This volume deals with the reception of Aristotle's natural philosophy in Oxford between 1250 and 1270.

Walter Burley is the author of a treatise, entitled De primo et ultimo instanti, which is regarded as the most popular medieval work on the problem of assigning first and last instants of being to permanent things. In this paper, however, the author does not deal with this treatise directly. She looks instead at Burley’s Physics commentary to see how he applies the ideas presented in De primo et ultimo instanti to the solution of an Aristotelian puzzle about the ceasing (...) to be of the present instant. In Burley’s interpretation, the relevant question raised by the puzzle is whether the present instant ceases to be when it is or when it is not. While Aristotle’s argument quickly dismisses the first alternative as absurd, Burley defends it by appealing to the ‘expositions’ of sentences about ceasing. Given that the sentence ‘this instant ceases to be’ has two expositions— ‘this instant now is and immediately afterwards will not be’ or ‘this instant now is not and immediately beforehand was’ —Burley maintains that the sentence is true in exposition but not true in exposition, so that an instant ceases to be when it is and not when it is not. (shrink)

La prima parte dello studio presenta una panoramica sulla vita e l'opera di Wylton, l'indagine poi verte sulla struttura e il contesto dottrinale della quaestio in esame , ed infine sulla dottrina della distinzione formale qui esposta. L'ampia appendice presenta un'edizione della quaestio, tradita nel ms Vat. Borgh. 36.

This report is divided into two main parts, devoted to the Aristoteles Latinus and to the Editions of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle. The report on the Aristoteles Latinus sheds light on recent research on medieval Latin translations of Aristotle’s works. Among other things, it discusses the editions published in the context of the Aristoteles Latinus , and some recent studies and collective volumes on individual texts and translators. The report on Editions of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle gives information for each (...) edition of a commentary on Aristotle that has been published in the last five years and on those editions that are about to be published or are in preparation or are planned to start within the next five years. (shrink)

"Geoffrey of Aspall, who died in 1287 and was master of Arts by 1262, was active at Oxford in the years 1255 to 1265. He wrote commentaries on several Aristotelian works, and was certainly a major protagonist of the introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford. In particular, he produced a very extensive question-style commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which contains important discussions of the fundamental topics of Aristotle's natural philosophy, like matter, form, natural agency, causes, change, the infinite and the continuum, (...) time, the eternity of the world, self-movers. Aspall's Physics commentary shows the influence of Grosseteste's metaphysics of light and of Roger Bacon's view on the physical role of intentional species, as well as a strong inclination to ontological realism. Aspall's commentary on Aristotle's Physics is edited here in two volumes, which together form the first critical edition of this work. The Latin text is accompanied by a facing English translation, and the text is extensively cross-referenced and provided with scholarly apparatus. The detailed introduction guides the reader through the intricacies of the textual transmission of Aspall's commentary, and also presents the main topics discussed in this commentary. The appendix to the edition makes available alternative versions of some sections of Aspall's commentary." --. (shrink)

Geoffrey of Aspall, who died in 1287 and was master of Arts by 1262, was active at Oxford in the years 1255 to1265. He wrote commentaries on several Aristotelian works, and was certainly a major protagonist of the introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford. In particular, he produced a very extensive question-style commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which contains important discussions of the fundamental topics of Aristotle's natural philosophy, like matter, form, natural agency, causes, change, the infinite and the continuum, time, (...) the eternity of the world, self-movers. Aspall's Physics commentary shows the influence of Grosseteste's metaphysics of light and of Roger Bacon's view on the physical role of intentional species, as well as a strong inclination to ontological realism.Aspall's commentary on Aristotle's Physics is edited here in two volumes, which together form the first critical edition of this work. The Latin text is accompanied by a facing English translation, and the text is extensively cross-referenced and provided with scholarly apparatus. The detailed introduction guides the reader through the intricacies of the textual transmission of Aspall's commentary, and also presents the main topics discussed in this commentary. The appendix to the edition makes available alternative versions of some sections of Aspall's commentary. (shrink)

Lo studio prende in esame sei questioni di Thomas Wylton sulla visione beatifica e una questione dal Quodlibet di Siberto di Beka, carmelitano, contemporaneo di Wylton. Il saggio confronta in modo analitico le posizioni dei due autori sul ruolo e la necessità del lumen gloriae nella visione beatifica nelle singole questioni di cui si dà a seguito l'edizione. I codici sono V’ = Vat. Borgh. 36; T' = Tortosa 88; S' = Vat. Borgh. 39. L'edizione, posta in appendice allo studio, (...) riguarda le seguenti porzioni testuali: Thomas Wylton, q. 2 [V', ff. 55va-56va]; q. 3 [V', ff. 56va-58ra]; q. 4 [V', ff. 58ra-va] T16 [T', ff. 46ra-48rb]; T19 [T', ff. 50ra-61vb]; T20 [T', ff. 61vb-62vb]; Siberto di Beka, Quodlibet, q. 16 [S', ff. 270va-272vb]. (shrink)

Thomas Wylton's Quaestio de anima intellectiva presents a controversial defence of Averroes' interpretation of Aristotelian psychology. The detailed introduction guides the reader through the transmission of the text, as well as the philosophical contents of one of the most significant medieval treatments of the nature of the soul.

Giles of Rome maintains that the senses are passive powers and more specifically receptive powers, that is, powers to receive something from sensible objects. The items that the senses receive from sensible objects are intentional species of the corresponding sensible forms. This paper deals with Giles’s account of the cognitive role of intentional species in sense perception. The central question is how the intentional species of red received in the eyes is related to the act of seeing a red apple. (...) Is such a species the act itself of seeing a red apple or rather something distinct from the act and causally related to it? And in the latter case, what kind of causality is involved? We shall see that Giles changed his mind on this subject, so that we have an early view and a mature view. His early view is that the intentional species is distinct from the corresponding sensory act and a cause of it, more precisely a formal cause. His mature view is that in the case of the external senses the intentional species is the same as the sensory act itself, whereas in the case of the internal senses two kinds of intentional species are involved, that is, that which is the same as the sensory act and another one that acts as a proxy for the sensible object. (shrink)

Giles of Rome maintains that the senses are passive powers and more specifically receptive powers, that is, powers to receive something from sensible objects. The items that the senses receive from sensible objects are intentional species of the corresponding sensible forms. This paper deals with Giles’s account of the cognitive role of intentional species in sense perception. The central question is how the intentional species of red received in the eyes is related to the act of seeing a red apple. (...) Is such a species the act itself of seeing a red apple or rather something distinct from the act and causally related to it? And in the latter case, what kind of causality is involved? We shall see that Giles changed his mind on this subject, so that we have an early view and a mature view. His early view is that the intentional species is distinct from the corresponding sensory act and a cause of it, more precisely a formal cause. His mature view is that in the case of the external senses the intentional species is the same as the sensory act itself, whereas in the case of the internal senses two kinds of intentional species are involved, that is, that which is the same as the sensory act and another one that acts as a proxy for the sensible object. (shrink)

L'A. analizza i problemi principali che caratterizzarono la polemica tra Wylton e Jandun sulla dottrina di Averroè relativa allo statuto ontologico del tempo. Rispetto alla posizione di Jandun, l'A. sottolinea l'importanza della distinzione fra tempo formale, inteso come atto mentale, e tempo materiale, identificato con il movimento, e individua nella teoria della realtà extra-mentale del tempo un motivo di originalità rispetto alla posizione soggettivizzante di Averroè. La posizione di Wylton, che l'A. definisce «realista», scaturisce invece dalla negazione degli elementi aristotelico-averroisti, (...) ed ha il suo punto di maggior originalità nel tentativo di riconciliazione di questa visione con quella aristotelica. Nell'appendice viene edita la quaestio XXX del IV libro delle Quaestiones super Physicam di Tommaso Wylton, basandosi sui mss. Cesena, Malatestiana, Pl. VIII sin. 2; Madrid, BN, 2015; Vat. lat. 4709. (shrink)

La prima parte dell'articolo è stata pubblicata nella stessa rivista 2 443-501, cfr. MEL XIV 3554. La classificazione e l'ordinamento delle argomentazioni e delle soluzioni presenti nei commenti esaminati si fondano sulla distinzione di due concetti di infinito: l'infinito nel continuo e l'infinito nel numero. Segue un'analisi del problema relativo al confronto degli infiniti, un tema presente in molti dei commenti presi in esame. In Appendice viene fornito un elenco delle questioni relative a Fisica III, 4-8, ordinate, per temi dottrinali (...) o esegetici, in tre gruppi: 1) caratteristiche generali dell'infinito; 2) l'infinito nella quantità continua; 3) l'infinito nella quantità discreta. L'A. rileva che nelle trattazioni studiate è assente un'analisi specifica della nozione d'infinito. I commentatori non solo usano il termine «infinito» senza specificarne il significato, ma sembrano essere anche del tutto inconsapevoli di alcune difficoltà che, nella dottrina aristotelica, derivano dall'uso ambiguo del termine. Tali trattazioni arricchiscono tuttavia il dibattito sull'infinito sia attraverso la discussione di problemi non affrontati da Aristotele sia per la varietà di argomenti ed esempi formulati per spiegare le principali tesi di Fisica III, 4-8. (shrink)

Sono presi in esame otto commenti per questioni sulla Physica . L'analisi si concentra sui due temi principali del III libro della Physica: il movimento e l'infinito. La sezione introduttiva esamina le affinità tra le diverse opere, suddividendole in gruppi e proponendo una cronologia relativa. Viene offerta in seguito un'analisi comparativa della trattazione del movimento presente in questi commenti, da cui risulta l'esistenza di una corrente inglese che si mostra incline a respingere la teoria averroista del movimento.

Si tratta della fase successiva di una ricerca condotta dall'A. sulle quaestiones sul libro III della Fisica contenuto in un gruppo di otto commenti di probabile origine inglese risalenti al periodo 1250-1270 e già pubblicata nella stessa rivista. Nel presente saggio l'A. prende in considerazione le questiones sul libro IV e si occupa principalmente del contesto dottrinale dei commenti e dei rapporti sussistenti tra essi. Nella seconda parte dello studio, che apparirà nel numero 9 del 1998 della stessa rivista, saranno (...) descritti i modi della trattazione degli argomenti affrontati da Aristotele nel libro IV quali il tempo, il vuoto e il luogo. In appendice viene pubblicata la lista delle quaestiones sul IV della Fisica che sono contenute nei commenti considerati e vengono raccolte in tre gruppi in base al tema affrontati tra quelli sopracitati. (shrink)

In a passage of De Anima II, chapter 12, Aristotle makes a general claim about the senses, which is condensed in the formula that the senses are receptive of the sensible forms without the matter. While it is clear that this formula must play an important theoretical role in Aristotle’s account, it is far from clear what it exactly means. Its interpretation is still a focus of controversy among contemporary scholars. In this article the author presents the exegeses of this (...) formula proposed by the two most authoritative commentators on De anima from the second half of the thirteenth century, namely, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome. Both commentators assume that with this formula and in particular with the qualification “without the matter” Aristotle intends to characterize an “intentional” reception of a form, and to contrast it with a “natural” reception, but they give different accounts of intentionality. (shrink)

In his Physics commentary, Thomas Wylton reports and rejects an opinion about time that posits the existence of minimal times conceived of as indivisible parts of time. This opinion is in contrast with the view that time is continuous, the predominant view in the late Middle Ages. In this paper I first explain the notion of minimal time. I then focus on the relation between the existence of minimal times and the existence of minima naturalia in the extension of natural (...) bodies. In particular, I present the two ways in which the author of the opinion in question deduces the existence of minimal times from the existence of minima naturalia in the extension of natural bodies. I also briefly present the reaction of Wylton against this opinion. I finally explain how in this opinion the position of minimal times is relevant to the problem of the existence of time. The Appendix to the paper contains Wylton's report of the opinion about minimal times. (shrink)