Nová kniha Petra Koláře, Pravda a fakt (Filosofia, Praha, 2002) je věnována tématu, kterým se Kolář částečně zabýval již ve své předchozí knize: teoriím pravdivosti a zejména teorii korespondenční. Diskuse o tom, jak explikovat pojem pravdy či pravdivosti se analytickou filosofií táhnou od jejích počátků, a rozdmychány byly zejména výsledky Tarského matematických analýz tohoto pojmu1. Kolář v první části knihy probírá a srovnává hlavní kategorie těch teorií, které jsou výsledky těchto diskusí (některé z nich samozřejmě tak či onak existovaly dávno (...) před Tarskim): dělí je na korespondenční, koherenční, pragmatistické, minimalistické, redundanční a sémantické (tou poslední je de facto původní Tarského varianta). Způsobu, jak Kolář tyto teorie vykládá, lze, myslím, vytýkat skutečně pramálo: jeho výklad je systematický, jasný a názorný. Také shrnutí na koncích jednotlivých kapitol jsou velice užitečná a dokumentují autorovu pedagogickou pečlivost. Přesto bych si k této části dovolil mít dvě drobné a jednu zásadnější připomínku. Zaprvé se mi nezdá příliš adekvátní, jak Kolář používá termíny deflacionismus a minimalismus: za deflacionistickou prohlašuje každou teorii, která rezignuje na explikaci pojmu pravdy, takže mu do této kolonky spadne jak horwichovský minimalismus, tak davidsonovský názor, že pojem pravdy nelze explikovat ne proto, že by byl triviální, ale naopak proto, že je příliš fundamentální (tady se dere na jazyk termín maximalismus). To se ale těžko slučuje s Davidsonovým výslovným odmítáním deflacionismu2. Zdá se mi, že termín deflacionismus je spíše víceméně synonymní s termínem minimalismus a ty oba se mi zdají do velké míry krýt i s redundanční teorií. Druhou drobnou výhradou je, že mi připadá škoda, že Kolář v rámci pojednávání pragmatistických teoriích zcela pominul současný pragmatismus. Škoda to je pro to, že pragmatismus v současné době zažívá velký revival a i různé pragmatistické teorie pravdivosti se proto dostávají na pořad dne (včetně například kontextu matematiky). Za.... (shrink)

This paper argues that the idea of a computer is unique. Calculators and analog computers are not different ideas about computers, and nature does not compute by itself. Computers, once clearly defined in all their terms and mechanisms, rather than enumerated by behavioral examples, can be more than instrumental tools in science, and more than source of analogies and taxonomies in philosophy. They can help us understand semantic content and its relation to form. This can be achieved because they have (...) the potential to do more than calculators, which are computers that are designed not to learn. Today’s computers are not designed to learn; rather, they are designed to support learning; therefore, any theory of content tested by computers that currently exist must be of an empirical, rather than a formal nature. If they are designed someday to learn, we will see a change in roles, requiring an empirical theory about the Turing architecture’s content, using the primitives of learning machines. This way of thinking, which I call the intensional view of computers, avoids the problems of analogies between minds and computers. It focuses on the constitutive properties of computers, such as showing clearly how they can help us avoid the infinite regress in interpretation, and how we can clarify the terms of the suggested mechanisms to facilitate a useful debate. Within the intensional view, syntax and content in the context of computers become two ends of physically realizing correspondence problems in various domains. (shrink)

Millions of animals are used every year in oftentimes extremely painful and distressing scientific procedures. Legislation of animal experimentation in modern societies is based on the supposition that this is ethically acceptable when certain more or less defined formal (e.g. logistical, technical) demands and ethical principles are met. The main parameters in this context correspond to the “3Rs” concept as defined by Russel and Burch in 1959, i.e. that all efforts to replace, reduce and refine experiments must be undertaken. The (...) licensing of animal experiments normally requires an ethical evaluation process, oftentimes undertaken by ethics committees. The serious problems in putting this idea into practice include inter alia unclear conditions and standards for ethical decisions, insufficient management of experiments undertaken for specific (e.g. regulatory) purposes, and conflicts of interest of ethics committees’ members. (shrink)

I compare Stalnaker’s early take on assertoric content with the one expressed in his recent book (2014). I discern in the latter some striking implications about the semantics of proper names and assertoric content’s relation to semantics.

While—like all artistic forms—it allows for deviation from this standard rule, rap is heavily reliant on building blocks of sixteen bars and a refrain. In addition, rhyme plays a prominent role in structuring rap, which is why the form is also colloquially referred to as “rhyming.” In view of this, Billy Woods’s record Today, I Wrote Nothing was a considerable departure from the existing rap norm. On the record, Woods stylistically adapted a collection of works by Russian absurdist writer Daniil (...) Kharms, which was also called Today, I Wrote Nothing. Kharms was known for writing short prose without any formal structure. Most of his stories deal with absurd situations and slapstick humour. The structure of the fragmented fiction is adapted into rap on Woods’s record. The long rap verses are replaced by short songs without any specific narrative. The record maintains the non-structure of Kharms’s writing, as well as its absurdity, but it abandons any semblance of traditional rap. The second important stylistic and structural choice made in Woods’s record was the integration of aspects of Flannery O’Connor’s writing, particularly its humour and darkness. The article will focus on how Billy Woods integrates intertextuality into his lyrics to give the songs additional layers of meaning. (shrink)

[What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] Summary: The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Most philosophers nowadays assume that the focus of the philosophy of consciousness, its shared explanandum, is a certain property of experience variously called “phenomenal character,” “qualitative character,” “qualia” or “phenomenology,” understood in terms of what it is like to undergo the experience in question. Consciousness as defined in (...) terms of its phenomenal aspect is often called “phenomenal consciousness.” The major issue that occupies most thinkers is whether this phenomenal character happens to be a physical property, or whether it is rather sui generis. Those who believe the former are materialists; those who conclude the latter are dualists. As the currently dominant metaphysic is materialism – also sometimes called physicalism – the challenge appears to be to slot phenomenal properties among the physical properties that ultimately make up the world. David Chalmers argued powerfully that we can go very far in situating many mental properties in the physical world – namely, the properties that can be understood in functional terms – but that phenomenal properties resist such a treatment. Chalmers calls this “the hard problem” of consciousness. But there are also some quite powerful positive arguments for dualism. The two most influential ones are the modal argument, also offered by Chalmers, and the knowledge argument invented by Frank Jackson. Chalmers invites us to conceive of creatures that are exactly like human beings – physically, functionally, behaviorally – only bereft of phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are conceivable, says Chalmers, they are metaphysically possible. And if they are metaphysically possible, materialism is false. Jackson, for his part, suggests we imagine Mary who has spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room and has seen the world through a black-and-white TV screen. But she also happens to know everything there is to know about the physics of color. And yet, Jackson suggests that once Mary is finally released from her room and sees a lawn outside, she learns something new: that this is what it is like to experience green color. The current work on consciousness is by and large characterized by attempts to answer these two dualistic arguments. I try to make sense of the positions within the domain of philosophy of consciousness by means of two major distinctions that mutually intersect. First, there is a distinction between dualism and materialism. An apparent third alternative currently on offer, the so-called Russellian monism, is unstable, collapsing into either dualism (panpsychism) or materialism (Russellian physicalism). Materialism comes in two main flavors: either the a posteriori physicalism, which detects an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical truths, hence denying that the former could be derived from the latter; or the a priori physicalism, which does not acknowledge any such obstacle. The second major distinction is between phenomenism and representationalism. It’s true that Ned Block, who introduced this contrast, meant to distinguish between two kinds of materialism. But I believe that the distinction actually intersects the one between materialism and dualism. We thus arrive at a table with six slots, representing six main positions in the philosophy of consciousness: (1) dualist phenomenism (Chalmers, the early Jackson, and Tyler Burge); (2) dualist representationalism (René Descartes); (3) aposteriori materialist phenomenism (Block); (4) a posteriori materialist representationalism (Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, David Rosenthal); (5) a priori materialist phenomenism (David Lewis); and (6) a priori materialist representationalism (Daniel Dennett, Derk Pereboom). However, this scheme is in fact somewhat misleading. It is true that Dennett is usually classified as an apriori materialist (or, more precisely an apriori materialist representationalist), but I believe that needs to be corrected. In order to understand why, I first analyze varieties of materialist representationalism in detail, in particular various construals of phenomenal character in terms of representation, or intentionality, which includes a discussion of the identity of its content (the issue of externalism). By contrast, Dennett rejects the concept of phenomenal character. Consciousness has no intrinsic, publicly inaccessible properties. On that ground, Dennett builds an empirical, fully functionalist theory of consciousness, which he also tries to integrate within a general Darwinian framework. From that point of view, one can contrast Dennettian and representationalist views on the issue of animal consciousness. In addition to his rejection of phenomenal character, Dennett also abstains from the regular metaphysical departure point of regular materialism. He does not so much ask how an enigmatic property of consciousness fits an antecedently characterized world, but rather how far we can investigate all aspects of the world, including consciousness, using the scientific method. He is thus a methodological naturalist, rather than a metaphysical materialist. While this approach removes obstacles to the science of consciousness, it does not solve what might be called “the hardest problem” – of intentionality, not phenomenal consciousness. The hardest problem consists in the fact that our intentional discourse involves conflicting commitments that prevent a coherent metaphysic of representational states. However, it does not follow that we should give up on this discourse as a theoretical means of reduction as well as a practical tool of explanation. But it might be that intentional discourse is a somewhat pseudo one. (shrink)

[Précis of What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] The paper provides a summary of my recent Czech-language book, WHAT IT'S LIKE, OR WHAT IT'S ABOUT? THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MATERIAL WORLD (2017). As suggested by the subtitle, the topic of the book is philosophy of consciousness. In the contemporary literature, most participants have in mind the so-called phenomenal characters, and the main issue debated between dualists and materialists is whether (...) these characters are material properties. Even the Russellian monists, who otherwise present themselves as an alternative to both dualism and materialism, accept the concept of phenomenal character. I express doubts about this concept in chapter six of my book; accordingly, I allot most space in the paper to the material from this chapter. Despite the majority opinion, I believe that no agreement has in fact been reached concerning the content of this concept. Similarly to Daniel Dennett, I recommend trying to develop a philosophy of consciousness without the concept of phenomenal character. As is well known, Dennett – to some extent similarly to the aforementioned materialists – proposes a reduction of consciousness in terms of representation. However, I wound up rather more skeptical than Dennett, since following up on my previous book, THE METAPHYSICS OF ANTI-INDIVIDUALISMU (2008), I claim that a naturalistic theory of representation is incoherent. (shrink)

Conditional excluded middle (CEM) is the following principe of counterfactual logic: either, if it were the case that φ, it would be the case that ψ, or, if it were the case that φ, it would be the case that not-ψ. I will first show that CEM entails the identity of indiscernibles, the falsity of physicalism, and the failure of the modal to supervene on the categorical and of the vague to supervene on the precise. I will then argue that (...) we should accept these startling conclusions, since CEM is valid. (shrink)

Lewis (1973) gave a short argument against conditional excluded middle, based on his treatment of ‘might’ counterfactuals. Bennett (2003), with much of the recent literature, gives an alternative take on ‘might’ counterfactuals. But Bennett claims the might-argument against CEM still goes through. This turns on a specific claim I call Bennett’s Hypothesis. I argue that independently of issues to do with the proper analysis of might-counterfactuals, Bennett’s Hypothesis is inconsistent with CEM. But Bennett’s Hypothesis is independently objectionable, so we should (...) resolve this tension by dropping the Hypothesis, not by dropping CEM. (shrink)

Quite a few results concerning the decidability of mereological theories have been given in my previous paper. But many mereological theories are still left unaccounted for. In this paper I will refine a general method for proving the undecidability of a theory and then by making use of it, I will show that most mereological theories that are strictly weaker than CEM are finitely inseparable and hence undecidable. The same results might be carried over to some extensions of those weak (...) theories by adding the fusion axiom schema. Most of the proofs to be presented in this paper take finite lattices as the base models when applying the refined method. However, I shall also point out the limitation of this kind of reduction and make some observations and conjectures concerning the decidability of stronger mereological theories. (shrink)

According to david lewis, When the conditional excluded middle is accepted for would-Asserting counterfactuals, It becomes difficult or impossible to define their might-Asserting counterparts. But I provide a definition of "might" counterfactuals that does agree with cem: a "might" counterfactual is true iff its consequent is true at some antecedent-World within a set whose membership is determined by appeal to various categories of possibility.

Tijekom svoje kratke filozofske profesure na Bečkom sveučilištu i u plemićkom zavodu Collegium Theresianum , ali i potom dok je bio profesorom teologije u Beču, isusovac Josip Zanchi, riječki plemić, četiri je puta tiskao svoj udžbenik Physica particularis, koji je sadržavao raspravu iz meteorologije. U svim je tim izdanjima izlaganje o uzroku dúge započeo povijesnom bilješkom, u kojoj je sažeto prikazao de Dominisov, Descartesov i Newtonov doprinos objašnjenju dúge. Potraga za Zanchijevim izvorom u optičkim i prirodnofilozofskim djelima objavljenim nakon Newtonova (...) djela Opticks otkrila je tri newtonovca koji su također spomenuli de Dominisa: Henryja Pembertona, Voltairea i Antonija Genovesija. Njima treba pridodati i četvrtoga: Pietera van Musschenbroeka, koji je de Dominisovu ulogu u povijesti istraživanja dúge opisao pod Genovesijevim utjecajem, ali tek u posmrtno objavljenom djelu Introductio ad philosophiam naturalem .Pri sastavljaju svoje povijesne bilješke o istraživanju dúge Josip Zanchi slijedio je Newtona ili nekog newtonovca. Tvrdio je više od Newtona jer je za njega de Dominis »prvi od svih otkrio pravi uzrok dúge«, pri čem je oprezno dometnuo videtur, a objektivnije je od Newtona i nekih newtonovaca opisao Descartesov doprinos. Kad je pak studentima objašnjavao dúgu, slijedio je posljednju riječ znanosti – Newtona.Uporabom Zanchijeva udžbenika Physica particularis s de Dominisovim optičkim i meteorološkim prinosom mogli su se susresti profesori i studenti filozofije i u Hrvatskoj. Taj su udžbenik posjedovale knjižnice na dvama isusovačkim filozofskim učilištima: u Zagrebačkom kolegiju najkasnije od 1758., a u Požeškom kolegiju najkasnije od 1769. godine.While teaching philosophy at the University of Vienna and the elite school Collegium Theresianum , but also theology in the same city, Josip Zanchi, Jesuit of noble birth from Rijeka, had published four editions of his manual Physica particularis, containing also a most comprehensive meteorological treatise. In each of the four Vienna editions his elaboration on the cause of rainbow opens a historical paragraph comprising a short survey of de Dominis’, Descartes’ and Newton’s contributions to the explanation of rainbow. Search for Zanchi’s source in the works dealing with natural philosophy published after Newton’s Opticks has brought to light three Newtonians who also mentioned de Dominis: Henry Pemberton, Voltaire and Antonio Genovesi. The name of Pieter van Musschenbroek should be added to this list. He described de Dominis’ role in the history of the explanation of rainbow under the influence of Genovesi, published posthumously in his work Introductio ad philosophiam naturalem .While composing his historical paragraph on the explanation of rainbow, Josip Zanchi followed in the footsteps of Newton or a Newtonian. He exceeded Newton by stating that de Dominis was »the first to have discovered the true cause of rainbow,« carefully employing videtur in support of his argument, his description of Descartes’ contribution being more objective than that of Newton or some Newtonians. However, in his academic lectures on rainbow, he followed the latest scientific discoveries – Newton.Through Zanchi’s manual Physica particularis, Croatian professors and students of philosophy could also have become familiar with de Dominis’ optical and meteorological contribution. This manual was available in the libraries of two Jesuit philosophical schools: Zagreb College or Collegium Zagrabiense, not later than 1758, and in Požega College or Collegium Poseganum, from 1769 at the latest. (shrink)

Özet Hz. Peygamber’in her hâlini bizzat müşahede edecek kadar yakın ve Kur’ân’ın ilk muhatapları olan sahabe neslinin örnek hayatı ve ilmi kişilikleri hakkında çalışmak, bilgi edinmek, Kur’ân’ı ve Rasûlullah’ı doğru anlamanın temel yöntemini teşkil eder. Abdullah ibn Mes’ûd, ilmi yönden zengin birikime sahip ve yaşantısı bakımından farklı bir kişiliği vardır. Müslüman olduktan sonra Rasulullah’ın yanından hiç ayrılmayan, her türlü hizmetinde bulunan, öyleki ehl-i beytten fark edilmeyecek kadar O’na yakın olan İbn Mesʿud, aynı zamanda hemen hemen bütün savaşlarda Rasulullah’ın yanında bulunmaktan (...) geri durmayan diğer taraftan Resulullh’tan sonra da Kur’ân ve İslâm’a hizmet eden ve müslümanları eğiten bir muallimdir. Kur’ân-ı Kerîm’e ve Arapçaya olan vukûfiyeti, başta kıraat olmak üzere tefsir, hadis ve fıkıh ilmine dâir derin bilgisiyle öne çıkmış ve isim yapmış olan Abdullah ibn Mes’ûd Rasulullah’ın övgüsüne mazhar olmuş ashabın büyüklerindendir. Abdullah ibn Mes’ûd’un Kur’ân’ın nüzûlünün neredeyse tamamına şahit olması ve Peygamber’in yakınında bulunması, Kur’ân ve Kıraat ilimler açısından çok önemlidir. Abdullah İbn Mesʿud’un kıraatı iki gruptan oluşmaktadır. Birincisi hemen birçok kıraat-ı aşere imamının senetlerinde yer alan ve üzerinde ittifak edilen sahih kıraatler, ikincisi de müfessirlerin tefsirlerinde ele aldıkları ve tefsir kabilinden izahatları, dil bakımından istişhadda bulundukları, ihticac için kullandığı veya sadece müteradif olarak ele aldığı ifadeleridir. Bu çalışmada kıraatini bizzat Hz. Peygamber’den alan İbn Mes’ûd’un kıraat ilmini elde ettiği yol ve alanları irdelenmiştir. Özellikle onun Hz. Peygamber’den Kur’ân tâʿlimi, Allah Rasûlu ve Cebrail’in katılımıyla gerçekleşen Kur’ân’ın arzına katıldığını söylemesi, genelde İslâmî ilimlere özelde Kıraat’a yaptığı katkı, cem, istinsah ve Mushaflar konusundaki tutumu, ashâbın onun kıraati hakkındaki sözleri ve görüşleri gibi konuları incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak birçok ilim dalında söz sahibi olduğu gibi Kıraat ilminde de imam olan büyük sahabi Abdullah ibn Mesʿdun kıratinin mahiyeti hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. (shrink)

Žižek as comedian: jokes in the service of philosophy.

Following its economic impact and rising popularity, ‘e-sports’ has become a theme within the academic debate on sports. The current discussion revolves around the definitions of sports provided by the philosophy and sociology of sports and how in turn, this can be adapted to e-sports. The premise of this article is the analysis of ‘institutionalisation’, which is claimed to be an element of modern sport. The governance and production aspects of e-sports will be the main focus where the nature of (...) video games with their fractured production process, the lack of a monopolistic international organisation and its relative novelty will be emphasised. Furthermore, the shaky ground on which the term ‘institutionalisation’ stands will be touched on. It will conclude that the current debate on the recognition of e-sports as a sport may experience certain pitfalls if it does not solve the fundamental problems regarding institutionalisation and ignores the production process of video games and e-sports. (shrink)

In rhetoric, an orator needs both a large vocabulary and a stock of commonplaces and arguments. Erasmus put them together in his De duplici copia verborum ac rerum . In this sixth volume of the first Ordo of the Amsterdam edition of the Latin texts of Erasmus, Betty Knott has edited the Latin text and added an English introduction and commentary, providing philological and historical information which helps the reader to understand the text and identify its sources.

Издание адресовано специалистам в сфере философии и эстетики.

В работе проведен сравнительный анализ терминологии грамоты и статута, выявлены и сопоставлены общие и родственные термины в контексте законодательств. Для специалистов.

Physical vacuum is a special superfluid medium. Its motion is described by the Navier–Stokes equation having two slightly modified terms that relate to internal forces. They are the pressure gradient and the dissipation force because of viscosity. The modifications are as follows: the pressure gradient contains an added term describing the pressure multiplied by the entropy gradient; time-averaged viscosity is zero, but its variance is not zero. Owing to these modifications, the Navier–Stokes equation can be reduced to the Schrödinger equation (...) describing behavior of a particle into the vacuum, which looks like a superfluid medium populated by enormous amount of virtual particle–antiparticle pairs. (shrink)

İslâm’da setr-i avret kadın ve erkek için farz olan hükümlerden biridir. Dinî/fıkhî bir terim olarak setr-i avret, vücudun şer’an/dinen örtülmesi gereken yerlerini örtmek, demektir. İslam hukukçuları, setr-i avretin namazın sıhhat/geçerlilik şartı olup olmaması hususunda ihtilaf etmişlerdir. Bu konuda biri cumhura, diğeri ise Mâlikîlere ait olmak üzere iki temel yaklaşım bulunmaktadır. Cumhura göre setr-i avret namazın sıhhat şartıdır. Dolayısıyla setr-i avret şartına riayet edilmeden kılınan namaz sahih değildir. Bu şekilde kılınan namazın vakit içinde veya vakit dışında mutlak olarak iadesi gerekir. Setr-i (...) avretin namazın sıhhat şartı olup olmaması ile ilgili Mâlikî mezhebinde ise iki yaklaşım bulunmaktadır. Birinci yaklaşım cumhur ile aynıdır. İkinci yaklaşıma göre ise setr-i avret İslâm’da genel bir farz olup ayrıca namazın sıhhat şartı değildir. Bu ikinci görüşü kabul eden Mâlikîlere göre namazda setr-i avret şartına riayet sünnettir. Diğer taraftan Mâlikî mezhebinde namazın sıhhatine etkisi açısından avret, avret-i muğalleza ve avret-i muhaffefe diye ikiye ayrılmaktadır. Setr-i avretin namazın sıhhat şartı olup olmaması ile ilgili ihtilaf avret-i muğalleza ile ilgilidir. Avret-i muhaffefenin namazın sıhhat şartı olmadığı hususunda ise ittifak vardır. Setr-i avretin namazın sıhhat şartı olup olmaması ile ilgili klasik fıkıh doktrinindeki ihtilafın bazı fıkhî semeresi/sonuçları bulunmaktadır. Nitekim cumhura göre ister avret-i muğalleza olsun ister avret-i muhaffefe olsun avreti açık olarak kılınan namaz sahih değildir ve mutlak iadesi gerekir. Maliki mezhebinde ise avreti muğalleza ve muhaffefe olmasına göre farklı görüşler bulunmaktadır. Vücutta açılan yerin avret-i muğalleza olması halinde; Setr-i avreti namazın sıhhat şartı kabul edenlere göre namaz sahih değildir ve mutlak iadesi gerekir. Setr-i avreti namazın sıhhat şartı kabul etmeyenlere göre ise namaz sahih olmakla birlikte vakit içerisinde iadesi müstehaptır. Vakit çıktıktan sonra ise namazın iadesi gerekmez. Vücutta açılan yerin avret-i muhaffefe olması halinde ise tüm Mâlikîlere göre ittifakla namaz sahihtir. Vakit içerisinde iadesi müstehap olmakla birlikte vakit çıktıktan sonra iadesi gerekmez. Setr-i avretin namazın sıhhat şartı olup olmaması ile ilgili klasik fıkıh doktrinindeki ihtilafın özellikle avret-i muhaffefe açısından uygulamadaki örnekleri ile ilgili şu söylenebilir: Setr-i avreti namazın sıhhat şartı kabul etmeyen Mâlikîlere göre kadınların başı, dizden aşağısı ve kolları açık namaz kılması sahihtir. Yine onlara göre avret-i muhaffefeden sayıldığı için erkeklerin uylukları/kalçaları açık namaz kılması sahihtir. (shrink)