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  1. Causation and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity (...)
     
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  2.  21
    Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):221–224.
    We have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in cases of ‘easy-knowledge.’ Erik Wielenberg argues that there are cases of easy knowledge thatour proposal cannot handle. In this note we reply to Wielenberg, arguing that our proposal does indeed handle his cases.
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  3.  73
    A New Asymmetry Between Actions and Omissions.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):460–482.
  4.  83
    Causes As Difference-Makers.Carolina Sartorio - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):71-96.
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  5.  61
    Difference‐Making in Epistemology.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):368-387.
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  6.  76
    How to Be Responsible for Something Without Causing It.Carolina Sartorio - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336.
    What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...)
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  7.  90
    Omissions and Causalism.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):513-530.
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  8.  19
    Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):875-888.
    This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin’s recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin’s ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.
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  9.  54
    On Causing Something to Happen in a Certain Way Without Causing It to Happen.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):119-136.
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  10.  87
    Causation and Responsibility.Carolina Sartorio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):749–765.
    In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...)
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  11.  67
    Resultant Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):63-86.
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  12.  23
    Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Responsibility and Overdetermination.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (4):473-490.
    In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions (just like our actions) can make (...)
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  13.  17
    Causation and Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (11):629-651.
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  14.  80
    Disjunctive Causes.Carolina Sartorio - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):521-538.
    There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...)
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  15.  9
    A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.
    Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model and the actual-sequence model. This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note that the counterparts of (...)
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  16.  53
    Moral Inertia.Carolina Sartorio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):117 - 133.
    I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is essential for moral inertia to be manifested. I argue that there are two different manifestations of moral inertia: strict prohibitions on interventions, and constraints (...)
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  17.  11
    Vihvelin, Kadri., Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter. [REVIEW]Carolina Sartorio - 2014 - Review of Metaphysics 68 (1):211-213.
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  18. Chapter 26: Causation and Ethics.Carolina Sartorio - manuscript
    My main aim is to examine the extent to which an appeal to the concept of cause contributes to elucidating moral notions or to increasing the plausibility of moral views. Something that makes this task interestingly complex is the fact that the notion of causation itself is controversial and difficult to pin down. As a result, in some cases the success of its use in moral theory hinges on how certain debates about causation are resolved. I will point to examples (...)
     
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  19.  22
    Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity.Carolina Sartorio - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):373–385.
    On the face of it, causal responsibility seems to be “additive” in the following sense: if I cause some effects, then it seems that I also cause the sum (aggregate, conjunction, etc.) of those effects. Let’s call the claim that causation behaves in this way, Additivity.
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  20. Failing to Do the Impossible.Carolina Sartorio - manuscript
    A billionaire tells you: “That chair is in my way; I don’t feel like moving it myself, but if you push it out of my way I’ll give you a hundred dollars.” You decide you don’t want the billionaire’s money and you’d actually prefer that the chair stay in the billionaire’s way, so you graciously turn down the offer and go home. As it turns out, the billionaire is also a stingy old miser; he was never willing to let go (...)
     
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  21. The Prince of Wales Problem for Counterfactual Theories of Causation.Carolina Sartorio - manuscript
    In 1992, as part of a larger charitable campaign, the Prince of Wales (Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth’s older son and heir) launched a line of organic food products called “Prince’s Duchy Originals”.1 The first product that went on sale was an oat cookie: “the oaten biscuit.” Since then the oaten biscuit has been joined by hundreds of other products and Duchy Originals has become one of the leading organic food brands in the UK. Presumably, the Prince of Wales is very (...)
     
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  22. Causation and Ethics.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
     
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  23. Causation and Responsibility, by Michael S. Moore.: Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Carolina Sartorio - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):830-838.
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  24. Comments on Clarke's 'Intentional Omissions's.Carolina Sartorio - 2010 - In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford. pp. 157--160.
     
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  25. Sobre los distintos alcances del argumento de la teoría de los modelos.Carolina Sartorio - 1998 - Análisis Filosófico 18 (2):173.
    I criticize what seems to be a common assumption of the precedent papers, namely, that the model-theoretic argument has similar consequences for the different realms of language. In particular, I argue that while the argument does not have serious consequences for natural languages, this is not the case with the language of mathematics.
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  26. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Responsibility and Overdetermination: Carolina Sartorio.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (4):473-490.
    In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions can make us responsible in overdetermination (...)
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