8 March, now known as International Women’s Day, is a day for feminist claims where demonstrations are organized in over 150 countries, with the participation of millions of women all around the world. These demonstrations can be viewed as collective rituals and thus focus attention on the processes that facilitate different psychosocial effects. This work aims to explore the mechanisms involved in participation in the demonstrations of 8 March 2020, collective and ritualized feminist actions, and their correlates associated with personal (...) well-being and collective well-being, collective efficacy and collective growth, and behavioral intention to support the fight for women’s rights. To this end, a cross-cultural study was conducted with the participation of 2,854 people from countries in Latin America and Europe, with a retrospective correlational cross-sectional design and a convenience sample. Participants were divided between demonstration participants and non-demonstrators or followers who monitored participants through the media and social networks. Compared with non-demonstrators and with males, female and non-binary gender respondents had greater scores in mechanisms and criterion variables. Further random-effects model meta-analyses revealed that the perceived emotional synchrony was consistently associated with more proximal mechanisms, as well as with criterion variables. Finally, sequential moderation analyses showed that proposed mechanisms successfully mediated the effects of participation on every criterion variable. These results indicate that participation in 8M marches and demonstrations can be analyzed through the literature on collective rituals. As such, collective participation implies positive outcomes both individually and collectively, which are further reinforced through key psychological mechanisms, in line with a Durkheimian approach to collective rituals. (shrink)

The psychosocial impacts of natural disasters are associated with the triggering of negative and positive responses in the affected population; also, such effects are expressed in an individual and collective sphere. This can be seen in several reactions and behaviors that can vary from the development of individual disorders to impacts on interpersonal relationships, cohesion, communication, and participation of the affected communities, among others. The present work addressed the psychosocial impacts of the consequences of natural disasters considering individual effects via (...) the impact of trauma and community effects, through the perception of social well-being, the valuation of the community and the social exchange of emotions. The aim of this study was to assess the relationship between individual reactions and the evaluation of social and collective circumstances after the earthquake of 27F 2010 in Chile, through collective-type intervention variables not used in previous studies. For this purpose, a descriptive, ex post facto correlational and cross-sectional methodology was carried on, with the participation of 487 people affected by the 2010 earthquake, 331 women and 156 men, between 18 and 58 years old, from the provinces of Ñuble and Biobío, VIII region, Chile. The measurement was carried out 4 years after the earthquake and the results show that greater individual than collective involvements were found, mainly in the coastal zone of the region. The mediation analysis showed that the relationship between the intensity of the trauma and social well-being occurs through a route that considers social sharing of emotions and community appraisal. These results indicate that the overcoming of individual affectations to achieve social well-being occurs when in the immediate post-disaster phases the affected communities activate shared emotional and cognitive processes, which allow them to jointly face subsequent threats and abrupt changes. (shrink)

In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions can make us responsible in overdetermination (...) cases. I go on to provide an account of how this may be possible. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

Los porqué y para qué una sociedad debe dedicar esfuerzos a la investigación y a la innovación están cambiando, incorporando como perspectiva central que los sectores más postergados sean sus destinatarios directos y tengan voz en su orientación. Luego de argumentar esta afirmación, el trabajo analiza algunos abordajes en torno a las articulaciones entre conocimiento, innovación e inclusión social, mostrando sus diferencias y, en ocasiones, divergencias. Ciertos enfoques teóricos que colaboran a entender mejor estas articulaciones son analizados, así como una (...) experiencia específica de política de investigación en la Universidad de la República, Uruguay, que busca potenciarlas. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

La comprensión psicológica es una capacidad requerida para la competencia moral en el sentido en que entender las intenciones, creencias e intereses de otros es un input crítico para evaluar las responsabilidades involucradas en sus comportamientos y comprender, a su vez, cómo interactuar con ellos para alcanzar nuestros propósitos. Por su parte, la interacción con otros está en el corazón de ambas capacidades, dado que una y otra son componentes esenciales y estrechamente relacionados de la vida social humana. Mi objetivo (...) en este trabajo, en relación con ambos supuestos, será poner de relieve una semejanza estructural entre la cognición psicológica y la cognición moral ordinarias, mostrando cómo ciertos tipos diferenciados de explicaciones en uno y otro dominio, permiten identificar un marco teórico consistente que, a su turno, puede dar cuenta de las relaciones entre ambas. Para ello, me referiré en primer lugar, sintéticamente, al Modelo Intuicionista Social de J. Haidt, en tanto ejemplifica un enfoque no clásico y dual de la cognición moral en el cual las intuiciones morales desempeñan un papel más básico que las razones. En el ámbito de la cognición psicológica, me referiré con más detenimiento al enfoque interactivo o de segunda persona, enriquecido por el enfoque dual de la cognición, en particular, por las propuestas sobre variedades implícitas o “mínimas” de atribución mental. En ese contexto, identificaré los llamados comportamientos expresivos: su naturaleza y su papel en la conducta y las interacciones humanas y su importancia como base evidencial de la comprensión mental. Ellos constituyen los objetos primarios de las intuiciones psicológicas. Espero mostrar que las señales expresivas son “legibles” por medio de las capacidades intuitivas que las detectan y comprenden su significación psicológica de maneras eficientes. Una vez expuestas las afinidades teóricas entre el MIS y el enfoque interactivo-dual, pondré de relieve que, así como para el primero, las intuiciones morales vienen primero y las razones después, también para el enfoque interactivo-dual de la comprensión psicológica, las intuiciones psicológicas vienen primero y las razones después. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appealing to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed (...) to perform. This essay argues, first, that the intuitive plausibility of the idea that responsibility is grounded in difference making is not completely put to rest by Frankfurt cases, even if those cases successfully show that responsibility is not grounded in difference making in the sense of access to alternative possibilities of action. It then goes on to develop a different compatibilist strategy, one according to which responsibility is grounded in difference making, but the type of difference making it is grounded in does not require access to alternative possibilities. Indeed, it is a form of difference making that is clearly compatible with determinism. (shrink)

What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...) morally responsible for things that we cause. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)

There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...) facts could be causes. Imagine, for instance, the following scenario. I have a gun filled with red paint and another gun filled with blue paint, and I fire both guns at my neighbor’s white wall. A moment later, there is a graffiti on the wall and my neighbor notifies the police. He would have done so regardless of the graffiti’s color, since all he cares about is the existence of a graffiti on his wall. Is it plausible to claim that a disjunctive fact is a cause of his notifying the police? In particular, is it plausible to claim that he notified the police because I fired the red-paint gun or the blue-paint gun (the thought being that my firing paint of either color would have sufficed)? It seems not. The police was notified because of the actual graffiti on the wall, and the actual graffiti on the wall is made of a certain pattern of colored patches. Imagine, that, as it turns out, there are patches of both colors on the wall. Then it seems that both my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun were causes of my neighbor’s notifying the police. In other words, my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun jointly caused the outcome: each of them was a contributory cause of the outcome’s occurrence. On the other hand, imagine that there are only patches of one color on the wall. Then it seems that my firing only one of the guns was a cause. Either way, the disjunction fails to be a cause: either my firing the red-paint gun was a cause, or my firing the blue-paint gun was a cause, or they were both causes, but their disjunction was not.. (shrink)

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.

Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model and the actual-sequence model. This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note that the counterparts of (...) Frankfurt-style cases also fail to undermine the actual-sequence model. My second strategy of defense consists in revitalizing the original motivation for the actual-sequence model, by revamping it, isolating it from claims that do not fully capture the same idea, and arguing that it can be developed in a successful way. (shrink)

The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. (shrink)

RESUMO O presente artigo apresenta uma semântica baseada nas atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição por uma sociedade de agentes para lógicas inspiradas no First Degree Entailment de Dunn e Belnap. Diferente das situações epistêmicas originalmente usadas em E, as atitudes cognitivas não coincidem com valores-de-verdade e parecem mais adequadas para as lógicas que pretendem considerar o conteúdo informacional de proposições “ditas verdadeiras” tanto quanto as proposições “ditas falsas” como determinantes da noção de validade das inferências. Após analisar algumas lógicas (...) associadas à semântica proposta, introduzimos a lógica E B cuja relação de consequência semântica subjacente - o B-entailment - é capaz de expressar diversos tipos de raciocínio em relação às atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição. Apresentamos também um cálculo de sequentes correto e completo para E B.ABSTRACT In the present work I introduce a semantics based on the cognitive attitudes of acceptation and rejection entertained by a given society of agents for logics inspired on Dunn and Belnap’s ‘First Degree Entailment’. Distinctly from the original epistemic situation of E, the cognitive attitudes do not coincide with truth-values and it seems more suitable for logics that intend to consider the informational content of propositions “said to be true” as well as propositions “said to be false” as determinants of the notion of logical validity. After analyzing some logics associated with the proposed semantics, we introduce the logic E B, whose underlying semantic entailment relation - the B-entailment - is able to express several kinds of reasoning towards the cognitive attitudes of acceptance and rejection. Acorrect and complete sequent calculus for E B is also presented. (shrink)

Little has been studied on the relationship between affect and school problems related with attendance. This study aims to identify different affective profiles and to determine whether these profiles differ from each other based on the four functional conditions of school refusal behavior. Participants comprised 1,816 Spanish adolescents aged 15–18 years. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children-Short Form and the School Refusal Assessment Scale-Revised for Children were administered. Latent profile analysis revealed five affective profiles: low affective profile, self-fulfilling (...) profile, low positive affect profile, self-destructive profile, and high affective profile. The self-destructive profile revealed the highest average scores in the first three factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the high affective profile reached the highest average score in the fourth factor. On the contrary, the self-fulfilling profile obtained the lowest average scores in the first two factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the low affective profile revealed the lowest average scores in the last two factors. Findings suggest the relevance of developing more adaptative affective profiles, such as the self-fulfilling profile, which would contribute to diminishing school attendance problems. (shrink)

field: Issue 8 Embodying an Anti-Racist Architecture comprises essays, articles, podcasts, drawings, designs, the cover image, and a film. ‘This Call to Action' is a document borne from dialogue, and as such derives its power from the activism that collaboration and cooperation engender. -/- Asma Mehan, Carolina Lima, Faith Ng’eno, and Krzysztof Nawratek discuss white hegemony across different geopolitical and academic spaces, mindful of the nuances of using English as their shared yet borrowed language. -/- .

South Carolina State College was founded in 1896. As one of the Black institutions taking advantage of the Second Morrill Act of 1890, a large portion of the college's limited financial resources, its energies, and its programs were devoted to training students in agriculture, home economics, vocational trades, and in the education of teachers. These curriculums were considered appropriate for young Black men and women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.When the civil rights movement began to challenge (...) segregation in education in South Carolina in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the state's white leaders responded quickly and effectively by creating graduate and law programs at State College. To preserve the racial status quo and segregation in education, Governor James F. Byrnes subsequently raised funds, including one-half million dollars from the Rockefeller sponsored General Education Board, to improve long neglected facilities at State College. A sizable portion of the funds were devoted to the agricultural program.While the defense of “separate but equal” education by Byrnes and others ultimately failed, the changes fostered at State College did dramatically improve the institution in the 1950s and 1960s and brought a shift in its mission away from its traditional focus on rural and agricultural education for Black youngsters. By 1966, the college was nominally integrated. Paradoxically, in 1971 with enrollments declining and fewer students interested in pursuing agriculture as away of life, the agriculture program was discontinued. (shrink)

In 1992, as part of a larger charitable campaign, the Prince of Wales (Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth’s older son and heir) launched a line of organic food products called “Prince’s Duchy Originals”.1 The first product that went on sale was an oat cookie: “the oaten biscuit.” Since then the oaten biscuit has been joined by hundreds of other products and Duchy Originals has become one of the leading organic food brands in the UK. Presumably, the Prince of Wales is very (...) proud of his Duchy Originals products, and of the oaten biscuits in particular. Let’s imagine that he is so proud of the oaten biscuits that he eats them regularly. Also, let’s imagine that one day Queen Elizabeth asks the Prince to water the plant in her room. As she explains to him, she’ll be gone for the day and the plant needs to be watered every afternoon. But the Prince decides not to water the plant. Instead of watering the plant, he spends his afternoon savoring some oaten biscuits, and the Queen’s plant dies. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on John Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" has drawn particular attention to the colonial antecedents and applications of the theory of appropriation in chapter V of the Second Treatise. This attention has coincided with a more general interest among political theorists in the historical and theoretical relationship between liberalism and colonialism. This essay reviews the surviving evidence for Locke's knowledge of the Carolina colony and argues that it was both more extensive and more enduring than previous commentators (...) have suggested. In particular, the essay provides evidence that Locke was engaged in revising the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina at just the moment in the summer of 1682 when he was most likely to have composed chapter V of the Second Treatise and hence that there was an immediate and identifiable colonial context that contributed to his distinctive theory of property. (shrink)

In this paper I reexamine the debate between two contrasting conceptions of free will: the classical model, which understands freedom in terms of alternative possibilities, and a more recent family of views that focus only on actual causes, and that were inspired by Frankfurt’s famous attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. I offer a novel argument in support of the actual-causes model, one that bypasses the popular debate about Frankfurt-style cases.

This essay explores some possibilities brought by the question about philosophy’s utility for science. We point to some arguments in favor of the importance of philosophy for science in general and Behavior Analysis in particular. We argue that philosophy is the consciousness of science. Without philosophical consciousness, science incurs epistemological naiveties; it uncritically defends scientific neutrality; it risks turning into a mere technique in the service of ideologies that endangers science’s existence. As the philosophy of Behavior Analysis, Radical Behaviorism can (...) play the role of conscience of that science. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government has drawn particular attention to the colonial antecedents and applications of the theory of appropriation in chapter V of theSecond Treatise. This attention has coincided with a more general interest among political theorists in the historical and theoretical relationship between liberalism and colonialism. This essay reviews the surviving evidence for Locke’s knowledge of the Carolina colony and argues that it was both more extensive and more enduring than previous commentators have (...) suggested. In particular, the essay provides evidence that Locke was engaged in revising the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina at just the moment in the summer of 1682 when he was most likely to have composed chapter V of theSecond Treatise and hence that there was an immediate and identifiable colonial context that contributed to his distinctive theory of property. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

This theoretical paper proposes a new perspective to understand the moral distress of nurses more fully, using virtue ethics. Moral distress is a widely studied subject, especially with respect to the determination of its causes and manifestations. Increasing the theoretical depth of previous work using ethical theory, however, can create new possibilities for moral distress to be explored and analyzed. Drawing on more recent work in this field, we explicate the conceptual framework of the process of moral distress in nurses, (...) proposed by Ramos et al., using MacIntyrean virtue ethics. Our analysis considers the experience of moral distress in the context of a practice, enabling the adaptation of this framework using virtue ethics. The adoption of virtue ethics as an ethical perspective broadens the understanding of the complexity of nurses’ experiences of moral distress, since it is impossible to create a ready model that can cover all possibilities. Specifically, we describe how identity, social context, beliefs, and tradition shape moral discomfort, uncertainty, and sensitivity and how virtues inform moral judgments. Individuals, such as nurses, who are involved in a practice have a narrative history and a purpose that guide them in every step of the process, especially in moral judgment. It is worth emphasizing that the process described is supported by the formation of moral competence that, if blocked, can lead to moral distress and deprofessionalization. It is expected that nurses seek to achieve the internal good of their practice, which legitimizes their professional practice and supports them in moral decision-making, preventing moral distress. (shrink)

In this article I review the core elements of Carolina Sartorio’s actual causal sequence account of free will and moral responsibility, and propose two revisions. First, I suggest replacing the contested notion of absence causation by the relatively uncontroversial notion of causal explanation by absences. Second, I propose retaining explanation by unreduced dispositions, of which Sartorio appears to be wary. I then set out a response to her critical treatment of manipulation arguments against compatibilism. Lastly, I point out that (...) Sartorio’s reasons-sensitivity condition on moral responsibility is amenable to a conception of moral responsibility that, unlike the one she endorses, dispenses with basic desert. (shrink)

What do the words ceteris paribus add to a causal hypothesis, that is, to a generalization that is intended to articulate the consequences of a causal mechanism? One answer, that looks almost too good to be true, is that a ceteris paribus hedge restricts the scope of the hypothesis to those cases where nothing undermines, interferes with, or undoes the effect of the mechanism in question, even if the hypothesis’s own formulator is otherwise unable to specify fully what might constitute (...) such undermining or interference. This paper proposes a semantics for causal generalizations according to which ceteris paribus hedges deliver on this promise, because the truth conditions for a causal generalization depend in part on the -- perhaps unknown -- nature of the mechanism whose consequences it is intended to describe. It follows that the truth conditions for causal hypotheses are typically opaque to their own formulators. (shrink)

Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model, which states that acting freely consists in being able to do otherwise, and, more recently, the actual-sequence model, which states that acting freely is exclusively a function of the actual sequence of events issuing in our behavior. In general, a natural strategy when trying to decide between two models of a certain concept is to look for examples that support one model and undermine the other. Frankfurt-style (...) cases have been used for this kind of purpose, to challenge the alternative-possibilities view and support the actual-sequence view. In this paper I examine the prospects of the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases: “PAP-style” cases, or cases that could be used to support the alternative-possibilities view and challenge the actual-sequence view. I argue that there are no successful PAP-style cases. (shrink)

On the face of it, causal responsibility seems to be “additive” in the following sense: if I cause some effects, then it seems that I also cause the sum (aggregate, conjunction, etc.) of those effects. Let’s call the claim that causation behaves in this way, Additivity.