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Carme Isern-Mas
Florida State University
  1.  11
    Externalization is Common to All Value Judgments, and Norms Are Motivating Because of Their Intersubjective Grounding.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:21-21.
    We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.
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  2.  20
    Making Sense of Emotional Contagion.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35).
    Emotional contagion is a phenomenon that has attracted much interest in recent times. However, the main approach on offer, the mimicry theory, fails to properly account for its many facets. In particular, we focus on two shortcomings: the elicitation of emotional contagion is not context-independent, and there can be cases of emotional contagion without motor mimicry. We contend that a general theory of emotion elicitation is better suited to account for these features, because of its multi-level appraisal component. From this (...)
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  3.  8
    Naturalizing Darwall's Second Person Standpoint.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - forthcoming - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Scienc.
    In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...)
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  4.  9
    Why Does Empathy Matter for Morality?Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2019 - Análisis Filosófico 39 (1):5-26.
    In this paper we discuss Prinz’s Kantian arguments in “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?”. They purport to show that empathy is not necessary for morality because it is not part of the capacities required for moral competence and it can bias moral judgment. First, we show that even conceding Prinz his notions of empathy and moral competence, empathy still plays a role in moral competence. Second, we argue that moral competence is not limited to moral judgment. Third, we reject Prinz’s (...)
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