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Carlotta Pavese
Cornell University
  1. Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.
    Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees. On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view (...)
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  2. Practical Senses.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    In their theories of know how, proponents of Intellectualism routinely appeal to ‘practical modes of presentation’. But what are practical modes of presentation? And what makes them distinctively practical? In this essay, I develop a Fregean account of practical modes of presentation: I argue that there are such things as practical senses and I give a theory of what they are. One of the challenges facing the proponent of a distinctively Fregean construal of practical modes of presentation is to provide (...)
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  3. Know-How, Action, and Luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.
    A good surgeon knows how to perform a surgery; a good architect knows how to design a house. We value their know-how. We ordinarily look for it. What makes it so valuable? A natural response is that know-how is valuable because it explains success. A surgeon’s know-how explains their success at performing a surgery. And an architect’s know-how explains their success at designing houses that stand up. We value know-how because of its special explanatory link to success. But in virtue (...)
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  4.  25
    The Psychological Reality of Practical Representation.Carlotta Pavese - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):784-821.
    ABSTRACTWe represent the world in a variety of ways: through percepts, concepts, propositional attitudes, words, numerals, recordings, musical scores, photographs, diagrams, mimetic paintings, etc. Some of these representations are mental. It is customary for philosophers to distinguish two main kinds of mental representations: perceptual representation and conceptual representation. This essay presupposes a version of this dichotomy and explores the way in which a further kind of representation – procedural representation – represents. It is argued that, in some important respects, procedural (...)
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  5. Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):61-79.
    This essay defends a novel form of virtue epistemology: Modal Virtue Epistemology. It borrows from traditional virtue epistemology the idea that knowledge is a type of skillful performance. But it goes on to understand skillfulness in purely modal terms — that is, in terms of success across a range of counterfactual scenarios. We argue that this approach offers a promising way of synthesizing virtue epistemology with a modal account of knowledge, according to which knowledge is safe belief. In particular, we (...)
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  6. Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Mind:fzab041.
    According to a rich tradition in philosophy of action, intentional action requires practical knowledge: someone who acts intentionally knows what they are doing while they are doing it. Piñeros Glasscock (2020) argues that an anti-luminosity argument, of the sort developed in Williamson (2000), can be readily adapted to provide a reductio of an epistemic condition on intentional action. This paper undertakes a rescue mission on behalf of an epistemic condition on intentional action. We formulate and defend a version of an (...)
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  7. Skill in Epistemology I: Skill and Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):642-649.
    Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the philosophy of skill.
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  8. Skill in Epistemology II: Skill and Know How.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.
    The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how (§1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stand together (§4-5).
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  9. A Theory of Practical Meaning.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):65-96.
    This essay is divided into two parts. In the first part (§2), I introduce the idea of practical meaning by looking at a certain kind of procedural systems — the motor system — that play a central role in computational explanations of motor behavior. I argue that in order to give a satisfactory account of the content of the representations computed by motor systems (motor commands), we need to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of meaning. Defending the explanatory relevance (...)
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  10. Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.
    According to a standard assumption in epistemology, if one only partially believes that p , then one cannot thereby have knowledge that p. For example, if one only partially believes that that it is raining outside, one cannot know that it is raining outside; and if one only partially believes that it is likely that it will rain outside, one cannot know that it is likely that it will rain outside. Many epistemologists will agree that epistemic agents are capable of (...)
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  11. Lewis Carroll’s Regress and the Presuppositional Structure of Arguments.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-38.
    This essay argues that the main lesson of Lewis Carroll's Regress is that arguments are constitutively presuppositional.
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  12. Practical Concepts and Productive Reasoning.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    Can we think of a task in a distinctively practical way? Can there be practical concepts? In recent years, epistemologists, philosophers of mind, as well as philosophers of psychology have appealed to practical concepts in characterizing the content of know-how or in explaining certain features of skillful action. However, reasons for positing practical concepts are rarely discussed in a systematic fashion. This paper advances a novel argument for the psychological reality of practical concepts that relies on evidence for a distinctively (...)
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  13.  91
    Knowing a Rule.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):165-188.
    In this essay, I provide a new argument for Intellectualism about knowing how, one that does not rest on controversial assumptions about how knowing how is ascribed in English. In particular, I argue that the distinctive intentionality of the manifestations of knowing how ought to be explained in terms of a propositional attitude of belief about how to perform an action.
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  14. Knowledge, Action, Defeasibility.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeaters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    One can intentionally do something only if one knows what one is doing while they are doing it. For example, one can intentionally kill one’s neighbor by opening their gas stove overnight only if one knows that the gas is likely to kill the neighbor in their sleep. One can intentionally sabotage the victory of one’s rival by putting sleeping drugs in their drink only if one knows that sleeping drugs will harm the rival’s performance. And so on. In a (...)
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  15.  61
    The Semantics and Pragmatics of Argumentation.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - In Daniel Altshuler (ed.), Linguistics meets philosophy. Cambridge:
    This paper overviews some recent work on the semantics and pragmatics of arguments.
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  16. On the Meaning of 'Therefore'.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):88-97.
    I argue for an analysis of ‘therefore’ as presupposition trigger against the more standard conventional implicature story originally put forward by Grice (1975). I propose that we model the relevant presupposition as “testing” the context in a way that is similar to how, according to some dynamic treatments of epistemic `must', ‘must’ tests the context. But whereas the presupposition analysis is plausible for ‘therefore’, ‘must’ is not plausibly a presupposition trigger. Moreover, whereas ‘must’ can naturally occur under a supposition, the (...)
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  17. Practical Representation.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - In Carlotta Pavese & Ellen Fridland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. Cambridge, UK: Routledge.
    This chapter discusses recent attempts to clarify the notion of practical representation and its theoretical fruitfulness. The ultimate goal is not just to show that intellectualists are on good grounds when they appeal to practical representation in their theories of know-how. Rather, it is to argue that ​ any plausible theory of skill and know-how has to appeal to the notion of practical representation developed here. §1 explains the notion of a mode of presentation and introduces practical modes of presentation. (...)
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  18.  4
    The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise.Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.) - 2020 - Routledge.
    Philosophical questions surrounding skill and expertise can be traced back as far as Ancient Greece, China, and India. In the twentieth century skilled action was an important factor in the work of phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and analytic philosophers including Gilbert Ryle. However, as a subject in its own right it has, until now, remained largely in the background. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise is an outstanding reference source and the first major collection of (...)
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  19.  4
    A Tribute to Karen Neander.Christopher Hill & Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Biological Theory:1-8.
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  20. Logical Inference and Its Dynamics.Carlotta Pavese - June 2016 - In Tamminga Allard, Willer Malte & Roy Olivier (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. College Publications. pp. 203-219.
    This essay advances and develops a dynamic conception of inference rules and uses it to reexamine a long-standing problem about logical inference raised by Lewis Carroll’s regress.
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  21.  20
    Editor’s Introduction.Carlotta Pavese & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):585-587.
    Volume 32, Issue 5, July 2019, Page 585-588.
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  22. Il Concetto di Verità' di Tarski.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - In Guido Bonino, Carlo Gabbani & Paolo Tripodi (eds.), Biblioteca Analitica. pp. 91-102.
    In questo capitolo racconto l'articolo classico sulla verità' di Tarski.
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  23.  10
    Introduction: Foundational Issues in Philosophical Semantics.Carlotta Pavese & Andrea Iacona - 2021 - Topoi 40 (1):1-3.
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  24. Introduction to Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. Oxford, UK:
    The diverse and breathtaking intelligence of the human animal is often embodied in skills. People, throughout their lifetimes, acquire and refine a vast number of skills. And there seems to be no upper limit to the creativity and beauty expressed by them. Think, for instance, of Olympic gymnastics: the amount of strength, flexibility, and control required to perform even a simple beam routine amazes, startles, and delights. In addition to the sheer beauty of skill, performances at the pinnacle of expertise (...)
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  25. Knowledge-How.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.).
  26.  57
    Knowledge and Mentality.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    This paper reexamines the case for mentality—the thesis that knowledge is a mental state in its own right, and not only derivatively, simply by virtue of being composed out of mental states or by virtue of being a property of mental states — and explores a novel argument for it. I argue that a certain property singled out by psychologists and philosophers of cognitive science as distinctive of skillful behavior (agentive control) is best understood in terms of knowledge. While psychological (...)
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    Significati, proposizioni e decitazionismo.Carlotta Pavese - 2007 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 20 (2):361-370.
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  28.  97
    The Dynamics of Argumentative Discourse.Carlotta Pavese & Alexander W. Kocurek - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic.
    Arguments have always played a central role within logic and philosophy. But little attention has been paid to arguments as a distinctive kind of discourse, with its own semantics and pragmatics. The goal of this essay is to study the mechanisms by means of which we make arguments in discourse, starting from the semantics of argument connectives such as `therefore'. While some proposals have been made in the literature, they fail to account for the distinctive anaphoric behavior of `therefore', as (...)
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