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  1.  22
    Die reine Rechtslehre im Lichte des kritischen Rationalismus.Carsten Heidemann - 2005 - Ratio Juris 18 (1):124-127.
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  2.  30
    Facets of 'Ought' in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law.Carsten Heidemann - 2013 - Jurisprudence 4 (2):246-262.
    Any correct assessment of Hans Kelsen's conception of Ought must take into account, first, that Kelsen's theory evolved over some 60 years which saw several major changes of its fundamentals; and second, that the Pure Theory must basically be understood as a meta-theory of institutionalised legal science. With these provisos, Kelsen's explanation of the Ought oscillates between two extremes: at one extreme, the legal Ought is just a formal semantic marker delimiting the realm of the law; at the other, the (...)
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  3.  12
    Hans Kelsen's Normativism.Carsten Heidemann - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.
    Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law is the most prominent example of legal normativism. This text traces its origins and its genesis. In philosophy, normativism started with Hume's distinction between Is- and Ought-propositions. Kant distinguished practical from theoretical judgments, while resting even the latter on normativity. Following him, Lotze and the Baden neo-Kantians instrumentalized normativism to secure a sphere of knowledge which is not subject to the natural sciences. Even in his first major text, Kelsen claims that law is solely (...)
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  4.  56
    The creation of normative facts.Carsten Heidemann - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):263-281.
    In Kelsen's formalist and reductionist theory of law, the concepts of `authority' and `competence' may be explained exclusively in terms of those norms on which the validity of other legal norms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describes the nature of these norms in different ways; at least three different conceptions can be distinguished. A rational reconstruction of the most plausible of these conceptions will understand sentences expressing such `norms of competence' either to state truth conditions for normative sentences (...)
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    The Creation of Normative Facts.Carsten Heidemann - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):263-281.
    In Kelsen's formalist and reductionisttheory of law, the concepts of `authority' and`competence' may be explained exclusively in termsof those norms on which the validity of other legalnorms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describesthe nature of these norms in different ways; at leastthree different conceptions can be distinguished. Arational reconstruction of the most plausible of theseconceptions will understand sentences expressing such`norms of competence' either to state truthconditions for normative sentences of a lower level orto state criteria for an act (...)
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  6.  25
    On Some Difficulties Concerning John Searle’s Notion of an ‘Institutional Fact’: Comment to John R. Searle “Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society” (Analyse & Kritik 20, 149-158). [REVIEW]Carsten Heidemann - 1999 - Analyse & Kritik 21 (2):251-264.
    John Searle’s conception of institutional facts figures centrally in his latest works. It is defective for several reasons: (1) Searle’s argument for philosophical realism is inconsistent. (2) Searle’s conceptions of consciousness and collective intentionality are problematic. (3) The notion of normativity is indispensable in Searle’s system, but cannot be accounted for and makes wide parts of his theory superfluous. (4) It is not clear what entities might be regarded as institutional facts. These problems have a common source: The philosophical basis (...)
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  7. On Some Difficulties Concerning John Searle’s Notion of an ‘Institutional Fact’: Comment to John R. Searle “Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society” (Analyse & Kritik 20, 149-158). [REVIEW]Carsten Heidemann - 1999 - Analyse & Kritik 21 (2):251-264.
    John Searle’s conception of institutional facts figures centrally in his latest works. It is defective for several reasons: (1) Searle’s argument for philosophical realism is inconsistent. (2) Searle’s conceptions of consciousness and collective intentionality are problematic. (3) The notion of normativity is indispensable in Searle’s system, but cannot be accounted for and makes wide parts of his theory superfluous. (4) It is not clear what entities might be regarded as institutional facts. These problems have a common source: The philosophical basis (...)
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