What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...) for the possibility of rational choice is that one alternative is not worse than the others. Each challenge is questioned. If comparativism is correct, then no matter what normative theory you favor, your answer to the question, ‘What makes my choice rational?’ must be comparative in form. In this way, comparativism provides a framework for normative theorizing. (shrink)

Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always (...) includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable. (shrink)

For all his profound interest in Secondness and its manifestation in various kinds of indices, including deictics, Peirce rarely addresses the inter-pronominalrelationships. Whilst the American founder of semiotics would designate language as a whole to Thirdness, only within the larger framework of which deictics can work, the German philosopher Cassirer observes that “what characterizes the very first spatial terms that we find in language is their embracing of a defi nite ‘deictic’ function”. For Cassirer the significance of pronominals, especially the (...) I-Thou relationship, lies in its impact on the development of spatial concept that lays the foundation of symbolic forms. It may look strange why the “designatives” of I, Thou, He, in Peirce’s own terms, so obvious in their categorial and empirical differentiation, should fail to be reduceable to the triad of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It is interesting, however, that in his 1906 correspondence with Lady Welby, Peirce should refer to the strange “Communicational Interpretant”, or “the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place”. Peirce asserts that this communication of a Form, say, being in love, is made possible by sign. This paper discusses Peirce’s and Cassirer’s references to deictics or indexical sign, in particular, inter-personal relationships, in light of Benveniste’s concept of discourse, and probes into a possible subtext underlying the Peirce-Welby correspondence. (shrink)

For all his profound interest in Secondness and its manifestation in various kinds of indices, including deictics, Peirce rarely addresses the inter-pronominalrelationships. Whilst the American founder of semiotics would designate language as a whole to Thirdness, only within the larger framework of which deictics can work, the German philosopher Cassirer observes that “what characterizes the very first spatial terms that we find in language is their embracing of a defi nite ‘deictic’ function”. For Cassirer the significance of pronominals, especially the (...) I-Thou relationship, lies in its impact on the development of spatial concept that lays the foundation of symbolic forms. It may look strange why the “designatives” of I, Thou, He, in Peirce’s own terms, so obvious in their categorial and empirical differentiation, should fail to be reduceable to the triad of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It is interesting, however, that in his 1906 correspondence with Lady Welby, Peirce should refer to the strange “Communicational Interpretant”, or “the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place”. Peirce asserts that this communication of a Form, say, being in love, is made possible by sign. This paper discusses Peirce’s and Cassirer’s references to deictics or indexical sign, in particular, inter-personal relationships, in light of Benveniste’s concept of discourse, and probes into a possible subtext underlying the Peirce-Welby correspondence. (shrink)

We explore corporate environmental accountability by examining how carbon emissions affect voluntary climate-related information disclosure based on TCFD principles. Using computerized textual analysis to measure such climate-related disclosure, our results show that firms with higher levels of carbon emissions disclose more climate-related information. This relation is stronger in firms belonging to carbon-intensive industries, such as energy, materials, and utilities. We also examine this relationship at the category level for Governance, Strategy, Risk Management, and Metrics and Targets, finding that carbon (...) emissions drive disclosure in all categories except in Governance. Overall, our findings indicate that high carbon emitting firms appear to discharge their corporate accountability by increasing climate-related disclosure, consistent with legitimizing their potentially unethical actions and submitting to stakeholder and societal pressure. (shrink)

Introduction: philosophy of science in practice Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Article Pages 303-307 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0036-4 Authors Rachel Ankeny, School of History & Politics, University of Adelaide, Napier Building, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia Hasok Chang, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH UK Marcel Boumans, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Valckenierstraat 65-67, 1018 XE Amsterdam, The Netherlands Mieke Boon, Department of Philosophy, University (...) of Twente, Postbox 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 3. (shrink)

The effective controlling and monitoring of an industrial process through the integration of statistical process control and engineering process control has been widely addressed in recent years. However, because the mixture types of disturbances are often embedded in underlying processes, mixture control chart patterns are very difficult for an SPC-EPC process to identify. This can result in problems when attempting to determine the underlying root causes of process faults. Additionally, a large number of categories of disturbances may be present in (...) a process, but typical single-stage classifiers have difficulty in identifying large numbers of categories of disturbances in an SPC-EPC process. Therefore, we propose a two-stage neural network based scheme to enhance the accurate identification rate for MCCPs by performing dimension reduction on disturbance categories. The two-stage scheme includes a combination of a NN, support vector machine, and multivariate adaptive regression splines. Experimental results reveal that the proposed scheme achieves a satisfactory AIR for identifying MCCPs in an SPC-EPC system. (shrink)

This study aims to decode the hemodynamic responses evoked by multiple sound-categories using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. The six different sounds were given as stimuli. The oxy-hemoglobin concentration changes are measured in both hemispheres of the auditory cortex while 18 healthy subjects listen to 10-s blocks of six sound-categories. Long short-term memory networks were used as a classifier. The classification accuracy was 20.38 ± 4.63% with six class classification. Though LSTM networks’ performance was a little higher than chance levels, it is (...) noteworthy that we could classify the data subject-wise without feature selections. (shrink)

Based on the expanded theory of planned behavior, this study first explores the configuration relationship between founder management and innovation by using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Based on the theory of planned behavior, this study divides the behavior intention of founders into three categories: Attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavior control. Using fsQCA, we found that there are two ways to achieve high innovation input of enterprises. In combination with the two ways, the factors such as male and highly (...) educated founder, and large firm size can effectively increase the innovation input of firms, which is consistent with the three aspects of the behavioral intention of the theory of planned behavior, and it proves that the theory of planned behavior can effectively explain the configuration relation between the founder and firm innovation. In addition, this study finds that the innovation output is different from the innovation input, is dependent on the innovation ability of the firm itself, and is less influenced by the external environment. (shrink)

Nanotechnology shows great promise in a variety of applications with attractive economic and societal benefits. However, societal issues associated with nanotechnology are still a concern to the general public. While numerous technological advancements in nanotechnology have been achieved over the past decade, research into the broader societal issues of nanotechnology is still in its early phases. Based on the data from the Web of Science database, we applied the main path analysis, cluster analysis and text mining tools to explore the (...) main research fronts and hierarchical structure of these societal issues. We found that the research studies fell into four categories: "General Toxicity and EHS (Environment, Health and Safety)," "Medicine and Cytotoxicity," "Assessment and Regulation," and "Environment and Ecotoxicity." These research studies have disclosed much information about the potential effect of nanotechnology on public health and the environment. Relatively speaking, the studies on the assessment, regulation, preventive solutions, and environmental protection are just emerging. This finding indicates that an abundance of effort should be conducted on these emerging themes to maximize the benefits of nanotechnology while minimizing its potential harm. The implications for various parties in this domain are also presented. (shrink)

This essay is devoted to the study of proper names. Although the view that sees proper names as referential singular terms is widely considered orthodoxy, there is a growing popularity to the view that proper names are predicates. This is partly because the orthodoxy faces two anomalies that Predicativism can solve: on the one hand, proper names can have multiple bearers. But multiple bearerhood is prima facie a problem to the idea that proper names have just one individual as referent. (...) On the other hand, proper names can have predicative uses. But the view that proper names are singular terms arguably does not have the resources to deal with these uses. In this dissertation I argue that the Predicate View of proper names is mistaken. In the first part of the thesis, I analyse this view in its main contentions and offer several arguments to reject it. This critical exercise provides useful insight into the life of proper names that I incorporate in my own view as follows: I argue that the behaviour of proper names should be understood in light of the wider phenomenon I call category change. Thus, I maintain, with orthodoxy, that proper names are fundamentally referential terms, but I also argue that they also have other uses, including the predicative uses highlighted by the predicativist. I also offer a semantic theory according to which proper names are polyreferential, that is, they are terms that can have more than one referent in a way that is distinct from both plural terms and general terms. This theory resolves the problem of multiple bearerhood and provides a base to account for all other uses of proper names that are not referential, i.e., common noun, adjectival and verbal uses, as semantically derived from the more fundamental referential meaning. (shrink)

In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of Four- (...) class='Hi'>Category Ontology is obliged to resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level. (shrink)

Cet article présente les solutions utilisées pour le Corpus électronique des textes polonais des 17e et 18e siècles afin d’adapter son jeu de balises grammaticales à l’évolution du système morphologique qui a eu lieu au cours de la période. Les 17e et 18e siècles ont été marqués en effet par la formation d’une nouvelle catégorie grammaticale, appelée « masculine-personality » (Pl. *męskoosobowość*). Cette époque marque une transition de l’état ancien à l’état moderne et se caractérise par une variation significative des (...) terminaisons des formes plurielles N, A et V des noms masculins animés à cette époque. Par conséquent, le jeu de balises utilisé pour annoter le corpus, qui a été créé à l’origine pour le polonais moderne, a dû être légèrement modifié à cet égard. La deuxième partie de l’article décrit les recherches menées à l’aide de ce système d’annotation, qui ont montré que la différenciation des terminaisons flexionnelles des noms masculins personnels et impersonnels en polonais était déjà avancée au 17e siècle et presque achevée à la fin du 18e siècle. (shrink)

Processes are occurrents that were, are, or will be happening. Moreover, either they endure (i.e., they continue) or they perdure. Stout [11] contends that they endure. His argument – the Change Argument, hereafter – is grounded in the claims that processes may change and that something may change if and only if it endures. I shall argue that the Change Argument does not succeed. In particular, I shall show that, if the Change Argument aims at (...) being neutral between endurantism and perdurantism, then it is invalid. If, instead, his argument rejects the constraint of neutrality in favor of the assumption of endurance theory for processes, then it is valid, but circular. In either case, Stout’s Change Argument fails to establish that processes endure. (shrink)

The study aims to analyze the changes in the status of rationality in the field of the New Rhetoric – the most influential direction in the modern theory of argumentation, which appeared in the 1960s with the scientific works of C. Perelman – L. Olbrechts – Titeka and S. Toulmin. The thesis presented is that the practices of contemporary public discourse find their most logical and comprehensive theoretical explanation in the teachings of the New Rhetoric, which change the traditional (...) status of rationality and transform it into a logic of practical philosophy. The novelties are ascertained by tracking the dynamics in the understanding of the main categories of argumentation – evidence, argumentation, deductive validity, evaluation criteria, arguments, facts, assumptions, values, consent. Perelman’s model of rational argumentation outlines the transition from logical to communicative rationality, which introduces the factors of contextuality and functionality; affirms the validity of a communicative reasonableness in which the mechanisms of thought are synchronized with the processes of language; introduces practical reasoning, which functions as a strategic interaction between logical thinking, imagination, and language. (shrink)

This paper is an essay in what Austin (_Proc Aristotel Soc_ 57: 1–30, 1956–1957) called "linguistic phenomenology". Its focus is on showing how the grammatical features of ordinary causal verbs, as revealed in the kinds of linguistic constructions they can figure in, can shed light on the nature of the processes that these verbs are used to describe. Specifically, drawing on the comprehensive classification of English verbs founds in Levin (_English verb classes and alternations: a preliminary investigation_, University of Chicago (...) Press, Chicago, 1993), I divide the forms of productive causal processes into five classes, corresponding to Aristotle's ontological categories: there are processes that cause change in location, in state, and in quantity; and that lead to the creation and destruction of substances. These broader categories are then subdivided into other ones, corresponding to different Levin classes, according to further differences in the causal processes they involve. I conclude by discussing the relevance of this argument to research in metaphysics and experimental philosophy. (shrink)

Pidgin languages are special reduced interlingual systems of communication created by the need to communicate between speakers of two or more different languages. They originate to fulfil certain communicative requirements, adapt to changes in these requirements, and disappear once they are no longer needed, for pidgin, by definition, are second languages, used by adults and not transmitted (except in the exceptional case of creolization) to a new generation of children. Pidgin languages are found in all parts of the world where (...) trade, warfare, colonialism or tourism has brought members of different speech communities into contact. The lifespan of some is no greater than the length of a summer holiday, others, such as Chinese Pidgin English, remained in existence for more than a century. Whilst for a long time pidgins were put in the category of “marginal languages” and their study correspondingly marginalized, in the most recent past, pidgin studies has become a fast growing and very respectable subfield of modern linguistics. The love-hate relationship which linguists, and indeed educators, historians and others, have had with pidgin languages centres around what I am inclined to regard as their single most important characteristic: their changeability. Pidgins, can be called the chameleons of the world's languages; they grow and contract with communicative requirements, they change their lexical composition to reflect the relative power of communicants, they change their speakers, and their geographical location and to their users look very similar to their own first languages. (shrink)

Environmental activism is crucial for raising public awareness and support toward addressing the climate crisis. However, using climate change mitigation as the cause for blockage, vandalism, and harassment activities might be counterproductive and risk causing negative repercussions and declining public support. The paper describes a dataset of metadata of 89 blockage, vandalism, and harassment events happening in recent years. The dataset comprises three main categories: 1) Events, 2) Activists, and 3) Consequences. For researchers interested in environmental activism, climate (...) class='Hi'>change, and sustainability, the dataset is helpful in studying the effectiveness and appropriateness of strategies to raise public awareness and support. For researchers in the field of security studies and green criminology, the dataset offers resources to study features and impacts of blockage, vandalism, and harassment events. The Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics was employed to validate the dataset. Consequently, the estimated result aligns with the Mindsponge Theory’s theoretical reasoning. (shrink)

Carey argues that the aspects of categorization that are diagnostic of deep conceptual structure and, by extension, narrow conceptual content, must be distinguished from those aspects that are incidental to categorization tasks. For natural kind concepts, discriminating between these two types of processes is complicated by the role of explanatory stance and the causal history of features in determining category structure.

Philosophers have long sought to explain perceptual constancy—the fact that objects appear to remain the same color, size and shape despite changes in the illumination condition, perspective and the relative distance—in terms of a mechanism that actively categorizes variable stimuli under the same pre-formed conceptual categories. Contemporary representationalists, on the other hand, explain perceptual constancy in terms of a modular mechanism that automatically discounts variation in the visual field to represent the stable properties of objects. In this paper I argue (...) that while the former view is unmotivated by empirical evidence, the later fails to account for inter- and intra-personal variability, the influence of expectations on constancy, and the systematic and normal failures of color constancy. A Bayesian approach that builds on the representational tradition in psychology solves both problems. (shrink)

This paper discusses the notion of necessity in the light of results from contemporary mathematical practice. Two descriptions of necessity are considered. According to the first, necessarily true statements are true because they describe ‘unchangeable properties of unchangeable objects’. The result that I present is argued to provide a counterexample to this description, as it concerns a case where objects are moved from one category to another in order to change the properties of these objects. The second description (...) concerns necessary ‘structural properties’. Although I grant that mathematical statements could be considered as necessarily true in this sense, I question whether this justifies the claim that mathematics as a whole is necessary. (shrink)

Stimuli that resemble humans, but are not perfectly human-like, are disliked compared to distinctly human and nonhuman stimuli. Accounts of this “Uncanny Valley” effect often focus on how changes in human resemblance can evoke different emotional responses. We present an alternate account based on the novel hypothesis that the Uncanny Valley is not directly related to ‘human-likeness’ per se, but instead reflects a more general form of stimulus devaluation that occurs when inhibition is triggered to resolve conflict between competing stimulus-related (...) representations. We consider existing support for this inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and further assess its feasibility through tests of two corresponding predictions that arise from the link between conflict-resolving inhibition and aversive response: 1) that the pronounced disliking of Uncanny-type stimuli will occur for any image that strongly activates multiple competing stimulus representations, even in the absence of any human-likeness, and 2) that the negative peak of an ‘Uncanny Valley’ should occur at the point of greatest stimulus-related conflict and not (in the presence of human-likeness) always closer to the ‘human’ end of a perceptual continuum. We measured affective responses to a set of line drawings representing nonhuman animal-animal morphs, in which each continuum midpoint was a bistable image (Exp. 1), as well as to sets of human-robot and human-animal computer-generated morphs (Exp. 2). Affective trends depicting classic Uncanny Valley functions occurred for all continua, including the nonhuman stimuli. Images at continua midpoints elicited significantly more negative affect than images at endpoints, even when the continua included a human endpoint. This illustrates the feasibility of the inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and the need for further research into the possibility that the strong dislike of Uncanny-type stimuli reflects the negative affective consequences of cognitive inhibition. (shrink)

This study considers the role of different cognitive units in sound change: phonemes, contextual variants and words. We examine /u/-fronting and /j/-dropping in data from three generations of Derby English speakers. We analyze dynamic formant data and auditory judgments, using mixed effects regression methods, including generalized additive mixed models (GAMMs). /u/-fronting is reaching its end-point, showing complex conditioning by context and a frequency effect that weakens over time. /j/-dropping is declining, with low-frequency words showing more innovative variants with /j/ (...) than high-frequency words. The two processes interact: words with variable /j/-dropping (new) exhibit more fronting than words that never have /j/ (noodle) even when the /j/ is deleted. These results support models of change that rely on phonetically detailed representations for both word- and sound-level cognitive units. (shrink)

This paper considers a principal concept of metaphysics – the category of substance – as it figures in Kant’s critical program of establishing metaphysics as a science. Like Leibniz, Kant identifies metaphysical concepts through logical reflection on the form of cognitive activity. He thus begins with general logic’s account of categorical judgment as an act of subordinating predicate to subject. This categorical form is then considered in transcendental logic with reference to the possibility of its real use. Transcendental reflection (...) reveals that the categorical form, in its potential for such use, constitutes the category of substance and accident, representing a first real subject and a determination of its existence. But to qualify for objective, scientific employment, metaphysics’ concepts must admit of real definitions, which show their objects to be possible, and such possibility, pace Leibniz, can be established only in relation to possible experience. Thus, relying on his doctrine of the schematism, Kant shows the category to figure constitutively in experience, as the ground of the first law of nature, that in all change substance persists. (shrink)

I argue that Sarah Sawyer's and Herman Cappelen's recent accounts of how speakers talk and think about the same concept or topic even when their understandings of that concept or topic substantially diverge risk multiplying our metasemantic categories unnecessarily and fail to prove explanatory. When we look more closely at our actual practices of samesaying, we find that speakers with seemingly incompatible formulations of a subject matter take one another to samesay when they are attempting to arrive at a correct (...) understanding of that subject matter. These speakers adopt what I call a prospective externalist perspective on the subject matter in question. I then argue that there are contexts where judgments of samesaying are more routinely defeated because speakers are taking up a perspective I call retrospective internalism. From this perspective, speakers are aiming to render maximally intelligible the linguistic behavior of other speakers that appear to them to deviate from their own. Whether or not we count speakers as samesaying with us will therefore depend on the kind of the perspective we adopt. Different perspectives, it will turn out, often yield different verdicts. On my perspective-based approach, there is no need to hypostatize or inflate our metasemantic taxonomies. (shrink)

The current conception of the plurality of worlds is founded on a set theoretic understanding of possibilia. This paper provides an alternative category theoretic conception and argues that it is at least as serviceable for our understanding of possibilia. In addition to or instead of the notion of possibilia conceived as possible objects or possible individuals, this alternative to set theoretic modal realism requires the notion of possible morphisms, conceived as possible changes, processes or transformations. To support this alternative (...) conception of the plurality of worlds, I provide two examples where a category theoretic account can do work traditionally done by the set theoretic account: one on modal logic and another on paradoxes of size. I argue that the categorial account works at least as well as the set theoretic account, and moreover suggest that it has something to add in each case: it makes apparent avenues of inquiry that were obscured, if not invisible, on the set theoretic account. I conclude with a plea for epistemological humility about our acceptance of either a category-like or set-like realist ontology of modality. (shrink)

How do people gather samples of evidence to learn about the world? Adults often prefer to sample evidence from diverse sources—for example, choosing to test a robin and a turkey to find out if something is true of birds in general. Children below age 9, however, often do not consider sample diversity, instead treating non‐diverse samples (e.g., two robins) and diverse samples as equivalently informative. The current study (N = 247) found that this discontinuity stems from developmental changes in standards (...) for evaluating evidence—younger children chose to learn from samples that best approximate idealized views of what category members are supposed to be like (e.g., the fastest cheetahs), with a gradual shift across age toward samples that cover more within‐category variation (e.g., cheetahs of varying speeds). These findings have implications for the relation between conceptual structure and inductive reasoning, and for the mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning more generally. (shrink)

Two experiments show that action alters the shape categories formed by 2-year-olds. Experiment 1 shows that moving an object horizontally (or vertically) defines the horizontal (or vertical) axis as the main axis of elongation and systematically changes the range of shapes seen as similar. Experiment 2 shows that moving an object symmetrically (or asymmetrically) also alters shape categories. Previous work has shown marked developmental changes in object recognition between 1 and 3 years of age. These results suggest a role for (...) action in this developmental process. (shrink)

By comparing the argument in the first edition of Hegel’s Science of Logic with that of the second we find that he not only introduces significant changes but indicates why he found the changes necessary. As over time he rethought his method in the course of his annual lectures he realised that pure thought should not anticipate results but follow from the inherent sense of each term. The details of his logical method suggest how the novelties that emerge in history (...) can require the introduction of new modified categories. (shrink)

By comparing the argument in the first edition of Hegel’s Science of Logic with that of the second we find that he not only introduces significant changes but indicates why he found the changes necessary. As over time he rethought his method in the course of his annual lectures he realised that pure thought should not anticipate results but follow from the inherent sense of each term. The details of his logical method suggest how the novelties that emerge in history (...) can require the introduction of new modified categories. (shrink)

Like belief revision, conceptual change has rational aspects. The paper discusses this for predicate change. We determine the meaning of predicates by a set of imaginable instances, i.e., conceptually consistent entities that fall under the predicate. Predicate change is then an alteration of which possible entities are instances of a concept. The recent exclusion of Pluto from the category of planets is an example of such a predicate change. In order to discuss predicate change, (...) we define a monadic predicate logic with three different kinds of lawful belief: analytic laws, which hold for all possible instances; doxastic laws, which hold for the most plausible instances; and typicality laws, which hold for typical instances. We introduce predicate changing operations that alter the analytic laws of the language and show that the expressive power is not affected by the predicate change. One can translate the new laws into old laws and vice versa. Moreover, we discuss rational restrictions of predicate change. These limit its possible influence on doxastic and typicality laws. Based on the results, we argue that predicate change can be quite conservative and sometimes even hardly recognisable. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es dar una mirada a la manera en que Roig opera en los ámbitos categoriales. Nuestro propósito es observar cómo el autor critica, confecciona, articula, utiliza, crea y entrelaza categorías, es decir, hemos querido hacer un alto en los procedimientos estructurales de su filosofar, en sus operaciones. Sostenemos como hipótesis que el rearme categorial al que Roig apela en múltiples pasajes de su obra implica, como operación de base, un cambio en el reconocimiento del lugar (...) de enunciación, y que éste se juega en parte importante en el empadronamiento de las categorías. Distinguimos al menos cinco operaciones categoriales en su trabajo reflexivo, las cuales pueden rastrearse a lo largo de toda su obra: (1) rescate, (2) crítica (3) reemplazo, (4) reelaboración e (5) invención. The aim of this work is to give a glance to the way in which Roig operates at categorical levels. Our intention is to observe how the author criticizes, makes, articulates, uses, creates and interlaces categories, that is to say, we wanted to take a break in the structural procedures of his philosophising, in his processes. We support as hypothesis that the categorical rearmament to that Roig appeals in multiple passages of his work involves, as a base operation, a change in the recognition of the place of enunciation, and that it plays an important part in the registration of the categories. We distinguish at least five categorical operations in his reflective work, which can be traced back throughout all his work: (1) rescue, (2) critique, (3) replacement, (4) re-elaboration and (5) invention. (shrink)

Natural language contains many examples of sound-symbolism, where the form of the word carries information about its meaning. Such systematicity is more prevalent in the words children acquire first, but arbitrariness dominates during later vocabulary development. Furthermore, systematicity appears to promote learning category distinctions, which may become more important as the vocabulary grows. In this study, we tested the relative costs and benefits of sound-symbolism for word learning as vocabulary size varies. Participants learned form-meaning mappings for words which were (...) either congruent or incongruent with regard to sound-symbolic relations. For the smaller vocabulary, sound-symbolism facilitated learning individual words, whereas for larger vocabularies sound-symbolism supported learning category distinctions. The changing properties of form-meaning mappings according to vocabulary size may reflect the different ways in which language is learned at different stages of development. (shrink)

"Why are there 'transsexuals' but not 'transracials'?" "Why is there an accepted way to change sex, but not to change race?" I have repeatedly heard these questions from theorists puzzled by the phenomenon of transsexuality. Feminist thinkers, in particular, often seem taken aback that in the case of category switching the possibilities appear to be so different. Behind the question is sometimes an implicit concern: Does not the (hypothetical or real) example of individual “transracialism” seem politically troubling? (...) And, if it is, does not the case of transsexuality merit equivalent critique? Or, conversely, if one accepts transsexuals as people with legitimate demands (e.g., on medical resources or single-sex spaces), then would one not also be committed to accepting the putative transracial in analogous ways? Understanding the ontological constraints and possibilities with regard to transforming one’s identity is, I suggest, a project that should accompany ethical evaluation of those transformations. Under what circumstances is it (un)ethical to leave behind a gender or racial group with which one has once been affiliated? This question is, again, especially pressing for radical thinkers who endorse the claims that race and gender taxonomies are internally hierarchical and constituted through relations of oppression, domination, and normalization. Changing one’s identity under these circumstances will surely always be linked, however tenuously, to consideration of the larger political and cultural milieu in which such changes are advantageous or disadvantageous, complicit with oppressive norms and/or resistant to them. To illuminate these larger questions, in this paper, I first provide three examples of the analogy thesis in feminist thinking about race and sex change, each of which draws ethical conclusions about individual motivation, political strategy, or public policy, premised on the assumption that race and sex change are equivalent phenomena. None of these accounts consider the genealogy of each category as significant to contemporary possibilities. I next offer a descriptive analysis that highlights different norms at play in contemporary North American understandings: Sex–gender, I argue, is essentialized as a property of the individual’s body, while race is essentialized with reference to both the body and ancestry. This analysis, I conclude, shows politically significant disanalogies between the categories, and reveals the importance of genealogical accounts of race and sex in thinking ethically about changing ourselves. (shrink)

Narrative analysis is well established as a means of examining the subjective experience of those who suffer chronic illness and cancer. In a study of perceptions of the outcomes of treatment of cancer of the colon, we have been struck by the consistency with which patients record three particular observations of their subjective experience: the immediate impact of the cancer diagnosis and a persisting identification as a cancer patient, regardless of the time since treatment and of the presence or absence (...) of persistent or recurrent disease; a state of variable alienation from social familiars, expressed as an inability to communicate the nature of the experience of the illness, its diagnosis and treatment; and a persistent sense of boundedness, an awareness of limits to space, empowerment and available time. These subjectivities were experienced in varying degree by all patients in our study. Individual responses to these experiences were complex and variable. The experiences are best understood under the rubric of a category we call “liminality”. We believe that all cancer patients enter and experience liminality as a process which begins with the first manifestations of their malignancy. An initial acute phase of liminality is marked by disorientation, a sense of loss and of loss of control, and a sense of uncertainty. An adaptive, enduring phase of suspended liminality supervenes, in which each patient constructs and reconstructs meaning for their experience by means of narrative. This phase persists, probably for the rest of the cancer patient’s life. The experience of liminality is firmly grounded in the changing and experiencing body that houses both the disease and the self. Insights into the nature of the experience can be gained from the Existentialist philosophers and from the history of attitudes to death. Understanding liminality helps us to understand what it is that patients with cancer seek from the system to which they turn for help. Its explication should therefore be important for those who provide health care, those who educate health care workers and those concerned to study and use outcomes as administrative and policy making instruments. (shrink)

In an effort to delineate a more plausible account of political change, this paper reads Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory as a corrective to exaggerated enthusiasm about the emancipatory force of reflection. This revised account valorizes both Bourdieu’s insights into the acquired, embodied, durable nature of the political habitus and judgment theorists’ trust in individuals’ reflection as a perpetual force of novelty and spontaneity in the public sphere of democratic societies. The main purpose of this exercise is to reveal the (...) mix of continuity and discontinuity that is characteristic of most transformations in the political common sense of democratic societies. In other words, this paper seeks to offer a more complex understanding of the inertial character of reflective judgment and of the difficulty of shifting the categories that define the political common sense. By cross-pollinating the ever-growing literature on reflective judgment and Bourdieu’s sombre theory of politics, we can better calibrate our expectations regarding the possibilities of significant democratic transformation in late capitalist societies. (shrink)

The concept of "nature as inner principle of change" is fundamental to Aristotle's theory of the physical world; it is the object of the present thesis to substantiate this claim by tracing the effects of this idea in Aristotle's rejection of materialism, in his doctrine of "natural places", in his definition of change and process in general, and in his notion of agency in general and the supreme Unmoved Mover in particular ). Aristotle elucidates "natural" by. contrast with (...) "artificial" - ), holding that natural substances not merely collectively - ) but as individuals each possess an 'innate impulse of change'. But this must be explained so as to allow for the fact that no change is entirely independent of external conditions - ). If, however, change were totally dependent on external conditions, its occurrence would be inexplicable - ), and the very concept of "change" would be incoherent. This latter conclusion emerges from an examination of the ancient paradox of becoming and Aristotle's treatment of it - ). The paradox is expounded -). Aristotle answers it by showing that language assumes a continuing subject of change - ). But this assumption meets the problem only if the metaphysical category of substance is also assumed, and along with it some distinction between substance-constitutive and non-substance-constitutive characteristics - ). The former mark off their subject as a thing of a certain causal type; thus change, in presupposing a substantial subject, presupposes one that makes some causal contribution to its own changes - ). But Aristotle means more than this by 'nature as inner principle'. He holds a natural substance to be the autonomous determinant of certain changes; these therefore are "natural", as manifesting the substantial nature - ). This problematic notion is taken for granted by Aristotle in the Vhys-ics - ), but can be seen to rest on his metaphysic of substance. It is a consequence of this that the natural change of a given substance be of one kind and display a unitary pattern reflecting the unity of the substance ). This view cripples scientific method as we understand it ), but Aristotle's idea of substance anyway cuts him off from the approaches successfully operated in later mechanics and chemistry - ). A summary of the ground so far covered ) introduces a further sense in which Aristotle's natures are "inner" principles of change: the subject of change is not external to the being which is the source of change - ). (shrink)