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Carme Isern-Mas
Florida State University
  1.  25
    Making Sense of Emotional Contagion.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35).
    Emotional contagion is a phenomenon that has attracted much interest in recent times. However, the main approach on offer, the mimicry theory, fails to properly account for its many facets. In particular, we focus on two shortcomings: the elicitation of emotional contagion is not context-independent, and there can be cases of emotional contagion without motor mimicry. We contend that a general theory of emotion elicitation is better suited to account for these features, because of its multi-level appraisal component. From this (...)
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  2.  18
    Naturalizing Darwall's Second Person Standpoint.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - forthcoming - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Scienc.
    In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...)
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  3. Love, Friendship, and Moral Motivation.Carme Isern-Mas - 2022 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 42 (2):93-107.
    The love that we feel for our friends plays an essential role in both our moral motivation to act towards them; and in our moral obligations towards them, that is, in our special duties. We articulate our proposal as a reply to Stephen Darwall’s second-person proposal, which we take to be a contemporary representative of the Kantian view. According to this view, love does not have a necessary role neither in moral motivation, nor in moral obligation; just a complementary one. (...)
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  4.  29
    The Implications of the Second-Person Perspective for Personhood: An Application to the Case of Human Infants and Non-Human Primates.Pamela Barone, Carme Isern-Mas & Ana Pérez-Manrique - 2022 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):133-150.
    This paper proposes an intermediate account of personhood, based on the capacity to participate in intersubjective interactions. We articulate our proposal as a reply to liberal and restrictive accounts, taking Mark Rowlands’ and Stephen Darwall’s proposals as contemporary representatives of each view, respectively. We argue that both accounts fall short of dealing with borderline cases and defend our intermediate view: The criteria of personhood based on the second-person perspective of mental state attribution. According to it, a person should be able (...)
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  5.  11
    Externalization is Common to All Value Judgments, and Norms Are Motivating Because of Their Intersubjective Grounding.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:21-21.
    We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.
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  6.  97
    A Second-Personal Approach to the Evolution of Morality.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2022 - Biological Theory 17 (3):199-209.
    Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...)
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  7.  15
    Why Does Empathy Matter for Morality?Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2019 - Análisis Filosófico 39 (1):5-26.
    In this paper we discuss Prinz’s Kantian arguments in “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?”. They purport to show that empathy is not necessary for morality because it is not part of the capacities required for moral competence and it can bias moral judgment. First, we show that even conceding Prinz his notions of empathy and moral competence, empathy still plays a role in moral competence. Second, we argue that moral competence is not limited to moral judgment. Third, we reject Prinz’s (...)
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