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Cathrine V. Felix [3]Cathrine Felix [2]
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  1.  19
    A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How : Grasping Truths in a Practical Way.Cathrine V. Felix & Andreas Stephens - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (1):5-0.
    For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find a universally accepted way to do so. In this article, we offer a case study of how cognitive-science input can elucidate an epistemological issue that has caused extensive debate. We explore Jason Stanley’s idea of the practical grasp of a propositional truth and present naturalistic (...)
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  2. On Friendship Between Online Equals.William Bülow & Cathrine Felix - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 29 (1):21-34.
    There is an ongoing debate about the value of virtual friendship. In contrast to previous authorships, this paper argues that virtual friendship can have independent value. It is argued that within an Aristotelian framework, some friendships that are perhaps impossible offline can exist online, i.e., some offline unequals can be online equals and thus form online friendships of independent value.
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  3.  11
    A Cognitive Perspective on Knowledge How: Why Intellectualism Is Neuro-Psychologically Implausible.Andreas Stephens & Cathrine V. Felix - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (21):21-0.
    We defend two theses: Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and (...)
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  4.  2
    Review - Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya and Sergi Rosell (Editors) Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Mattias Gunnemyr & Cathrine Felix - 2016 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 20 (28).
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