offered two kinds of arguments. On the one hand, he documented the strong phenomenological background of Garfinkel’s ideas. On the other hand, he found in Garfinkel’s own words expressions of gratitude to (...) Husserl, Gurwitsch, and Schutz, among other phenomenologists. However, having proved that there was a close relation of Garfinkel with ethnomethodology, Psathas went on to show that Garfinkel turned phenomenological ideas into something new; in particular, he turned phenomenology into an experimental science dealing with the natural attitude. This is a groundbreaking contribution that Psathas appreciated and comprehended as no one else. (shrink)

There is a broad consensus that the study of social institutions is one of the fundamental concerns of the social sciences. The idea that phenomenology has ignored this topic is also widely accepted. As against this view, the present paper aims at demonstrating that especially Schutzian phenomenology—that is, the social-phenomenological tradition started by Alfred Schutz and continued by Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger, among others—provides rich insights on the nature and workings of social institutions that could contribute to enriching the (...) current social-scientific debate on the issue. In order to show this, the authors attempt to unearth and systematically reconstruct Schutz’s and Berger and Luckmann’s insights on social institutions and to confront them with current approaches. (shrink)

En este trabajo paso revista a las diferentes acepciones del concepto de realidad en la obra de Alfred Schutz y las tensiones que lo surcan. Así es que describo una dimensión pragmatista de la realidad, y muestro cómo ella entra en contradicción con una idea marcadamente realista y objetivista. En este contexto, la obra de Schutz se presenta como atravesada por una tensión irresuelta en tres frentes problemáticos: realismo –constructivismo; egología– intersubjetividad; relativismo– fundacionalismo. La intrepretación schutziana del Quijote ilustra magníficamente (...) de qué modo operan estas contradicciones. Al respecto, si bien Schutz se siente cercano a la exégesis de Ortega y Gasset, argumentamos que su Quijote es más afín al de Unamuno. Otra diferencia sustancial que lo distancia de Ortega, a pesar del profundo respeto que sentía por él, es el modo en que ambos cuestionan concepciones colectivistas de lo social como la de Durkheim: Schutz considera que lo social es abstracto y, por ende, irreal, mientras que Ortega lo concibe como una realidad sustituta. Además, Schutz piensa que lo social se enfrenta al individuo, mientras que Ortega muestra que se contrapone a la interacción.In my paper I review the different meanings of the concept of reality in the work of Alfred Schutz and the tensions that cross it. I describe a pragmatic dimension of reality and then I show how it clashes with an idea re-markably realistic and objectivist. In this con-text, Schutz's work is presented as crossed by an unresolved tension on three fronts: realism – constructivism; egology - intersubjectivity; relativism - foundationalism. The Schutzian intrepretación of Don Quixote superbly illustrates how these contradictions operate. In this regard, although Schutz felt close to the exegesis of Ortega y Gasset, I argue that his Quixote is more akin to that of Unamuno. Another substantial difference with Ortega, despite the deep respect Schutz had for him, is the way in which both challenge collectivist social concepts like Durkheim’s: Schutz considered that the social is abstract and therefore unreal, while Ortega conceived it as a substitute reality. Also, Schutz thinks that the social is opposed to the individual while Ortega shows that it opposes interaction. (shrink)

My aim is to depict Schutzian phenomenology as a whole. In order to do so, I will start by presenting Schutz’s ideas on the phenomenological, egological,and eidetic reductions as mere technical devices. Then I will show how they are interconnected with phenomenological psychology. After that, I will argue thatphenomenological psychology leads to worldly phenomenology and I will explore its consequences for transcendental philosophy and the empirical sciences. I will conclude with some reflections on naturalized phenomenology and how it finds absolute (...) certainty in the life-world, not in the transcendental realm. (shrink)

My aim is to depict Schutzian phenomenology as a whole. In order to do so, I will start by presenting Schutz’s ideas on the phenomenological, egological,and eidetic reductions as mere technical devices. Then I will show how they are interconnected with phenomenological psychology. After that, I will argue thatphenomenological psychology leads to worldly phenomenology and I will explore its consequences for transcendental philosophy and the empirical sciences. I will conclude with some reflections on naturalized phenomenology and how it finds absolute (...) certainty in the life-world, not in the transcendental realm. (shrink)

My aim is to depict Schutzian phenomenology as a whole. In order to do so, I will start by presenting Schutz’s ideas on the phenomenological, egological,and eidetic reductions as mere technical devices. Then I will show how they are interconnected with phenomenological psychology. After that, I will argue thatphenomenological psychology leads to worldly phenomenology and I will explore its consequences for transcendental philosophy and the empirical sciences. I will conclude with some reflections on naturalized phenomenology and how it finds absolute (...) certainty in the life-world, not in the transcendental realm. (shrink)

En este texto paso revista a las tesis de Alfred Schutz sobre el sentido común, reconstruyendo su posición en un doble sentido, genético y sistemático. En este marco, argumento que su posición va pasando de una consideración negativa del sentido común entendido como un modo de conocimiento distinto del conocimiento científico, de cuyas cualidades está desprovisto, a una consideración positiva, que hace de él no sólo el suelo de todo otro modo de conocimiento (incluido el científico) sino también nuestro arraigo (...) en el mundo de la actitud natural. Esta transformación es correlativa de un pasaje desde una perspectiva más epistemológica hacia una perspectiva más ontológica, donde el sentido común pasa de ser considerado como un modo específico de conocimiento a ser visto como el ámbito de nuestro arraigo en el mundo y el suelo de toda consideración ontológica y científica. (shrink)

My aim is to collect and consider as a whole Schutz’s fragments on the sociology of roles. With this goal, I will classify the fragments into two sets according to their theoretical intention. First, I will consider Schutz’s discussion of Parsons’ theory of social action of the 1940s. I will show that Schutz focuses on criticizing Parsons’ objectivism and on retrieving the concrete ego as the performer of social roles. Second, I will account for Schutz’s intent to elaborate on a (...) terminology of his own concerning these issues in the 1950s. I will argue that Schutz bases his theory of social roles in his phenomenology of the life-world. This not only requires a subjective approach—which he had already provided in the 1940s—but also requires taking into account objective meaning. Other elements of Schutzian phenomenology must be called in as well, such as the relative natural conception of the world of groups, socioculturally derived knowledge, and imposed relevances. I will end by discussing the main contributions of Schutz’s conception of social roles and to what extent he succeeded in overcoming the objectivism of structural-functional theory. (shrink)

This book outlines, for the first time in its history, the program of phenomenological sociology as a science of the natural attitude of groups. The claim is that phenomenological sociology exists as a matter of fact in the long-held, pre-reflective practices of classical and contemporary social thinkers.

En este artículo paso revista a la noción de barbarie en Michel Henry entendida como enfermedad de la vida. Argumento que ella se contrapone a la cultura, la cual consiste el auto acrecentamiento de la vida. En este marco, comparo la crítica de la cultura y el diagnóstico de la crisis en la fenomenología histórica y en la fenomenología de la vida, haciendo foco en el contraste entre la reivindicación del mundo de la vida y la defensa de la vida (...) acósmica. Luego profundizo en el diagnóstico henriano de la barbarie abordando tres de sus manifestaciones principales, a saber, la economía política, el arte, y la ciencia. Finalmente, cotejo brevemente la posición de Henry con trabajos contemporáneos sobre los “mundos-de-la-muerte” y la ética del care, llamando a elaborar una ética de la vida con miras a su liberación. (shrink)

In the first place, I discuss the main papers and books on Durkheim published in recent years, where no attention is given to the phenomenological interpretations of his work. Then I expose different phenomenological readings of Durkheim, some of them positive, some negative, some ambivalent. Later I find that there is in Durkheim an implicit practice of phenomenology, inspired by Descartes’ Meditations on first philosophy. Consequently, I support Tyriakian’s thesis that there is in Durkheim an implicit phenomenological approach, despite his (...) positivism. Then I wonder whether this tacit approach produces a phenomenological ontology of the social world. I find that it actually does, especially in what regards to social facts considered as things. I argue that Durkheim’s conception of social things is consistent with Husserl’s notion of ideal objectivities. I conclude that Durkheim’s rule of considering social facts as things is part of his phenomenological legacy and that it does not contradict the idea that they also are “states lived”. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to account for Michel Henry’s critique of Merleau-Ponty as regards the own body and the flesh. To that end, I start by displaying Merleau-Ponty’s position on these matters. Then I present Henry’s critique, which are focused on Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible. After that, I consider these objections in general and concentrate on the meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s latest work on Descartes’ dioptric, in particular. Finally, I argue that his unfinished work (...) opens more fruitful channels of dialogue than the works criticized by Henry. (shrink)

La crítica de la ontología ocupa un lugar preponderante en la filosofía de Michel Henry. No obstante, los términos en que se expresa son diversos según los contextos argumentales en que se despliegan. En este trabajo distingo tres argumentos con los que Henry cuestiona la ontología en distintas obras y períodos de su filosofía; a saber: la crítica del monismo ontológico; la crítica del monismo fenomenológico; la crítica de la ontología. Una vez expuestos, indago el modo en que estos argumentos (...) han sido tratados en la bibliografía secundaria. Concluyo con algunas reflexiones en cuanto al alcance de las variaciones terminológicas y argumentativas propias de estos tres argumentos y expresando una preferencia personal por la tercera y última formulación.The critique of ontology is preponderant in the philosophy of Michel Henry. However, the terms in which it is expressed are diverse according to the different lines of argument. In my paper I distinguish three arguments with which Henry challenges ontology in three different works and periods of his philosophy; namely: the critique of ontological monism; the critique of phenomenological monism; the critique of ontology. Once exposed those arguments, I describe how they have been received in the secondary literature. I conclude with some reflections on the terminological and argumentative variations characteristic of these three arguments and I express my personal preference for the third, last formulation. (shrink)

Very often, phenomenology has been presented as opposed to structuralism. We aim to contest that opposition. We will argue that Husserl has influenced on structuralism in the early 20th century, and that phenomenolgy shows itself as a neither a global (trivial) nor a methodic struc-turalism. Indeed,..

Me propongo delinear las nociones de vida y revelación tal como son descritas en la obra temprana y en la obra tardía de Michel Henry. Además, cotejaré estas descripciones con la piedra de toque de la fenomenología, a saber, la experiencia en primera persona. A partir de ella levantaré una objeción material: que la vida no se revele en mí como una fenomenalidad pura distinguida del fenómeno propia-mente dicho pone en jaque el carácter absoluto de la manifestación pues hay al (...) menos un caso en que no se cumple. Luego mostraré que, en sus últimos años, Henry da cuenta de este tipo de experiencia a partir de las figuras del mal. Argumentaré, por último, que aunque tiene el mérito de dar cuenta de una heterogeneidad posible de la experiencia, la respuesta ofrecida allí resulta insuficiente para retirar la objeción planteada inicialmente.My aim is to delineate the notions of life and revelation as they are described in the early work and in the late work of Michel Henry. In addition, I will compare these descriptions with the touchstone of phenomenology, namely, the first-person experience. Based on it I will raise a material objection: that life does not reveal itself in me as a pure phenomenality distinguished from the phenomenon itself calls into question the absolute character of manifestation because there is at least one case in which it is not fulfilled. Then I will show that, in his latest years, Henry accounts for this type of experience as a figure of evil. Finally, I will argue that, although it has the merit of accounting for a possible heterogeneity of the experience, the answer offered there is insufficient to withdraw the objection raised initially. (shrink)

Comentando una carta de Husserl a Lévy Brühl, Merleau-Ponty subraya que la eidética de la historia no nos dispensa de la investigación histórica. Esta concepción siempre ha estado presente en su obra, y se ha ido modelando de diferentes maneras y componiendo combinaciones variadas según va desarrollando su fenomenología, su filosofía de la historia, y su ontología. En cada uno de esos estadios presenta, respectivamente, una concepción situacionista, una concepción estructuralista, y una concepción sensible de la esencia. Sin embargo, la (...) desmesura de lo vivido respecto de lo pensado no debe interpretarse como una derrota del pensamiento sino como creación. (shrink)

In my review I argue that this book is more than just a history of the way in which Husserl’s work was studied and taught in the United States and Canada from the early XXth Century on since it shows that what started as a “reception” soon became a local interpretation and appropriation of the phenomenological perspective which ended up blossoming as an autochthonous movement with its own concerns, issues, and schools. The book clearly shows the different phases in the (...) development of the phenomenological movement in North America, the numerous institutions participating in it, and the variety of local perspectives. (shrink)

En este trabajo, paso revista a las consideraciones respecto de la filosofía que Merleau-Ponty ha ido vertiendo a lo largo de su obra. Comenzaré presentando su interpretación fenomenológicoexistencial de la filosofía pues ella inaugura una serie de consideraciones concernientes al tratamiento de la ..

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the idea that members are fully competent at what they do. With that aim, I start with a Schutzian and Ethno­methodological account of what it is like to be a member of the tango scene in the dance halls of Buenos Aires. I specify different degrees and kinds of competences. On the one hand, there are fully competent members and incompetent members. The incompetent members are the vast majority in comparison to the (...) few fully competent ones. On the other hand, there are technically competent members and socially competent ones. Technical competence is very hard to acquire, thus it is very rare. Social competences, instead, are accessible to all members. These different ways of being a member are heterogeneous and indicate a significant diversity of competences and skills. I conclude that not all members are alike and that each one is challenged in a particular way. (shrink)